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
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Economic Impact of Military Base Closings

Vol. I

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Prepared for the
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

(15) ACDA/E-90

(11) apr 1970

(12) 286p.1



Economic Impact of Military Base Closings.

Vol. I.

Adjustments by Communities and Workers,

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Prepared for the
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

195 450

This report was prepared under a contract with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The judgments expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or of any other department or agency of the United States Government.

PREFACE

This study was conducted for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) under contract number ACDA/E-90. It is one of a number of studies conducted for the Agency on the economic impact of defense and disarmament.

The study deals with the economic effects of a specific series of actions to reduce, consolidate, or terminate activities at military installations in the United States as announced by the Secretary of Defense on November 18, 1964. Actions to terminate or reduce activities at military installations are being undertaken on a continuing basis by the Secretary of Defense. The reference 1964 Announcement, however, was sweeping and dramatic in its implications. Eighty domestic bases were included and the number of civilian positions affected amounted to over 80,000--about four-fifths to be abolished another fifth to be transferred to other installations. The actions portended by the Announcement included the most sweeping series of closures ever covered by a single announcement. The Announcement of course was attended by considerable publicity and much alarm and protestation by a number of the local communities and states affected.

How much of the concern over the pending actions under the Announcement was justified? Did the affected communities actually undergo substantial changes in levels of economic activity? If not, why not? ACDA's purpose in this study was to explore these questions, even if precise answers could not be provided. Because the actions covered by the 1964 Announcement constitute the kind of comprehensive reduction in activities at military bases which might occur under a disarmament agreement, this information is particularly relevant.

The study concentrates on certain selected communities where the available data appeared to indicate that a "significant" impact might occur. At the request of ACDA, the study also attempts to provide a broad-brush treatment of what happened to all the communities affected. At the further request of ACDA, the study takes one of the selected communities and endeavors to provide insights into the community reaction and response to the Announcement and related actions with particular emphasis on the manner of organizing a collective community effort to deal with the change. Finally, the study includes a separate analysis of the effects of the Department of Defense civilian personnel facing job loss or transfer to other areas. This analysis provides an indication of the flexibility of the Department of Defense and Civil Service as a whole to absorb Department of Defense contractions outside Washington without undue hardship to personnel.

The study was conducted under the broad direction of Darwin W. Daicoff of The University of Kansas. Chapter contributions were made by Marston M. McCluggage, Charles K. Warriner and Ronald R. Olsen of The University of Kansas and the following individuals from other universities and colleges in the country: David H. Clark and Josephine T. Crouse of The University of Maine, Guy G. Gordon of The University of Washington, Mark A. Haskell of New York University, Fred E. Johnson of The University of Alabama, Robert M. Lawrence and Theodore J. Taylor of Texas Technological College, and David W. Stevens of The Pennsylvania State University.

Appreciation is expressed for the support of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and for the guidance, aid, and suggestions provided by Henry D. Wyner of the Economics Bureau of the Agency who served as the Project Officer for the study.

VOLUME I

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INTRODUCTION

This research report consists of three phases. Phase I is a description of the impact of the actions and adjustment of the affected communities. It presents a brief over-all analysis of all 80 actions with in-depth emphasis on the effect of nine selected actions. The time frame of the analysis covers the period 1960 through 1967. Phase I of Volume I presents a summary of these effects, while Volume II provides comprehensive detail of nine actions. A synthesis of the detailed studies with emphasis on the community impact of these actions is also presented in Phase I.

Phase II presents an analysis of the social reaction and response of a particular community to a specific closure action--Schilling Air Force Base, Salina, Kansas. It is a study of that community's perception of the "crisis". This phase also describes the community effort which was undertaken in response to the "crisis" and pays special attention to the extent of resource mobilization to meet the perceived "crisis". In addition, it presents an analysis of plans and programs of community organization engaged in offset activity and, in this sense, is a study of the institutionalization of social response. The analysis begins at the date of the Announcement and continues through 1966. Portions of the analysis were subsequently reformulated to take into account some events which occurred in 1967.

Phase III presents a discussion and analysis of the employment impact which these actions had on Department of Defense civilian personnel. It analyzes the situation at three different levels: 1) DOD Civilian Personnel Reports present a description of the impact of civilian personnel at the installation where closure action was completed or well under way by mid-1967; 2) four of the installations for which the community economic impact was analyzed in Phase I were selected for a detailed analysis of worker

response to closure actions; and 3) data of the Centralized Referral System were utilized in order to describe and analyze the DOD placement system. This analysis covers a two and one-half year period beginning on the Announcement date.

In general the results of this study show that the individuals and communities affected by the Announcement adjusted without calamitous economic or social consequences. For example it was found that the change in employment growth was not related to either the magnitude or the timing of closure activity. In fact swift closure patterns were often associated with rapid community and individual adjustment. From a social viewpoint the adjustment in Salina was clearly aided by the character of the residents and may or may not be related to the variety of offset activities which the community organized. It was found that civilian workers often reacted and adjusted faster than the actual closure timetable prescribed; a circumstance that may have caused some difficulties for installation management and possibly impeded community adjustment. Consequently, it appears that there is little community benefit to be derived from a closure policy that provided long lead-time and lengthy closure patterns. These results must be viewed against the national economic conditions which prevailed from 1965 through 1967. A less robust national economy obviously would have made adjustment more difficult.

When qualified by the condition of the national economy, the findings of this project should provide a guide for the improvement of Federal government programs designed to facilitate the individual and community adjustment process to DOD action which will reduce DOD employment and/or other economic activity associated with particular installations. In this sense, this study of a 1964 action may claim current relevance. If the Federal government chooses to assume a similar degree of responsibility for the effects of changes in the level of activity of other government agencies or of large government contractors, this report may have even greater significance and relevance.

PHASE I: COMMUNITY IMPACT AND ADJUSTMENT¹

Introduction

The objective of this phase of the study is to present a description and analysis of the community economic impact of and adjustment to the reduction, consolidation or discontinuance of activities at 80 domestic military installations pursuant to the Announcement of the Secretary of Defense of November 18, 1964. This analysis is performed in three major sections. Section one presents an analysis of all 80 actions. An estimate is made of how many of the 80 actions are likely to have a serious economic effect. For those communities in which the effect may be anticipated to be substantial, a study of the relationship between the timing and the magnitude of the curtailment of Defense activity and the employment consequence on the affected communities is presented. The second section carries the analysis to nine specified actions selected for detailed study. The exact form of the actions, the scope and the method of their analysis and summaries of the detailed studies constitute Section two. Section three is a synthesis of the principle findings of the nine detailed studies contained in Volume II of this report. This synthesis falls into two parts:

1. community reaction to the closure Announcement--immediate public reaction and formation of local offset groups, and
2. longer range reactions to the closure process--impact on employment and housing sectors, re-use of installation facilities, the nature of the recovery of the communities and the use of lead time.

1. The report of this phase was prepared by Darwin W. Daicoff, The University of Kansas. He wishes to recognize the important contribution of Phyllis Saindon and William L. Stringer. The report has also benefited from the assistance of Bruce W. Macy, Midwest Research Institute, and Murray L. Weidenbaum, Washington University.

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Beside an overview of all 80 actions, nine areas of predicted substantial impact were examined in detail. The study is further concerned with actual or contemplated changes in the use of the land and the facilities subsequent to their release to the civilian sector. The community analysis of the nine areas presented herein is based primarily on data gathered at the separate localities by individual researchers in charge of each detailed study. The analysis utilized data for eight years--1960-67 inclusively. This time frame provides approximately four years before and four years after the Announcement upon which to base a time-series analysis. Stopping the analysis with 1967 was required by the limitations imposed on the study, not the least of which is the time lag involved in obtaining the necessary economic data.

While a total of 89 actions were itemized in the Announcement, only 80 were specific to a geographic area. The locations of these were such that only 64 separate communities (SMSA's or counties) were likely to be affected. By relating the number of displaced personnel to the population of the affected communities, the 64 areas are reduced to 15 in which a severe impact might be expected and 12 in which a moderate impact might be expected. After considering offsetting DOD actions 23 areas of impact remain--14 severe and nine moderate.

CONCLUSIONS

The principal conclusion of this study is that the communities affected incurred much less severe changes in economic activity than those which appeared to be anticipated by the publicity and concern generated by the November 1964 Announcement of the Secretary of Defense. The general level of economic activity in the Nation may well account for a major portion of the success that these communities have had in offsetting the effects of the installation closures. The adjustment experience might have been significantly different had the national economy been less robust.

After the Announcement some of the areas continued to experience employment growth while others declined. In general, those areas where the direct reduction of employment due to the installation closure represented five percent or more of the community's population, negative employment effects occurred. When the installation closure represented less than five percent, no consistent pattern of negative impact was detected. Furthermore, there does not seem to have been a relationship between the speed or the extent of curtailment of activities at the defense installation and the rate of employment growth in the 23 areas considered most likely to experience a major impact. Relatively little unemployment resulted from the actions for two reasons: a) great efforts were made to affect large scale transfers and relocation of civilian personnel; as a result the workers did not enter the local job market, and b) many local jobs were vacated by DOD personnel and their dependents; their positions became available to that small number of persons who became unemployed either as a direct or indirect result of the reduction in military activity. Thus with the aid of the DOD's relocation program, unemployment problems partially corrected themselves. While employment losses generally were not significant there sometimes was a community adjustment to the loss of the military installation rather than a community recovery. This occurred to the extent that the area often suffered a loss of economic diversification and/or the wages of the replacement jobs were commonly lower than the lost DOD jobs.

The community reaction to the Announcement typically followed the phases listed: 1) disbelief, 2) efforts to rescind the decision, 3) panic, 4) resignation to the inevitable and 5) decision that the closure was probably, in balance, advantageous for the economy. If military control remained at the installation long after the Announcement, the reaction usually included another phase (sometimes before and sometimes after phase 5): 4a) discontent with planning for the re-use of the facilities while they are still occupied by the military. If the military relinquished control, a final phase often occurred: 6) relative satisfaction after the negotiations ended.

A well publicized announcement of the closure action followed by a swift pattern of closure seemed to incite the townspeople to unite to work for the common goal of recovery from any forthcoming economic impact. This is in sharp contrast to the consequences of the earlier, quiet deactivation of certain missile facilities. A swift closure of an installation and a rapid transfer of its ownership to local authorities facilitated the community's efforts to recover from the economic impact of the closure. When the military retained control of the installation for considerable time after the Announcement, extreme difficulty was encountered by community effort to secure re-use of the facilities. The delay involved in military transfers left the city unable to act under its own authority in regard to matters concerning the facilities.

The larger metropolitan areas made the transition with considerable ease. The smaller, more isolated areas required a much stronger push from community action in order to secure replacement activities that would keep the level of employment high and would maintain a satisfactory degree of economic diversification in the community. Expansion of public programs often provided the first offsetting activities for the community. They are especially valuable as they often can be pressed into operation more quickly than can private enterprise. A united effort to attract private industry was necessary to provide permanent economic replacement for the installation's activities. In cases where large air strips were converted to municipal control, the increased availability of transportation and freight facilities acted as a positive attraction. In cases where incentives to new industry (including tax reductions, subsidies, extension of public utilities, or zoning concessions) were required, community-wide programs often were necessary in order to secure these inducements. The housing sector was a significant problem in each of the communities. The departure of DOD personnel created a serious disequilibrium in the housing market and, particularly, in the low-cost portion of that market. This resulted in great increases in vacancy ratios and subsequent deterioration; in addition mortgage defaults became much more common.

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At the date of Announcement the local military authorities produced data on the amount of spending in the communities for procurement and on military and civilian payroll. These were used to identify the magnitude of the reduction the community would face. In almost no instance were such data available for any extended time period. A relatively simple procedure should be established to develop those data for all military installations so as to facilitate analysis of the impact of military activity at the community level. While such data would be invaluable to an analysis of the adjustment process, the data would also provide the basis for an analysis of the role of the installation in the local economy.

All Actions

AN OVERVIEW

On November 19, 1964 the Secretary of Defense announced the most comprehensive program of action to discontinue, reduce, or consolidate activities at United States military installations yet announced by the Department of Defense. The Secretary announced that actions would be undertaken with respect to ninety-five military installations--eighty in the United States and fifteen overseas. Many of the installations to be affected--such as the Brooklyn Navy Yard and the Springfield Armory--were quite old and historic. This factor, together with the scope of the announced changes, brought about a great deal of publicity for the Announcement in the national press. It also brought upon Mr. McNamara and his Department considerable pressure from local forces and their representatives in Congress to change plans with respect to individual bases. Despite dire predictions that carrying out the plans would result in severe hardships for the affected communities, the Secretary remained firm; the indications are that no substantive changes were made in these plans because of these pressures. As was indicated in the Announcement, considerations of savings in defense costs were paramount, and it was stated that the expected savings would be in the order of \$477 million dollars and would permit personnel reductions numbering 63,401 and the release of 376,720 acres of military property for civilian use.

In addition to the 80 specific actions, nine miscellaneous actions were scheduled to affect domestic activities. These 89 actions when completed were scheduled to result in the dislocation¹ of 65,447 military jobs and 73,405 civilian jobs and

1. In some cases the action carried with it the elimination of a military activity per se. In other cases there was a movement of an activity to another location; this was not a job elimination but a job dislocation. Nationally job

in an annual savings of \$439.160 million. A summary of actions and a grouping by functional type of these 89 actions are presented in Table I. In terms of the total number of jobs dislocated, the scheduled closing of all the logistical operations at three depots ranks first; with a high concentration of dislocated civilians, these closures alone account for almost one-half of the total dislocations of civilian jobs. Second in size is the scheduled closure of six Strategic Air Command AF bases in which military jobs will account for the greatest portion of the dislocated jobs. A similar concentration of military jobs is present in the announced phase-out of obsolete missile systems and in the closure of five other AF bases. Ranking third in terms of total number of dislocations the three actions resulting in the reduction in naval shipyard capacity will involve a concentrated dislocation of civilian jobs. The three actions, which involve the Air Force, account for a majority of the military job dislocations--85 per cent. The scheduled closure of inactive Army training bases is important because of the release of 75,000 acres of land to other government agencies and private parties.

Because of the emphasis in this analysis on the community impact of the actions, the domestic actions have been reformulated from a functional basis to one based on geographic location. It was found that 64 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) or non-SMSA counties were scheduled to suffer a loss of civilian and/or military jobs. (See Table II.) While some of these areas were hit harder than others, only 34 per cent lost more than 1,000 jobs. Over half the areas lost less than 500.

If one were inclined to argue that the absolute size of the employment reduction would define the seriousness of the

elimination and dislocation are quite different. For any given community, however, this distinction may be trivial in that, if a DOD job no longer exists in the community, it is largely irrelevant to that community whether that job no longer exists or exists at some alternative location.

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TABLE I

**SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TO DISCONTINUE, REDUCE OR CONSOLIDATE CERTAIN DOD ACTIVITIES,
NOVEMBER 19, 1964, BY TYPE OF ACTION**

Action	Description	Number	Jobs Dislocated		Annual Savings (millions of dollars)
			Military	Civilian	
1.	Shipyard capacity reduction	3	322	17,874	42.8
2.	SAC base closures	6	28,649	3,362	73.5
3.	Missile inactivation	12	12,194	300	116.9
4.	Military ocean terminal closure				
5.	Arsenal closure	3	493	3,344	14.1
6.	Depot capacity reduction	2	23	3,360	6.4
7.	Inactive Army base closure	3	3,658	33,442	86.1
8.	Army consolidation	4	6	175	1.5
9.	DSA realignment	1	1,647	1,178	14.1
10.	Radar station closure	8	281	1,644	11.3
11.	Misc. Air Base closure	16	2,122	160	13.8
12.	Other	5	14,861	3,175	47.9
		26	1,191	5,391	10.6
	TOTAL	89	65,447	73,405	439.2

Source: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Announces Actions to Discontinue, Reduce, or Consolidate Activities, November 19, 1964.

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TABLE II

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TO DISCONTINUE, REDUCE OR CONSOLIDATE CERTAIN DOD ACTIONS,
NOVEMBER 19, 1964, BY SIZE, AT IDENTIFIED LOCATIONS

Number of DOD Jobs Dislocated by Each Action	Number of Locations	Jobs Dislocated	
		Civilian	Military
10,000 and over	3	4,712	40,813
5,000 - 9,999	6	23,409	17,756
3,000 - 4,999	6	19,276	3,060
1,000 - 2,999	7	4,455	6,427
500 - 999	12	6,567	2,617
Less than 500	30	2,382	1,481
TOTAL	64	60,801	72,154

Source: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Announces Actions to
Discontinue, Reduce, or Consolidate Activities, November 19, 1964.

action, he might be inclined to argue that a significant economic impact could be anticipated in 22, or certainly no more than 34, locations.

SEVERITY OF REDUCTION

The seriousness of the loss of a given number of jobs in a community is dependent largely upon the size and structure of the community. Without a detailed knowledge of the economic character of a community, it would be impossible to anticipate the extent to which the loss in DOD jobs was likely to be of major consequence to that community. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to relate the size of the layoff to the size of the local area. For surely a reduction of 1,000 jobs in Salina, Kansas would be more serious than a reduction of 1,000 jobs in New York City. It would probably be best to relate the actual reduction in the DOD workforce to the total employment. Ideally, this should be done for each community by relating the loss of DOD jobs for some time period to the total community employment for the same period. Unfortunately, data for this type of comparison are unavailable. The best that can be done is to relate population in 1960 to the scheduled DOD workforce reduction in 1964 and subsequent years.

There is no way to judge what percentage loss of employment would constitute a severe blow to a community. Because of this an arbitrary standard is employed in the subsequent analysis. For the purpose of this exposition, a job loss amounting to over three per cent of total population is judged to be severe, and a loss of one per cent is judged to be moderate. While these criteria are arbitrary, they are set low enough so as to err on the conservative side and thereby eliminate from consideration only those actions which are likely to have only a minimum economic consequence in the effected communities. The relationship thus developed between the number of DOD jobs eliminated and the population of the affected communities clearly shows that most of the communities face a potential loss that is minimal.

In only 15 of the 64 communities did the DOD employment loss exceed three per cent of the total population and thereby

qualify as an area of potentially severe impact. Extending the potential employment loss to one per cent, 12 more communities are added. These divisions of 15 and 12 are thus the areas of potentially severe and moderate impact.

The number of communities expecting a severe or a moderate effect should be further adjusted by eliminating those actions which are offset to a considerable extent by relocations of personnel and by other actions specified in the Announcement. For example, the loss of DOD jobs at Ellsworth AFB, Rapid City, South Dakota, accounts for more than one per cent of employment and thus would qualify under the moderately severe community impact criteria described above. The scheduled loss of the TITAN I Squadron, however, was offset by the scheduled gain of five SAC refueling aircraft and a fighter interception squadron. Four of the 27 communities have such offsets scheduled. Eliminating those communities from the analysis reduced the number of potentially severe impact areas to 14 and moderate impact areas to nine--a total of 23 communities. (See Table III.)

This study does not involve a detailed analysis of the economic consequences which resulted from the actions in each of the 23 areas. Some limited data are available, however, which will give a clue to the economic impact of the actions in these areas. Civilian employment data on a county or SMSA basis are available in County Business Patterns for the first quarters of 1959, 1964, and 1967.¹

It is postulated that a significant reduction in DOD jobs would lead to a similarly significant reduction in the number of private sector jobs and that this reduction should appear in the County Business Patterns data on employment. It should be noted that these employment data exclude civilian DOD

1. It would be preferable to use County Business Pattern data for 1968. Unfortunately these data were not available at the time of the writing of this report.

TABLE III

NUMBER OF COMMUNITIES WITH SEVERE OR MODERATE IMPACT, WITHOUT
OFFSETTING RELOCATIONS, BY RELATIVE SIZE OF JOB ELIMINATION

Eliminated DOD Jobs as a Percentage of 1960 Population	Number of Communities
5.00 and over	6
4.00 - 4.99	3
3.00 - 3.99	5
2.00 - 2.99	2
1.00 - 1.99	7
TOTAL	23

Source: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Announces Actions to Discontinue, Reduce, or Consolidate Activities, November 19, 1964. U.S. Bureau of Census, County Business Patterns, First Quarter, 1964 and 1967, Summary editions; U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1965, 1968, and U.S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book 1967 and 1962; U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1967, 1962.

workers and military personnel; therefore, these data reflect only the non-Defense employment impact of the curtailment of Defense activities. It was found that only two of the 23 communities experienced a decrease in employment from I-64 to I-67.¹ Thus whatever reduction in DOD activity occurred up to I-67 produced an observable economic consequence in only a small portion of the communities which were expected to suffer moderate or severe effects.

In addition to experiencing a loss of civilian employment as a consequence of the reduction of DOD jobs, a community may have failed to keep pace with its pre-Announcement growth rate. If this occurred, a relative loss may be said to have occurred even if total civilian employment rose after the Announcement. Such results did occur for just over one-half of the communities--12 out of the 23. (See Table IV.) That is, in 12 communities the growth of civilian employment between I-64 and I-67 was slower than the growth between I-59 and I-64. Assessing the 23 communities, two lost civilian employment; ten others experienced a slowdown in the rate of civilian employment growth; and 11 experienced a gain in the rate of civilian employment growth. It is important to note that the employment impact was severe only for that group of communities in which the scheduled dislocations represented more than five per cent of the population: two lost civilian employment; three others showed a slowdown in civilian employment growth; and only one showed an increase in civilian employment growth. Thus in terms of changes in civilian employment (with the exception of those six communities in which the dislocated jobs were most important relative to the size of the community) no uniformly serious affect can be shown to have resulted from whatever curtailment of DOD activity occurred. To say this differently, while a serious affect is likely in those communities in which the scheduled reduction

1. Throughout this report, particular quarters will be designated by Roman numerals and the year by Arabic numerals; thus, the first quarter of 1964 becomes I-64.

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TABLE IV

NUMBER OF COMMUNITIES CLASSIFIED BY RELATIVE EMPLOYMENT GROWTH AND SIZE OF REDUCTION

Eliminated DOD Jobs as a Percentage of 1960 Population	Employment Growth 1964-67 Relative to Employment Growth 1959-64	
	positive	negative
5.00 and over	1	5
4.00 - 4.99	2	1
3.00 - 3.99	3	2
2.00 - 2.99	2	0
1.00 - 1.99	3	4
TOTAL	11	12

Source: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Announces Actions to Discontinue, Reduce, or Consolidate Activities, November 19, 1964, U.S. Bureau of Census, County Business Patterns, First Quarter, 1964 and 1967, Summary editions; U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1965, 1968, and U.S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book 1967 and 1962; U.S. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1967, 1962.

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in DOD jobs account for five per cent or more of the population of the community; a job loss of between one and five per cent may or may not have caused a serious affect.

TIMING OF THE REDUCTION

In order to look at the experience of the 23 communities in a bit more detail, it is necessary to take into account both the magnitude and the timing of the reduction of DOD activity in these communities. Unfortunately the lack of time series data on the number of military personnel and on the amount of Defense installation spending in each of the communities causes the analysis to be restricted to the number of civilian DOD employees. Therefore, the number of civilian DOD employees is used as an indicator for the level of DOD activity. For exposition purposes three levels of DOD activity at the various installations are identified: 1) no significant change in the number of civilian DOD jobs from November 1964, 2) a level of civilian employment approximately one half the pre-Announcement level and 3) complete or nearly complete closure of the installation.

Since the latest available total employment data is for I-67 and since the magnitude and speed of closure is to be related to employment growth, the level of DOD civilian activity at each of the installations through 1966 is of relevance. For comparative purposes, the degree of closure was calculated for December 1965 and December 1966. For this analysis three degrees of closure were employed: 0 per cent (or no closure), 50 per cent and 100 per cent (or full closure). Using these two factors i.e., the two reference dates and the percentage decrease in civilian DOD employment, six situations exist: 1) no closure, 0 per cent December 1965 and 0 per cent December 1966; 2) slow partial closure, 0 per cent December 1965 and 50 per cent December 1966; 3) slow full closure, 0 per cent December 1965 and 100 per cent December 1966; 4) rapid partial closure followed by no change, 50 per cent December 1965 and 50 per cent December 1966; 5) rapid partial closure followed by full closure, 50 per cent December 1965 and 100 per cent December 1966 and 6) rapid full closure, 100 per cent December 1965. The 23

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bases were ranked in these six categories. Of these, eight showed no closure; four experienced slow partial closure; one had a slow full closure; two showed rapid partial closure followed by no change; two exhibited rapid partial closure followed by full closure; and six reached rapid full closure.

As has been discussed, 11 of the 23 communities grew more rapidly in the period I-64 to I-67 than they had grown in the period I-59 to I-64 and 12 communities grew less rapidly. It is now possible to relate this rate of employment growth to the magnitude and speed of the installation closure in each of these 23 communities. (See Table V.) It was found that in those communities which experienced a rapid complete closure or just an Announcement effect (no change in the level of installation operation through the end of 1966) about as many grew more rapidly as grew less rapidly; therefore, the degree or speed of closure seems completely unrelated to the rate of employment growth.

On the other hand a significantly different pattern was found for those communities that exhibited slow partial closure. All five of the communities that continued the level of base operation in December 1965 that they had at the date of Announcement, independent of whether they then fully closed or not, grew more rapidly after the Announcement than they had been growing prior to the Announcement.

In contrast to this all four of the communities in which the level of the installation operation in December 1965 was only 50 per cent of the level of operation at the date of Announcement, again independent of whether they then remained partially closed or fully closed, grew less rapidly than they had been growing prior to Announcement.

These preliminary analyses of both the magnitude and the timing of the reduction of DOD personnel showed no identifiable pattern in the employment consequences which resulted from the events following announced reduction of Defense activities in the 23 communities that were most likely to be hurt. It remains to submit selected areas of anticipated maximum impact to a further series of much more detailed analysis.

TABLE V

NUMBER OF COMMUNITIES CLASSIFIED BY PATTERN OF INSTALLATION
CLOSURE AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH

Closure Pattern	Rate of Employment Growth	
	Increase	Decrease
No Closure	3	5
Slow Partial followed by no change	4	
full closure	1	
Rapid Partial followed by no change		2
full closure		2
Rapid Full Closure	3	3
TOTAL	11	12

REVIEW

This analysis of all 80 actions produces some general conclusions. The most important of which is that, while some communities were significantly effected by the scheduled reduction of military activity in their area, most of the actions were small enough that they can be disregarded. Only when the installation closure represents a significantly large portion of the area's economy does there appear to

have been an impact on the rate of growth in the community. Peculiarly the speed of the closure seems rather unrelated to the rate of growth in these communities. We are thus left with the unsatisfactory conclusion that it is uncertain whether these effected communities actually suffered because of the reduction in defense spending or whether their economic experiences following the Announcement was related to other factors not considered which were strong enough to obscure the economic importance of the actions. It is also possible that the measures of economic activity employed in this analysis are so gross as to be insensitive to the changing economic conditions and thus obscure the real effect of the action. This leads to the necessity of looking at these closures in much greater detail so as to measure economic performance more accurately and to take into account these other factors that may account for the experiences of these communities. It is in this context that the detailed analysis of certain selected actions should make a significant contribution.

Selected Actions

DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC INSTALLATIONS

According to the requirement of USACDA a number of specific actions were singled out for detailed analysis. Originally this included 1) Hunter AFB, Savannah, Georgia; 2) Elwood unit of the Joliet Arsenal, Joliet, Illinois; 3) Schilling AFB, Salina, Kansas; 4) Dow AFB, Bangor, Maine; 5) New York Naval Shipyard, Brooklyn, New York; 6) Amarillo AFB, Amarillo, Texas; and 7) Larson AFB, Moses Lake, Washington. Because of subsequent DOD decisions it became clear that the economic affect of the closure of the Elwood unit and Hunter AFB would be minimal, as a result two additional actions were included in the study--8) Mobile Air Material Area, Mobile, Alabama and 9) Middletown Air Material Area, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

The November 19, 1964 closure Announcement and subsequent DOD documents contain the following information regarding these nine actions:¹

1. All functions of the Mobile Air Material Area (Brookley AFB) are scheduled to be phased out and transferred to other Air Force logistical bases by July 1969; the Base facilities will be retained for possible Defense uses--Mobile, Alabama--1,072 military and 12,003 civilian jobs dislocated.
2. MATS activities at Hunter AFB will be consolidated with other MATS units; Hunter will be closed and reported to GSA by July 1967, except for a small portion supporting a radar squadron--Savannah,

1. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Announces Actions to Discontinue, Reduce, or Consolidate Activities, November 19, 1964.

Georgia--5,136 military and 635 civilian jobs dislocated.

3. The Elwood unit of the Joliet Arsenal will be closed by July 1965 and maintained on standby status--Joliet, Illinois--6 military and 878 civilian jobs dislocated.
4. The B-47 Aircraft at Schilling AFB are scheduled for phase-out by April 1965; by July 1965 the refueling aircraft will be transferred; by July 1965 the Atlas F. Squadron will be inactivated, and the Base will be closed and reported to GSA--Salina, Kansas--5,016 military and 356 civilian jobs displaced.
5. The Strategic Air Command mission at Dow AFB will be consolidated at another AFB; the Air Defense Command Fighter Interceptor Squadron will relocate; the Air Material Guard use of Dow will continue--Bangor, Maine--4,237 military and 343 civilian jobs displaced.
6. Close New York Naval Shipyard except for the Applied Science Laboratory and Administration Building--Brooklyn, New York--165 military and 9,771 civilian jobs displaced.
7. All functions of the Middletown Air Material Area (Olmsted AFB) will be phased out and transferred to other Air Force logistical bases by July 1969; the facilities will be retained pending studies for other possible Defense use--Middletown, Pennsylvania--1,428 military and 14,096 civilian jobs displaced.
8. By June 1966, all SAC aircraft will be relocated from Amarillo AFB; by July 1968 all Air Force technical training activities will be relocated, and Amarillo AFB will be reported to GSA--Amarillo, Texas--5,566 military and 1,571 civilian jobs displaced.

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9. The Titan I Squadron at Larson AFB will be inactivated by April 1965; by July 1966 aircraft will be relocated, and Larson will be reported to GSA--Moses Lake, Washington--3,947 military and 388 civilian jobs displaced.

Regardless of the criteria employed by USACDA in selecting the communities for detailed analysis, their selection included communities with a large reduction of DOD personnel and a mix of communities involving different relative portions of military as opposed to civilian personnel, the size and location of the community which was likely to bear the brunt of the impact, the type of Defense installation whose activities were to be curtailed, and the scheduled date for the completion of the action. A balance was achieved between those actions that involved 1) large military, large civilian, and balanced job displacements; 2) SAC AF Bases, Depots, and Arsenals; 3) the scheduled date of the completion of the action; and 4) the geographic location of the affected community.

The installations differed in many respects. A great variation existed in the geographical areas surrounding the bases. Salina and Moses Lake are small communities and relatively isolated from other populated areas. The base-related population in these cities accounted for a large proportion of people in the immediate area. Likewise, Bangor and Amarillo are isolated communities but have a more substantial civilian population. Mobile is unique in that it is a large urban center and also has a large trade area; Middletown is near other large cities and urban developments. In these two cities the base was just another employer and not the dominant economic force in the community. Brooklyn, New York is obviously quite different from the other communities.

Salina, Moses Lake, Amarillo and Bangor were all sites of SAC installations--including excellent air strips and supporting airport facilities such as hangars, control tower and machine shops. They were equipped to handle a large number of military personnel and to maintain a large number of reliable, long-range aircraft. The function of the SAC bases dictated a large military component and a relatively

small civilian complement. Although some service facilities were maintained, the bulk of the non-airstrip facilities was housing. The depots at Harrisburg and Mobile had quite extensive permanent facilities for industrial and warehousing activities in addition to the housing and transportation facilities. These depots and the Navy Yard included a proportionally large civilian work force.

Seven of the nine bases selected for study are on the list of 23 actions expected to have the most severe economic consequences on the local communities. The nine actions account for 26,573 military and 40,044 civilian job dislocations. Subtracting the scheduled closure of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (because it will not close until 1975) from the 80 specific domestic actions, reduces the total dislocation to 60,651 military and 64,399 civilian jobs. Thus, the nine selected actions account for over half of the total jobs dislocated--about 44 per cent of the military and 62 per cent of the civilian. If significant economic consequences resulted from the actions of the November 1964 Announcement, they should show in the detailed analysis of the nine selected actions. If such consequences to closure are not evidenced, it would be fairly safe to generalize and to assume that only negligible economic consequences occurred as a result of all 80 actions.

APPROACH

The detailed analysis of the nine selected actions was designed to allow for the capture of the essence of the adjustment process and for the measurement of the magnitude of the economic consequences of the action as it affected each of the nine communities. Rather than attempting to conduct all the community impact studies from a central location, a highly qualified researcher located near the scene was selected to carry out the individual studies. Most often he was a well known professor of economics or business administration and was not only personally acquainted with the community but also highly skilled in ferreting out and utilizing state and local data sources. Because of his reputation and his expertise, he was often able to gain access to data sources that were unavailable to the general researcher. This decentral-

lized research approach produced results that were superior to any which could have been produced by a centralized program.

The study of the New York Naval Shipyard at Brooklyn, New York was from its inception different from the others. While the other situations involved community impact studies, the objective of the Brooklyn study was to report on what could be called "vicinity impact". Thus, a slightly different format and special analysis were required for the research of the closure of the Navy Yard. The researchers, chosen for this special project were Mark A. Haskell, Graduate School of Public Administration, New York University, and Darwin W. Daicoff, Department of Economics, The University of Kansas.

The remaining six studies which constitute the bulk of the project can be considered in a group. These studies have a common objective--the analysis of community impact resulting from the closure of a military installation in or near that community. The six researchers chosen for these studies were Mobile--Fred E. Johnson, School of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Alabama; Salina--Darwin W. Daicoff, Department of Economics, University of Kansas; Bangor--David H. Clark, College of Business Administration, University of Maine; Middletown--David W. Stevens, Institute of Research on Human Resources, Pennsylvania State University; Amarillo--Robert M. Lawrence and Theodore J. Taylor, Texas Technical College; and Moses Lake--Guy G. Gordon, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Washington.

A consistent definition of the basic types of data to be gathered by each researcher was formulated to provide a foundation for the analysis i.e., sales tax, building permits, utility sales, etc; thus, a structural framework was constructed to assure basic homogeneity among the papers. Each researcher carried out singular analysis of his own situation. As certain specialized data were available in some cases (such as the input-output studies in Bangor and Moses Lake), each researcher used his discretion to make additions to the data base as he deemed appropriate.

A time-series method is the primary analytical procedure

employed in this research. The trends during the four years preceding Announcement, the state of the local economy at Announcement and the trends during the four years following the Announcement were compared and analyzed--the analysis thus covers the time period 1960 through 1967.

Although immediate impact was considered in each case, this time period approach coupled with the scheduled differences in closure patterns among the actions singled out for detailed analysis allowed for a study of the range of closure patterns--closure soon after Announcement, closure by the end of the study, and no closure by the end of 1967. Because the immediate impact is only part of the picture, the rather long period of analysis was useful in that it allowed time for an impact to be observed.

Before examining the six major studies which appear in Volume II or examining the synthesis which follows in this Volume, it would be helpful for the reader to have a cursory familiarity with each of the situations. The following short summaries might be considered a series of introductions to the principal studies. They are in essence a capsulization of the complete studies. As a matter of style, they are highly condensed versions of the large studies and "set the scene," as it were, for the highly detailed analyses. As closely as possible, the analyses of the various base closures are those of the individual researchers; care has been exercised to preserve the individuality of their papers.

SUMMARIES

MOBILE AIR MATERIAL AREA (BROOKLEY AFB)

Brookley AFB is located within the Mobile, Alabama SMSA and is designated officially the Mobile Air Material Area (MOAMA). For approximately thirty years the Base was the major employer in the Mobile Area, employing approximately 12,600 civilian workers at the time of the Announcement. At peak employment in 1960 the Base accounted for 13 per cent of the area's total employment and 15 per cent of its personal income. These levels decreased to 10 per cent and 12 per cent

respectively by 1964. Even so, wage payments to civilian personnel amounted to nearly \$90 million in that year, with another \$4.4 million being paid to military workers--1,258 at the time of the phase-out Announcement. It is estimated that another \$5 million was added to the local economy by Base procurement in 1964.

Even though full closure is not scheduled to occur until June 1969, 10,000 civilian jobs were eliminated by July 1968. Thus the expected impact, if there is to be one, should have shown itself by mid-1968. There have been, in fact, only slight reactions exhibited by the available economic indicators.

Prior to Announcement, the Mobile SMSA economy showed a stagnant tendency from 1960 to 1962, then a gradual upward trend. Area employment declined in each of the years, and the unemployment rate remained above 6 per cent during most of this time. Government employment had stabilized and the quite sizable decline in manufacturing employment was not compensated for by the small increase in service workers. The 1963-64 period showed general improvement. Because of support from the government sectors, employment grew while the rate of unemployment declined. Retail sales grew, but there was a steady deterioration in Mobile's market penetration, due primarily to its inaccessibility from the surrounding region and a lack of adequate shopping centers on the outskirts. Subsequent to the general improvement in conditions, bank debits and deposits showed significant increases in the 1962-64 period. Leading the recovery were gains in contract construction, non-durable manufacturing, and service sectors offsetting a decline in the durable goods sector. Generally, the economy was on an upward path at the time of the Announcement.

Following the Announcement a decline in the level of total employment began which continued through 1967. Excessive unemployment was avoided, however, by a similar decrease in the labor force. Despite the reduction of 10,000 civilian jobs by 1968, the unemployment rate has risen slowly. Although contract construction, residential construction, and

the housing industry were hard hit; gains in retail sales, wholesale trade, insurance and real estate, manufacturing, and service industries offset the losses. An overall strength of the local economy is evidenced by increased bank debits and deposits for the 1964-66 period; a slight decline in 1966-67 is attributable to exogenous economic conditions.

It is concluded that although the economy did not grow as rapidly as it would have without closure, the impact has been somewhat obscured by a general rise in other sectors and is now negligible. Were it not for the heavy reliance on the government sector prior to 1964, the impact of closure would have indeed been imperceptible.

Since operation of the Base was not fully terminated by mid-1968, re-use of facilities was only slight. Only three firms employing 855 persons occupied Brookley facilities. The re-use of Base facilities was hindered by several procedural difficulties: rules which prevented the city from gaining even partial control prior to complete closure, subsequent rules attached to locating on Federal property, GSA rules governing pricing of surplus properties, strict requirements for inspection of the premises by the USAF, and military regulations regarding the transaction of business on the Base. Likewise, it is generally agreed that the extension of the closure date hindered the efforts to attract occupants. But even so, new industry on other property and a general growth in the economy guarded Mobile from what could have been deleterious effects.

SCHILLING AFB

Schilling AFB located in Salina, Kansas, serves not only north central Kansas, but also parts of Oklahoma, Colorado, and Nebraska as a major trade center. The population of Salina is over 40,000 persons and nearly 1.5 million persons in the entire trade area. It is, likewise, the hub of area transport facilities. At the time of the closure Announcement, Schilling AFB employed approximately 5,000 military personnel and 350 civilians and provided an estimated \$20 million payroll, \$35 million procurement expenditure, and \$1.1 million local purchases by Base divisions at local

firms. The closure was originally feared to exert severe impact on the area's economy. These ominous expectations were compounded by the scheduled speed of closure--complete by June 1965.

Prior to the Announcement, the Salina economy exhibited a mixed but generally growing trend. Weaknesses did appear in activity bearing little direct relation to the Schilling operation: few new industries entered the Salina area; agriculture continued a long term decline; population experienced a net decrease in the period from 1960 to 1964; the central business district showed economic decline; the trade and service sectors failed to expand; and the contract construction and housing industries showed general weaknesses. On the other hand, the growth that was exhibited, may be traced directly to the Schilling activity. For example, 1,000 Defense related workers, constructing 12 Atlas missile sites temporarily buoyed the economy in 1960-62. The growth of the school system, continuance of Federal impacted area funds and resulting public expenditures also acted favorably on the local economy. Losses were similarly offset by gains in transportation industries, communications industries, public utilities, government, finance and real estate.

The period following the Announcement was marked by a temporary decline (1965-66) followed by a significantly stronger economy. Many military personnel and dependents held civilian jobs and their departure tended to open new employment opportunities to those persons adversely affected by the closure. Even so, overall employment and population declined. Retail and public utility sales showed increases after 1966 as did the manufacturing sector and the food and kindred products sector of the economy. The housing market itself, however, suffered from a market glut after closure. In all, activities unrelated to the Base grew, while related activities showed mixed results.

After the initial shock of the Announcement subsided, the Schilling Development Council was formed to expedite recovery of the Salina economy and to promote various re-uses of base property. The Council accepted four State projects: Highway

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Patrol Training Center, Vo-tech school, Kansas State Institute of Technology, and the Vocational Rehabilitation Center. Significant re-use of the Base did not occur, however, until mid-1966. A subtle tax subsidy was employed to attract new industry and defense related projects have continued to aid economic development. By 1967 the disposition of only three of the twelve Atlas missile silos was complete--those to Kansas State University for research purposes. The Capehart housing project was utilized to house families of Viet Nam-bound servicemen from nearby Fort Riley--an action which also averted a further housing market glut. An Airport Authority was created as a special unit of government to secure the available Base facilities and was given additional facilities that would produce enough rental income to provide for the operation and maintenance of the airport. The Authority allowed leasing of its property to businesses. Beech Aircraft Corporation, the largest employer, created employment for 725 by mid-1967. By the end of 1967, thirty-seven businesses were located at the Base, employing over 1,200 persons--more than enough to compensate for the number of civilian jobs displaced by the closure.

Economic expansion has likewise resulted from eight major industrial expansions and tax-supported city additions on non-Base property. Besides economic expansion, these off-Base activities also served a very real psychological purpose by creating an atmosphere of hope and confidence in the future of the "civilian" community.

DOW AFB

The City of Bangor, Maine where Dow AFB is located, is economically integrated with three small surrounding communities. Thus, while in 1960 the Bangor population was 38,912, the Greater Bangor Population extended to 78,549. These figures include approximately 5,000 military personnel and 7,000 military dependents residing in the area because of the Base operation. It is estimated that in 1964, prior to the closure Announcement, \$7.8 million was infused into the Greater Bangor economy by Base military personnel and their families, resulting in \$8.9 million in personal income to area

residents. This amount equaled 42 per cent of the total military personnel spending. Civilian personnel strength at the Base was relatively small--about 400 in 1964. That number was gradually reduced until complete phase-out in June 1968. Nearly 4,000 military personnel remained through 1965 and 1966, but increased in 1967. By April 25, 1968, after departure of the SAC wing, only a small contingent remained to close the Base.

There was some economic growth in the Greater Bangor Area between 1960 and 1964 and a significant improvement in the level of economic activity, but the changes bore little relationship to the Base. From a stagnant condition in 1960-62, the economy strengthened in 1963-64. A slow population growth helped keep the unemployment rate decreasing, while total employment grew. An input-output study identified the major sources of "export" income in the 1963 Bangor economy as higher education, paper, leather and textile manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and Dow AFB. During the period prior to the Announcement the paper industry showed a relatively small but steady decline in employment. Production increased but productivity rose even more. The textile industry showed a highly fluctuating level of employment. The largest change, an increase, occurred in the leather industry where employment rose by nearly 500 workers. In all, the trend of the Bangor economy at the time of the Announcement was one of rising employment and lowering unemployment caused primarily by rising employment in the leather industry and government.

There were no signs that the Announcement or the reduction in military manpower had any effect on the local economy. Retail sales have grown as the market penetration of the Bangor area has grown. It is estimated that Bangor may serve as a trading area for 150,000 persons. Those industries identified as major sources of "export" income continued to grow in terms of wages and employment. New industries, likewise, moved into the area, employing more persons and using utilities which would otherwise not be used once the Base was closed. The "study" further identified areas most likely to feel the impact of closure: automotive dealers, gasoline

service stations, furniture, and drug and proprietary stores. In actuality, these sectors have been quite unsteady, but no significant declines can be found to have occurred.

A "Task Force" of civic leaders designated four areas of community concern in connection with possible Base re-use: 1) education and institutional; 2) airport; 3) housing; and 4) industrial/commercial. In the process of constructing a plan, these needs were considered: 1) to diversify and upgrade the industrial structure; 2) to expand the tax base; 3) to develop an integrated transportation system; 4) to provide improved public housing; and 5) to provide improved hospital facilities. The airport facility will be operated as a municipal facility, anticipating that revenues from the airport will make it self-sustaining. TransEast Airlines is operating the airport facility while Northeast and Alitalia Airlines have agreed to make some limited use of it. No significant industrial re-use was made of the Base facilities; plans for Capehart Units located at Dow were not yet firm, though they will presumably be used for low cost housing. The University of Maine will acquire, at no charge, approximately 64 Base buildings to form a new unit to serve as a commuting campus for the area--possibly to serve 2,000 students beginning in September 1968. The Base hospital facility will be used by Bangor City Hospital for long-term medical care. In all, though re-use has been minimal, significant expansion elsewhere sufficed to maintain a healthy Bangor economy.

MIDDLETOWN AIR MATERIAL AREA (OLMSTED AFB)

Olmsted AFB is located 15 miles south of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Though only 25 miles north of York and 35 miles west of Lancaster, properly speaking, it lies within the Harrisburg SMSA. Predictably the Base drew 69 per cent (1964) of its employees from the 371,653 residents (1960) in the Harrisburg area. Another 15 per cent came from the Lancaster SMSA and only 1 per cent from the York SMSA. By the time of the closure Announcement, approximately 10,500 civilians were employed at the Base, yielding nearly \$76 million per year in civilian payroll. The total value of local procurement prior to phase-out approximated \$2 million annually. By

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June 1966 the civilian personnel complement had been halved, and by December 1966 only one-fourth of the 1964 level still remained. Final closure was achieved by June 1968; one year before the date originally scheduled.

From 1960 until the Announcement, the area labor market tightened. While the labor force continued to rise in number, the unemployment rate dropped. Retail sales and other general indicators, likewise, marked a generally healthy economy. The insurance sector as well as the electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies sector showed especially strong growth during this period; while the service sector showed relative strength. In fact of ten sectors with the highest wage bills only the primary metals sector experienced an absolute decline over the five year period.

The local economy continued to show diversified strength after November 1964. The labor force continued to grow, but employment increased even more rapidly, resulting in a continued decline in the area unemployment rate. By classifying the displaced workers of Olmsted with regards to their eventual disposition, it can be shown that although approximately 10,000 jobs were eliminated at the Base, only 2,000 persons were placed upon the area labor market. A further tightening effect was exerted upon the Harrisburg area labor market as the neighboring Chambersburg and New Cumberland Army Depots, and the Mechanicsburg Naval Supply Depot each expanded employment to fulfill the needs of the Viet Nam war effort. Among the ten industries with the highest wage bill in 1967, all showed moderate to large increases over the 1964 wage bill. Similarly, an increase in retail sales over the period after the Announcement is indicative of an economy generally unhindered by the closure of Olmsted AFB.

Disposition of Base property has been successful. The University of Pennsylvania has drawn plans to extend its use of various Base facilities. Likewise, the Harrisburg Industrial Development Corporation leased a warehouse area to Fruehauf Corporation which subsequently hired approximately 500 workers for their manufacturing operation. The existing runway and hangar facilities have been put to partial re-use

as an airport and terminal facility serving the Greater Harrisburg Area--designated the Olmsted State Airport. In all, a total of 17 leasees occupied vacated building space, employing nearly 550 persons (excluding those employed by Fruehauf). In addition, six firms expressed interest in locating on unused Base facilities. These would employ an additional 2,000 workers. While the current employment on the vacated Base facilities is substantially less than the number of civilian DOD jobs eliminated, the current employment is about half of the net reduction of DOD jobs in the area. Considering present operations, possible future ones, and significant new off-Base development; the recovery process can be optimistically assessed.

AMARILLO AFB

Amarillo is the center of a large regional trade and marketing area. The 5,000 permanent military personnel and 1,500 civilian employees, as well as some 5,000 intermittent military students at Amarillo AFB, were estimated to contribute some \$60 million dollars, directly and indirectly, to the Amarillo SMSA economy. The Amarillo situation is unique in that only partial reduction in Base personnel occurred during the study--13,120 at closure versus 8,100 at termination of this study. The closure pattern was marked by numerous changes in the scheduled closing date by the DOD. Consequently any study of impact in long measure must be restricted to measuring impact resulting from a sequence of certain psychological events.

Prior to the actual Announcement of closure (from 1960 to 1964) the Amarillo economy grew substantially. Population growth was reflected in the trend of increased number of customers of water, electricity, gas, and telephone companies, and in the growth of school population. Confidence in the local economy by the business community was evidenced by the growth of the construction industry. The increase in bank debits indicated that the volume of trade in the Amarillo regional economy had increased substantially. Optimism on the part of the population was expressed by the extremely low rate of foreclosure on FHA approved houses and by the rate of construction of new dwellings. Officials of Amarillo continued

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to spend increasingly greater amounts per capita for public facilities and services.

Any impact on the Amarillo economy primarily must be that impact resulting only from the Announcement--not the closure itself. A general decline in population and school enrollment is characteristic of other towns in the Amarillo area of Texas. Even so, the general downturn in construction activity and utility sales must relate a degree of caution on the part of various city leaders. As far as indicators of real impact are concerned, however, the general business activity was good as evidenced by the fact that bank debits and demand deposits continued a general rise after the Announcement. Likewise, the receipts and expenditure pattern for the city of Amarillo did not resemble that for a city plagued with the loss of a major source of income.

A failure to replace the Base operation with a significant re-use of facilities might be attributed to the reluctance of city leaders to state a definite date for occupancy. The airport operation itself became property of the city in October 1968, at which time the city constructed a \$3.2 million air terminal to replace existing facilities. The AEC (Atomic Energy Commission) requested permission to use certain warehousing and storage facilities. The only commercial replacement announced was a repair and maintenance facility operated by Bell Helicopter Co. of Ft. Worth. By the end of 1968, the company plans to employ approximately 1,000 persons in the operation--many of whom will be brought in from outside the Amarillo SMSA. Also proposed for Base utilization was the Mid Continent Technical Training School designed to train personnel in vocations compatible with the Bell operation. While actual Base reutilization was slight, projects initiated off the Base, before and after closure, appeared to give strength to the Amarillo economy, and to lessen any community impact.

LARSON AFB

Larson AFB is located immediately outside the city of Moses Lake, Washington, approximately 110 miles from the

nearest large trade center--Spokane. The area's economy is largely agrarian, discounting the Base-related activities prior to Closure. Before the Announcement the Base employed nearly 3,800 military and 400 civilian personnel at an annual payroll approximating \$15 million. It is estimated, however, that only \$1 million was added to the Grant County economy through Base procurement and only \$1.5-\$1.8 million through local purchases by Base personnel. This relatively small sum accrued because of the absence of large retailing and entertaining establishments in Moses Lake, and the inability of local merchants to maintain sufficient stock. The speed of closure increased the danger of significant impact--all Base personnel and equipment were gone by April 1966.

Prior to the Announcement the local economy had been disturbed in 1962 by the discontinuation of the operations of the Boeing Company which involved several hundred employees and by the completion of construction of the TITAN I missile facilities. The population began a decline in 1963 which has continued through 1967. Similarly the labor force registered a high in 1962, then fell until 1964, while unemployment rates dropped after reaching a peak in 1-63. Although retail sales declined in the 1963-64 period, the bank deposit data show a small recovery extending from early 1964 to the time of the Announcement. Among the major industries of the area, only food and kindred products showed a significant gain for the period. All other industry reflects the 1963-64 decline presumably attributable to the discontinuation of the Boeing and TITAN I operations. Agriculture, the primary occupation in the area, remained notably steady, while property value ironically continued to rise during the period.

By the end of 1966, in terms of the usual measures, Moses Lake had fully recovered from the closure of the Base. Possibly because of the agrarian dependence of the local economy, the years following the Announcement showed little impact due to the closure. Employment and retail sales were up and the unemployment was at its lowest rate in years. New food processing plants were built and existing ones expanded; this, plus some increase in agricultural output, appeared to be responsible for the recovery. Food and kindred products

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accounted for 63 per cent of area manufacturing in 1964 but accounted for 75 per cent by 1967 in a growing sector of the area's economy. The economy remained healthy through 1967.

Re-use of Base facilities was small. Operations of the Big Bend Community College and a men's Job Corps Center were begun on the Base in 1965, but any industrial uses, and hence large employers, did not materialize. In June 1966 the Air Force announced its intention to leave the instrument landing system for the airport. Subsequently, after an earlier expression of interest in the idea, Boeing announced that it would guarantee the Moses Lake Port Authority's operation of the airport to the amount of \$300,000. When the GSA transferred air operations to the Port, Boeing signed a contract to use the Grant County Airport as a training center through 1980. The possibility will exist that they may also use the facility for some part of the SST work at some future date. Though other parcels of land have been acquired from the GSA, plans for its utilization have not yet been announced.

Synthesis

THE NEW YORK NAVAL SHIPYARD

Since the study of the New York Naval Shipyard closure is quite different from the studies of the other closures, it is somewhat inappropriate to include the analysis of the Yard closure in this synthesis of the affects of the installation closures. Nonetheless because it makes up part of the total analysis and because some of the conclusions regarding the Yard experience are relevant to the other closures, it has a place here.

Although the Yard was an installation of substantial size, its closure affected a very small percentage of the total population of the area in which it was located--greater New York City. The Brooklyn study therefore concentrated on the impact of the closure on the businesses in the area immediately surrounding the installation; it was in essence a vicinity impact study.

It was found that while there had been considerable public activity aimed at securing major re-use of the Yard facilities, in fact, little actual re-use had occurred. Beyond finding little re-use, little adverse economic affects of the closure could be isolated. Between mid-1965-67 there was a decrease of only four retail establishments in the vicinity of the Yard. Because of the relatively small size of these establishments, the indirect employment loss stemming from the closure of the Yard was minimal in the area of the Yard.

REACTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT

The psychological reaction of the communities to the publication of the DOD decision followed the same pattern in all cases: Immediately after the Announcement there was an aura of total disbelief--disbelief that this could really be happening as well as disbelief that the installation was

dispensable to the Nation's defense. The community leaders recovered from this quickly and turned their energies toward obtaining a reversal of the closure decision. Appeals were taken ultimately to the Secretary of Defense, but the results were all the same--the decisions were final.

While these appeals and negotiations were in the works, some businesses closed. It is probable that a major percentage of these businesses were already in a precarious position or only needed an excuse to close. Whatever the cause, this reaction was observable immediately after the first publication of the proposed closure and was evidence of an Announcement effect independent of any reduction in the level of Defense activity in the community. As discussed later, this effect was often most apparent in the housing sector where cessation of building activities was immediately concurrent with the Announcement.

After the installation closure decision was declared irrevocable, the community experienced an overwhelming scare reaction. This reaction has been described by one observer as "open panic". This period of panic was relatively short as the community began to realize that recovery was dependent, first of all, upon acceptance and then upon action to off-set the impact. The community assumed an atmosphere of resignation which bordered on defeatism before a plan for action was devised.

After the situation had been analyzed as it really existed--uncolored by the fear and scare reactions which accompanied the Announcement--the community began to see the installation closure as a good opportunity for the city to obtain a non-military economic foundation. The imagination of the city leaders became alive with possibilities for their cities. They not only envisioned ambitious projects and plans but they took steps to initiate these programs. Negotiations were begun with organizations which might be interested in establishing operations in the city. Opportunities to secure replacement economic activities both on and off the defense installation were often pursued.

There often was observable warring among three identifiable

factions. The DOD, the city fathers, and the industrial promoters each tried to find the most suitable solution to its own particular set of objectives. The DOD, whose desires took priority in any case, had a concern with the overall condition of the Nation's military capability. Its policies were determined by budget constraints and national security needs. Though the DOD made the ultimate decisions, such decisions were sometimes difficult for the other two factions to anticipate and to reconcile with their objectives.

Typically the city fathers' objective was to preserve the community's present economic life as long as possible. Thus, their actions were aimed at preserving the greatest military "occupation" as long as possible. Especially in cities such as Amarillo where hope against the actuality of closure persists, attempts to keep the military for as long as possible were particularly strong and persistent.

To some extent the promoters of industrial development who sought the re-use of Base facilities were often in opposition to the city fathers. Though both desired economic activity, the developers wanted the evacuation of the installation as quickly as possible. The departure of the military was crucial to re-use as it was difficult if not impossible to come to terms with a prospective private firm if the facilities were not yet available and no specific date for possession could be set.

The red tape involved in working with the military made negotiations very complex. In some instances, even though plans were made between a city and an organization to occupy a base facility, no final arrangements could be reached because the military had not yet vacated the premises. This confusion sometimes led to great discord between the city and the DOD. Still there was no way the city could supersede the military to effect a decision to leave more quickly. In essence, all the city had was the assurance that the military would leave when the time was right. Eventually, the DOD succeeded in placating the cities; hurt feelings were soothed and everyone was relatively content with the outcome. All of the bases went through the first five stages with, of course,

varying degrees of success. Because in some communities the process of closure was complete after the first five stages, the two latter stages were experienced by only some of the communities.

In short, the pattern of the reaction to the Announcement of closure followed five very definite stages in all cases: 1) disbelief, 2) efforts to rescind the decision, 3) "open panic", 4) resignation to the inevitable and 5) decision that the closure was probably, in balance, advantageous for the economy. If military control remained at the base for a long period of time after the Announcement, the reaction included another step (sometimes reached before stage 5 and sometimes after stage 5): 4a) discontent with planning re-use operations for base facilities when the facilities were still occupied by the military. If the military relinquished control of the installation, a final stage occurred: 6) relative satisfaction after the negotiations ended.

This pattern of reactions is significant not only in showing a probable sequence of events in a community when a major Defense installation is closed but also in interpreting the papers included in this study. A direct relationship can be found between a city's stage in this pattern and the attitude around which the paper is written. The tone of each paper is colored by the pervading opinion of that stage. Thus, when the military vacated the facilities quickly--before or by the first deadline i.e., less than a year after the Announcement, as in Salina and Harrisburg; the reports reflect the satisfaction with which the city viewed its relations with the DOD. At the same time, to some extent in Mobile and especially in Amarillo, where closure dates have been changed and military control has remained, dissatisfaction with the military's timing and "uncooperativeness" in developing plans for withdrawal of personnel are evident. The long "lead time" was designed to give the cities ample time to plan their economic off-set activities and re-use of the Base facilities. This aid to city recovery has been deemed only a further complication of an already complex problem in these two cities.

If Bangor is a good indication, however, it is reasonable to assume that after the DOD has completed the closure of the remaining installations and has initiated negotiations designed to mitigate the ill feeling within the city, the community will be satisfied with the treatment afforded by the Federal government. Bangor, with its closing now complete, is unique in its feeling that the comparatively long lead time was advantageous in that it allowed the City to plan its actions more carefully. It should be noted, however, that the closure of Dow AFB has been completed and that Bangor has had the time to pass to the final stage of adjusting effectively to the situation.

THE FEDERAL ROLE

The Office of Economic Adjustment of the DOD was created in 1961 specifically to aid communities in recovery from the economic impact resulting from a reduction of the military activity associated with the community. It is the responsibility of the OEA to coordinate the activities of the Federal government with the activities of the affected community. Some of the operations within the scope of OEA are:

1. Perform analyses of the impact problem.
2. Establish job opportunity guarantees for all career employees.
3. Establish retraining programs to give career employees new skills.
4. Establish programs to stabilize property values in communities with the help of the Housing and Home Finance Agency.
5. Conduct detailed surveys of the community situation with the help of the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, the Area Redevelopment Administration, the Small Business Administration and other Federal, state and local agencies.
6. Administer the conversion of property excessed by Department of Defense to constructive community advantages--social, economic, recreational and governmental.
7. Plan Federal assistance for the communities such as

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- a. Loans and grants.
- b. Technical assistance in assessment of industrial potential.
- c. Area skill surveys.
- d. Small business loans.
- e. Natural resource development.
- f. Public works.
- g. Manpower development and training

All potential military uses for the Defense facility being closed are considered prior to any closure announcement by the Department of Defense. After the decision has been made to contract defense activities in a community, the OEA works with representatives of the local area to facilitate recovery activities. A major step generally involves the formation of a citizens' council which is responsible for the economic adjustment processes of the community. When effective this group has the unified, nonpartisan support of the community; in addition, it must have sufficient authority to act for the community. By working with the OEA, whose responsibility it is to establish liaison between community leaders and the various Federal agencies, this council charts a course of redevelopment based upon a realistic view of the community's situation.

Most Federal real property holdings which Federal agencies find are no longer required for their needs and for the discharge of their responsibilities are reported to the General Services Administration for 1) utilization by other executive agencies having a requirement for such property or 2) disposal as surplus property.

The General Services Administration thus has a critical role in the disposal of military property. Reports of excess

1. General Services Administration, Disposal of Surplus Real Property (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966).

real property containing essential descriptive data and information about specific properties are submitted by the DOD to the appropriate GSA regional office. GSA notifies other executive agencies whose function require the use of real property of the availability of specific excess properties. While other executive agencies are determining whether excess property can be appropriately used to fill their needs for real property, GSA inspects the property and arranges for an appraisal of its fair market value. After disposal plans have been completed and the decision has been reached as to the method of disposal to be employed, the appraisal provides a means of determining the basis for negotiated disposals to non-Federal public agencies as well as the guide for evaluating the adequacy of bids received in competitive bid sales offerings. Responsibility for the care and custody of surplus real property pending its disposition is vested in the DOD. During this period the DOD may, with GSA's approval, lease all or part of the property, provided 1) the lease is for a period not exceeding one year, 2) the lease is revocable on not to exceed 30 days' notice, and 3) the use and occupancy will not interfere with, delay, or retard the disposal of the property.

Regulations governing the disposal of surplus real property provide for notice to be given to eligible public agencies of surplus property which may be disposed of to such agencies. The notice is given prior to any public advertising, negotiation or other disposal actions with regard to surplus real property which GSA determines is available for disposal. The notice requires that an eligible public agency desiring to perfect a comprehensive and coordinated plan of procurement and use for the surplus real property inform the GSA. The GSA determines what constitutes a reasonable period of time to allow the public agency to perfect and submit a comprehensive and coordinated plan of use and procurement for the property. The public agency is notified of the decision and provided with such further instructions as may be required to proceed with the acquisition of the property. The discount or price preference provisions afforded public agencies in acquiring surplus real property are as follows:

Public Park or Public Recreational Area
 . . .50 percentum of the fair value.

Historic Monument

. . .Without monetary consideration.

Public Health or Educational¹

. . .Up to 100 per cent public benefit allowance.

Wildlife Conservation

. . .Without consideration.

Public Airport

. . .Without consideration.

Negotiated sales (without use restrictions)

. . .Fair market value.

Surplus properties not disposed of to public agencies or institutions are ordinarily offered for sale by GSA regional offices, after advertising, on a competitive bid basis. Surplus structures and other improvements located on land to be retained by the Government are normally offered for sale by the agency having care and custody over the land.

Additionally, two further features of the disposal should be noted. These are that when an air field is taken over by a local governmental body, this body receives title to more than the airstrip. It obtains other land and structures with the requirement that the rent of this property will be used in the operation of the air field. In the communities studied a significant portion of the lease property thus came to be owned by the local agency responsible for the air field. The second feature is that besides transferring land and structures to local civilian authorities certain amounts of personal property were also transferred. Thus, the local government agency which secured the installation hospital secured property which was necessary to the operation of the hospital. Organizations that were to use base properties for educational purposes also secured significant amounts of equipment.

1. Policy guidelines prescribed by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare provide that only those activities devoted to academic, vocational or professional instruction or organized and operated to promote and protect the public health are eligible.

RE USE OF BASE FACILITIES

Just what useable physical facilities were left behind by the military? In each case, by far the most important item on the list of useable base properties was a large, modern airstrip capable of handling the largest aircraft. In addition to this, only the depots had a really substantial physical plant with a potential for easy industrial conversion. The SAC bases included some permanent buildings which had been used to house, school or provide medical services for DOD personnel. Some of these facilities had a ready civilian use. With a few exceptions, most of the other facilities at these SAC installations would require substantial modification before they could be used as locations for civilian activities.

The extent of re-use of base facilities has been a very important factor in accounting for the differences in extent of the affected community's recovery to its pre-Announcement economic level. The industries which utilized these facilities brought many people into the area and employed area residents who were unemployed as the result of base closure. In the case of Salina and Amarillo a large percentage of this new industry is highly dependent upon Defense activity--notably the war in Viet Nam. In Salina, the Beech Aircraft operations almost entirely supply aircraft for the war. Likewise, Scientific Engineering supplies items under Defense contracts as its major products. The Bell Helicopter facility which located on the Base in Amarillo is involved almost exclusively with the repair of helicopters damaged in Viet Nam. Should the U.S. involvement in the war in Viet Nam decrease significantly, the future of these industries would be doubtful.

In addition to the Defense-oriented industries which moved into the base facilities at Salina and Amarillo, the growth of Federal military installations located near other closed bases influenced the impact on those communities. Harrisburg is the prime example. The rapid growth in size of the other Defense installations in the area was also a result of the war in Viet Nam. It has been estimated that 30 per cent of the dislocated civilian employees of Olmsted AFB found new employment in nearby Defense installations. Savannah and

Joliet were eliminated from the study for this very reason-- the increased Defense activity due to the war resulted in replacement of the bases by new operations located near or in the old facilities.

To some extent, this re-use of facilities for other Defense activities may be only a temporary aid in restoring the economies of these communities. For these communities the end of the Viet Nam war and the resultant decreased Defense activity might portend a second crisis. The contribution these activities have made to the communities immediately after the Announcement, however, should not be belittled, but it is suggested that some foresight may be helpful to anticipate the possible consequences when these installations are no longer necessary and, in turn, phased out.

Re-use of the facilities vacated by the military varies from base to base. The communities can be divided into two groups: 1) slight or minimal re-use and 2) moderate to large re-use.

The majority of the communities experienced only minimal re-use: Mobile, Bangor, Amarillo and Moses Lake. In Mobile where the closure date was extended to the latter part of 1968--four years after Announcement--re-use has been only slight. Rules established by the DOD and by other governmental agencies made it extremely difficult for the City to negotiate with prospective users. During the period of deactivation of the Base, only three firms agreed to locate on Base facilities. This accounted for only 855 workers-- a small replacement for the former DOD civilian employment of 12,600 at the Base.

In Bangor, too, re-use of the Base facilities has been at a minimum. Though legal and planning steps were taken by the City to insure such activity, the positive off-set was not forthcoming. On the positive side, the airport facility, which is one of the largest in the area, was utilized as a municipal airport. The City also converted the Base hospital to a City hospital and formulated plans to use 64 Base buildings as a new commuting unit for the University of

Maine. With these exceptions almost no re-use has occurred; industrial interest has not been stimulated.

Because the Amarillo AFB is near its pre-Announcement level of activity, only a small portion of the Base has been freed for conversion to new activities. With the exception of the conversion of the airport facility to municipal control, the limited re-use has been Defense oriented: the Atomic Energy Commission contracted for warehousing and storage facilities and the Bell Helicopter Company, previously discussed, utilized some facilities.

Moses Lake experienced only limited re-use of facilities concentrated in municipal and educational activities: the Base airport was converted to municipal use and community college and Job Corps operations were initiated. There was no industrial re-use; thus, large scale replacement of employees did not occur on the Base.

In two cases a large percentage of the Base facilities found re-use in governmental and industrial activities--Harrisburg and Salina. In addition to State operation of the airport facility in Harrisburg The University of Pennsylvania has planned uses for various facilities. During the post-Announcement years nearly a score of new private operations located on the Base. Such usage enabled the community to replace a large percentage of the workforce released by the closure. Thus, Harrisburg reflects an intermediate stage where considerable re-use has occurred but significant potential for re-use of the facilities remains.

In Salina the entire Base facility has been converted to non-military ownership. In addition to the use of the airport as a municipal facility, much of the installation was used to house educational activities. The big difference occurs in the industrial re-use (which was complemented by much new industrial activity in non-Base areas). Beech Aircraft Corporation alone created over 700 jobs. During the three years following the Announcement, thirty-seven firms located on the Base and the employment created by these firms more than compensated for the number of civilian jobs displaced by the closure.

It is important to note that in several instances the first re-use of base facilities was a publicly supported activity--either local, state, or Federal. Often the initial re-use step involved the conversion of the base airstrip to municipal control. Later such activities as Job Corps and Vocational Schools were included. These publicly supported activities offered the first re-use of the base facilities and often provided the incentive for the communities to work to secure private industry.

EMPLOYMENT IMPACT

There is a direct contrast between the closing of an AFB and the closing of a private industry. The most severe difference is the amount of resultant unemployment. Because the majority of the workers on an AFB are military personnel, the workers are simply transferred to another location of Air Force activity.

As discussed in Phase III of this report, large efforts were devoted to relocation of civilian personnel effected by the curtailment of the Defense activities. It is sufficient to note here that, at least partially because of these efforts, only a small percentage of the displaced civilian workers actually entered the local labor market of the communities associated with the installations involved in the Announcement. To the extent to which DOD civilian personnel were dependents of the military personnel, they were likely to be secondarily involved in military transfers and thereby never enter the local labor market. In this recent curtailment, however, some workers remained behind. Many were skilled and were able to find similar work nearby without moving. The point is, however, that the closing of an AFB results in relatively little direct unemployment. In contrast, when a private industry is closed the majority of the work force may turn to the local labor market.

The removal of a significant number of people from the population of a community does create the potential for some indirect or induced unemployment. This results from the lesser demand for labor and services which develops from a

population decrease. At the same time, the military and civilian dependents who were transferred with the Air Force and civilian personnel also vacate many jobs. Many military dependents and some military personnel were employed in civilian capacities in almost all communities. When military personnel were reassigned, some job opportunities were thus created. While there was less demand for labor, there were also fewer workers to fill available positions. Thus, the situation partially corrected itself. For instance, there were fewer children in the schools and there were fewer teachers--both the direct result of the transfer of Air Force dependents. Some of the vacated positions could easily be filled by members of the local labor force who were no longer needed to directly or indirectly service the needs of the Defense installation. On the other hand, a significant number of the jobs vacated by military personnel and their dependents, were undesirable for the head of a family: unskilled, often minimum wage, "women's jobs." Still the offset helped stabilize the economy if only at a different, and often lower level. Whether this lower level was acceptable to the city or not was largely a function of the character of the individual city.

HOUSING IMPACT

It is unreasonable to argue that all of the difficulties the housing sector encountered after Announcement were the results of the curtailment of Defense activity. The pattern established prior to the Announcement must be compared to the situations which existed at and after the Announcement. How this sector, or for that matter any other sector, would have reacted in the absence of Base closure cannot be determined, but neither can the developments after Announcement be attributed to the one factor--closure--which occurred in the midst of other economic circumstances that had an influence on that sector.

The facts show quite clearly that the curtailment of Defense activity adversely affected the housing sector in each city. To determine the basic impact on this sector it is necessary to examine the general pattern of impact concentrated

in two areas in each of the communities studied--new construction and housing values. New construction was one of the first segments of the economy to show a reaction. Often a nearly complete work stoppage resulted from the initial reaction following the Announcement.

In addition an effect was observable in the housing sector when existing dwellings were considered. The market value of existing houses experienced a rapid deterioration when the actual transfer of military and civilian personnel reached significant proportions. Because such effects were primarily concentrated in low and low-middle income housing, physical deterioration set in very quickly upon vacancy. As a consequence this housing exhibited a tendency to become a burden on the city's entire housing sector.

The impact in these areas was manifested by two especially significant reactions: 1) A market glut slowed the new housing construction industry significantly and 2) Loss of equity was experienced by both military and civilian personnel who were forced to vacate the area immediately incurred a capital loss.

The effects on the construction segment of the local economies were to some extent lessened by other events. While the housing construction sector suffered, the non-residential construction sectors grew significantly in almost every instance. This was due partially to the rebuilding or conversion of base facilities, the change in the area's economic base, and the community's efforts to stimulate the economy. The result was the creation of new positions in the construction industry outside the residential segment. Because many opportunities were created in the construction industry, only those workers or firms who were restricted to specialized residential construction were at a permanent disadvantage as a result of the decline in residential construction activity.

Likewise, while average real estate values fell during a period immediately following the Announcement, DOD personnel remaining in the area and other area residents were presented with opportunities to secure better housing. A noticeable

number of area residents took advantage of this opportunity and moved to better housing. This upgrading was limited by the relatively small decline in house values in the middle and upper range of housing quality. It should be noted that, with the exception of low-cost housing near the installation, in most every community the real estate market rebounded soon after the initial panic.

A rise in FHA foreclosures was evidenced during the post-Announcement months. It is notable, however, that the Authority did not universally place the foreclosed properties on the market to avoid loss. In an alternative move, the Authority held and often repaired the homes. In so doing, the public investment was protected and a reasonable housing market maintained.

The disposal of base housing deserves careful consideration. In a market suffering from an oversupply, placing such units as the Capehart housing units on the market would have been disastrous. In most cases these units were either held vacant or were allowed to be used for purposes other than private housing. The result was that their availability did not directly affect the housing market.

THE NATURE OF RECOVERY

The economic, social and cultural level which each city assumed after the installation closure was for all intents and purposes close to what might be expected for a city of that type and size in that location. Because of delayed closure patterns, significant deleterious effects cannot be isolated in either Amarillo or Bangor. Moses Lake was an agricultural center before the Base located in the vicinity, and it reverted to that status after closure. Mobile and Harrisburg were large, thriving, urban centers and the reduction of activity at their installations caused only a temporary slump before the economy was able to regain its former level. Salina is the one great exception in that there seemed to be a change in the general character of the economy following closure. Besides being the site of AFB activity, the city was a rural trading center with the bulk of its economy centered around

agriculture and agriculturally related industries. While the Base supplied diversification for the City, the economic foundation of the community remained rooted in agriculture. When the Base and its influences were removed, Salina recognized its need for diversification of economic activity and took steps to insure the replacement of these activities in such a way as to bring the greatest benefit to the City.

This leads to the conclusion that the presence of a military installation in a community does not impart a permanent influence on the community with which it is associated.¹ While the installation is active, it contributes people, dollars, and activity to the community; but, this in itself does not change the community's potential to carry on a high level of activity without the Defense installations.

The findings of this study may seem to be in some conflict with previous analyses that have dealt with the economic relationships between military installations and certain geographic areas. This conflict is, however, more apparent than real. Most of the prior studies have produced measures of an area's economic dependence on specific military spending.² Some would use these measures to argue that a removal of this spending would result in a predictable reduction of income and employment in an area. It is this argument that creates the apparent conflict; the predicted outcome of the reduction of installation spending would be substantially more severe than the outcomes actually observed in the communities analyzed in this report.

1. This finding may be a reflection of the particular installations studied. It is possible that there would be a significant difference between these bases which came into existence primarily as a result of World War II and installations which have existed for many years such as the Portsmouth and the Brooklyn Navy Yards.

2. While there have been some studies of the effects of the closure of a military installation, they have not been particularly detailed or well done.

Although the methodology employed in most of the earlier studies produces results that are subject to a considerable margin of error, the precision of their results are of secondary importance here. The major difference between the economic effect of the reduction of military spending associated with the Defense installations studied in this report and the economic effects that would have been predicted on the basis of the prior studies lies in the difference in the scope of this study. While there might have been a tendency for the income and employment to decline to the predicted level in the communities analyzed in this report, this has not occurred because of the offsetting economic activities that have occurred in each of the communities. It may be postulated that, if the remainder of the local economy had not expanded at the same time that military spending was being reduced, the economic effect of the reduction of military spending would have been much more severe and would have been more in line with the effects predicted by the results of the previous studies.

Much effort, planning, and perhaps some luck must occur in order for a city to become something it was not before the military installation was established. In the absence of this effort and planning, the city reassumes its former position. Salina is proof, however, that it is not impossible for a city to change. By the utilization of the "gifts" which were left behind by the military i.e., permanent base facilities which were declared military surplus, Salina was able to modify its economic structure from one with a strictly agricultural orientation to one that also included industry.

This is not to say that communities with even the most spectacular recovery were unharmed by the closure. Although the results seem to indicate "full" recovery in several cases, it is likely that at least some aspects of the cities' economies are still suffering in more subtle respects. Thus it is largely a function of the definition of recovery which is employed.

A community's recovery from the curtailment of Defense activities may be dated from the point when economic activity

and the growth rate returned to the 1964 level. For some purposes this "recovery" is sufficient. For the community involved, however, a definition of recovery should also include the economy's return to a level of diversification comparable to the pre-Announcement level. In other words, if, as in the case of Moses Lake, the Defense installation was the only diversification in an otherwise wholly agricultural economy; the recovery cannot be complete unless it includes an alternate diversification. In every instance besides that of Moses Lake, attempts were made with various degrees of success to utilize the released DOD facilities. In Moses Lake, except for the airport, re-use has been negligible. As it stands now, while frozen food processing plants provide employment, Moses Lake is solely an agricultural center. Based on the wage rates, the seasonality of employment, the large proportion of the employment that is female, and the relatively low skill levels this is likely to be disadvantageous for the town.

The stability and equilibrium achieved by a community may contrast with its previous level of economic well being. Because a city such as Moses Lake reached some sort of equilibrium, it cannot be said to have recovered. Contentment with low paid, seasonal, relatively unskilled jobs as a replacement for the year around, high paid skilled jobs associated with the military is evidence of adjustment to closure rather than recovery from it.

LEAD TIME

The comparative advantages between short and long lead time seem to be subject to some controversy. It appears that short lead time encourages a more energetic campaign by the city to replace the installation in its economy. It also assures a quick removal of military paraphernalia as well as military personnel and authority. In several communities delay in this removal has been a great stumbling block for obtaining civilian interest in re-use of the facilities.

In addition to the length of lead time, however, it is essential to consider the use of the lead time. Especially

in Amarillo the disbelief that the Base would actually close was not dispelled quickly. This was due in part to continual changing of plans and deadlines by the military; the total effect was that many residents harbored hope that the closure decision would be changed. This attitude contributed significantly to delays in developing a sense of urgency for community action. This delay in turn led to poor use of lead time. In Amarillo, Mobile and Moses Lake the re-use of the base facilities was most limited. In part because no one really "believed" that the base would close and possibly because the community lacked the incentive to initiate a positive plan of action, the cities virtually sat back to wait for some solution. In Amarillo and Mobile the situation was complicated by continued military control. In Moses Lake, however, the military vacated the facilities very promptly after closure. Here the lack of re-use of Base facilities must be accredited to the failure of the community off-set program to make effective use of the facilities.

CONCLUSION

Factors such as length of lead time, speed with which the installation's facilities were made available for industrial re-use, geographical location, and the organization of the community affected the closure operations at varying degrees. All communities showed some immediate impact but, likewise, regardless of extent of industrial expansion, the communities exhibited recovery from the immediate economic recession.

It has been shown that a significant and persistent downturn in the level of economic activity in the six communities has not been found and whatever short term recession did occur has been largely off-set in each of these communities. Thus far, the explanation of these phenomena has been in terms of the structure of the local economies and the rather minimal real loss that should ever be expected due to the closure of a military installation--particularly one with a large civilian component. But surely this is not the whole story. The success of these communities in recovering from the curtailment of Defense activities has certainly been eased by the buoyance of the national economy. The community

impact story described may tend to lead formulators of public policy to a sense of complacency; this is only possible in the situation of rapidly rising economic activity and a full employment situation. The story may have been quite different had the National economy in 1964-67 been significantly less robust. One sector of the national economy has not shared proportionately in the recent economic growth--the housing-construction industry. The fact that the home construction in the six communities has been hurt may also simply be a reflection of a national phenomenon and not a peculiarity of the closure situation.

The economic impact of the closure is not independent of the psychological impact of the Announcement itself. In all six cases the Announcement was a bombshell dropped on unsuspecting communities. The news was released amid fanfare and excitement. This motivated the citizens--first toward near panic and then to community efforts toward offsetting action. This fact can be further corroborated by an examination of the impact of the earlier deactivation of missile systems at Moses Lake and Salina. This deactivation was done quietly--almost before many townspeople realized what was happening. These actions caused extreme depression on the economic activity of the areas. From this research, then, it can be concluded that to insure maximum recovery and minimum deleterious effects on the community, the closure actions should be done quickly and given considerable publicity, with prompt official release of available information and future plans and schedules.

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PHASE II: COMMUNITY ADJUSTMENT SALINA, KANSAS¹

Introduction

On November 18, 1964 the telephone of Whitley Austin, Editor of the Salina Journal rang. Senator James B. Pearson of Kansas was calling from Washington: "Whit, sit down, I've got bad news for you. They're closing the air base." That evening the Journal's banner headline read "Mac's Axe on Schilling." The Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, had released a list of 95 military installations that would be closed in the interest of economy and consolidation. On the list was Schilling Air Force Base of Salina, Kansas, slated to be closed by June 30, 1965 one of the earliest dates on the list. Thus Salina citizens learned of the crisis which became the focus of their attention and much of their activity during the following months.

To all the members of the community this was an exciting, a threatening, and a disturbing announcement. There was both shock and frantic activity for this was perceived as an important change in the life of Salina.

What followed could have been apathy and resignation to a fate defined by forces outside of their control; it could

1. The authors of this report of the second phase are Charles K. Warriner and Marston M. McCluggage. The research for this phase was done during 1966 and 1967 by Marston M. McCluggage, Kenneth M. Rothrock and Charles K. Warriner of the University of Kansas. Some aspects of the data are more fully described in the "Interim Report: Community Adjustment Salina, Kansas" prepared by Marston M. McCluggage. That document is the source of many details implied but not reported in this report. The authors are indebted to many persons in Salina, Kansas for their cooperation and assistance in securing data for this study, and to Kenneth M. Rothrock for this admirable assistance in the field work.

have been random, ineffectual and disorganized activity leading to schism, conflict and segmentation of the community. But instead the Salina Story is one of success not of failure. It is a story of community effort, community activity and community organization in response to an unexpected crisis not of its own making. It is the story of a community with courage to proceed with plans and programs, of a community with the faith in itself to undertake control of its own destiny, and of a community exercising vision to exploit what might have been a defeating situation.

How did such a response come about? How did it happen that Salina neither fell into a slough of despond nor wasted its energies on internecine conflicts over goals or means? How does it happen that Salina is probably a healthier community today than it was in November 1964? The answer to these questions is the problem undertaken in this report. We hope to indicate the factors in Salina's background, its situation and its character as a community which made such a result possible. In this we are especially concerned not only with the character of social organization in Salina, but also with the activities and policies of various government agencies, local, state and national, as they affected the response Salina as a community was able to make.

In the rest of this section we shall provide an introduction to Salina as a community and a description of the basic questions we attempted to answer in the research.

SALINA AS A COMMUNITY

Salina was founded and made the county seat of Saline County, Kansas in 1859 in what was then a relatively undeveloped portion of the Great Plains. Today Salina is the largest and most important city between Topeka, Kansas 112 miles to the East and Denver, Colorado, 445 miles to the West. It is the center of retail trade, serving a large area and around 1.5 million people, an agricultural industry center and a transportation center. It is located at the intersection of two important highways, U.S. 40 and U.S. 81 and at the intersection of Interstate Routes 70 and 35W.

Four railroads give Salina rail lines radiating in nine directions out of the City. Regular bus and airline services are also provided.

Throughout its history Salina's location has played an important part in determining its character. During its early years its economic support was derived from trading with farmers and Indians. Until recent years the flour milling and flour milling equipment industries, begun in 1861, provided along with retail trade, the economic mainstay of the community. Its industry, in addition to flour milling, includes the manufacture of farm implements, cement products, metal products, dairy products, beverages, machinery, amusement devices, tents, leather goods, brick and tile, furnaces, pumps, books and stationery.

In response to the expansion of the retail trade area, the community grew at a steady rate. At the turn of the century the population was 6,074, by 1920 it was 15,085 and by 1940 it was 21,018. Concomitant with the introduction of the U.S. military establishment in the 1940's Salina began a period of rapid population growth, so that by 1964 the civilian population was 41,293.

For many years Salina's population has been a community of long-term residents, many of them descendants of early Scandinavian immigrants, organized into a stable social structure which recognized differences in education, wealth and occupation. Part of this stable structure was a "power elite" of successful, educated and active persons interested in the community and its success. These leaders did not always agree with each other for they represented different economic, professional and political interests yet they met each other frequently in the Chamber of Commerce, Board of Trade, and other professional and social organizations. During recent years Salina was also the home of many Schilling AFB military, civilian and contract personnel and their dependents, many of whom participated in the churches and clubs of the community and were in other ways an important part of community life.

Although the community has been generally healthy, a

variety of problems unrelated to the military Base were apparent to the leaders of the community. The local milling industry has been affected by the changes in milling technology, freight rates, and in government support. Generally the milling of wheat has been shifted near to the areas of flour consumption and revised grain freight rates have fostered this shift of milling away from the wheat production areas. Like other American communities Salina has experienced a decline of the central business district. Along with this the expansion of the city threatened overly expensive extensions of city services in certain directions and finally the community recognized its dependence upon other than industry for its economic base. In addition a significantly high percentage (20.6 per cent) of Salina's housing was reported as deteriorating or dilapidated by the 1960 census.

Compounding these problems have been the fluctuations in the military activity in Salina. The community's first introduction to the U.S. military operations was the establishment of Camp Phillips, an early World War II Infantry Training Ground. The original Camp Phillips became Smoky Hill Air Force Base and by December, 1942, this base, located three miles south of Salina, was busy training B-17 flying fortress crews. In 1943 the Twentieth Bomber Command was formed and the Salina Base became the first in the U.S. to train B-29 Super Fortress crews. Finally in the fall of 1949 Smoky Hill AFB was closed.

At the outbreak of the Korean conflict, Smoky Hill was reactivated as a Strategic Air Command B-29 Base. The Department of Defense (DOD) declared Smoky Hill a permanent installation in July of 1953. At this time plans for a long range construction program were released. The Base, "home" of the 40th and 310th Bomber Wings, was renamed Schilling Air Force Base in March 1957.

Since its reactivation in 1952 Schilling AFB has contributed greatly to the Salina economy. In 1960 Schilling personnel received approximately \$25 million in payroll. Although Base personnel patronized the Post Exchange and Commissary for many of their consumer needs the large

percentage of their monthly paychecks found its way into the local economy. The payroll loss at the time of closing Announcement was less than the 1960 figure but was still in excess of \$20 million. In addition to the purchases for private needs made by Schilling personnel from their salaries, the Air Force Base made large purchases directly from the local economy. These purchases were approximately \$1,100,000 per fiscal year. In 1960 Schilling AFB alone spent \$970,680 in the local community for utilities, services and supplies.

These contributions to the local economy were variable during the years as changes in the use of the Base resulted in fluctuations in the number of personnel assigned, in the amount of construction activity, and in the nature of the purchases made in the local market.

Of considerable significance to the events which followed the Announcement of the Base closing was the presentation in September, 1964, by the Salina City Planning Commission of a comprehensive plan for the City's growth--the 701 Plan. A community data book was published in connection with the plan which provided much of the basic information necessary for considering the plan. This report was discussed at the variety of public meetings and reported in detail in the Salina Journal. There was an evening City planning meeting devoted to the discussion of this plan on the 18th of November, the day before the Announcement.

THE NATURE OF THE CASE

One important reason for examining the history of Salina's response to the closing of Schilling AFB is to see how one community was able to handle this kind of a crisis. It was clear from the start of the research that this was an important event with implications of a crisis for Salina. Schilling with 13,000 officers, men, civilian employees and dependents was over one-fourth of the population of Saline County and it was estimated that Schilling AFB contributed about \$35 million annually to the economy of the area. The loss of such a large segment of the population and of the economy is a serious social, economic and cultural blow to any community.

On the other hand, a community crisis can be identified, not by the seriousness of the event, but by the way in which the community responds to that event. For some communities very small events may lead to a crisis type response while in other cases even great natural catastrophes may be handled in an orderly fashion through established social organization, relationships, and leadership.

In these terms it is not so clear that the closing of Schilling AFB was a crisis for Salina. We found none of the typical indicators of a crisis: 1) there was no period of immobilizing shock, irrational excitement, milling or random efforts; 2) little time or energy was wasted on attempts to change the event itself, to make it "go away"; 3) there was no period of searching for goals or indecision as to the directions the community should go; and 4) there was no period of searching for new leadership or disagreements as to the agencies which should act.

Thus, instead of a study of crisis which this was to be at the start, it is a study of the way in which one community went about solving a problem with which it was faced. A crisis in terms of the seriousness of its potential consequences, but one that was handled within the framework of a set of established and unquestioned community goals, a set of established community organizations, and a set of community leaders.

As we shall show, a major factor in keeping this event within the problem-solving and out of the crisis pattern of response is to be found in the events of the first few days and hours in which established leaders affirmed their competence for continued leadership by defining the problem in acceptable terms and in initiating meaningful and relevant action. The fact that the Announcement was not the closing of the Base itself, still more than six months in the future, was of course an important element differentiating this crisis event from natural catastrophes.

Salinans themselves, various officials of the DOD and its agencies and other outsiders as well consider Salina an

instance of a successful solution to a serious community problem. But in what way is it successful? This judgment was made even before the full impact of the Pase closing could be manifested and long before the consequences of Salina's solutions could be felt. The criteria for success must therefore be elsewhere than in the final economic or social measures of the consequences.

In practical human affairs goals are often so complex and longrange and the consequences and effects of action so attenuated that we can seldom directly measure the extent to which particular activities lead to achievement of goals desired. Other criteria of success are then used. In communities there are three such criteria for successful problem solving: 1) A community is successful if it selects appropriate goals acceptable and meaningful to the members of the community and thus powerful enough to mobilize effort and loyalty. 2) A community is successful if it selects activities which are generally thought to be appropriate instruments for the achievement of those goals. Here we can distinguish between the expert judgment and community judgment, for communities may accept means and activities which have low efficiency and thus fail to solve the problem. Thus a primitive tribe may accept certain magical rites for the solution of drought. From the point of view of the outside meteorologist or agronomist it is clear that their problems of food supply will not be solved by this means, though the community may accept it as an adequate and appropriate solution.

Finally, 3) a community is thought to be successful in its problem solving when it institutionalizes its problem solving activities as an ongoing part of the normal community structure. In terms of this criterion a problem is solved when the process of solution is made the responsibility of a particular agency with the personnel and other resources for carrying out the activities decided upon. A community can be said to have solved its problems when and as long as it has allocated the problem solving activities to such an agency.

Salina is a successful case by all three of these criteria.

The goals to be achieved were accepted without question by the members of the community and are recognized by outsiders as appropriate ones. The means chosen were within the competence of the community and are generally believed to be appropriate and efficient techniques. And, the solution process was institutionalized even before the Base was officially closed. In this sense there was no crisis for the problem was solved before it arose.

The general research problem and the purpose of this report is to account for this success in each of its particulars. What were the factors in and the process through which Salina was able to define appropriate and meaningful goals powerful enough to gain widespread acceptance in the community and mobilize the effort necessary to achieve a solution. What were the factors in and the processes through which Salina defined the activities to be directed toward the achievement of the goals and the solution of the problem. Finally, what were the factors and processes that led to the particular institutionalization of the solution activities? From this we hope to learn something about the ways other communities might use Salina's experience as a guide for their own response to crisis events.

Communities are dynamic systems embedded in a complex social, cultural, political, economic and ecological environment. The character of this environment may have much to do with the final success of any community, but a community may achieve success in a hostile environment while another in a very supportive and rich environment may fail. It is not so much the character of the environment as it is the way in which the community uses that environment. And this depends upon two major aspects of the community itself: 1) the nature of the culture of the community--its beliefs and conceptions and knowledge and 2) the level and character of its social organization. A community with little knowledge of the political social or economic environment in which it is embedded has little chance of using that environment successfully. Similarly, a community divided by schisms and conflicts, without legitimate and capable leadership, or with weak and ineffectual agencies whether they be governmental

or voluntary associations has little chance of mobilizing itself to use that environment. For these reasons we shall pay particular attention to these two facts. The uniqueness of Salina lies more in its own history and the way in which that history led to the particular culture and social organization at the time of the crisis, than in the unique environment in which it existed.

Although the three major elements of community problem solving--goal determination, means definition, and institutionalization--are logically distinct and independent they are not always so clearly separated in community action. Where there are complex and conflicting goals the competition between them may be worked out in the process of defining the means to their achievement. Similarly, the decisions upon the nature and form of institutionalization may be involved in the decisions about the means to be used. In the Salina case we can identify three rather clear-cut stages in the response: Stage 1, the definition of the situation and identification of the problem; Stage 2, the mobilization of resources and definition of the means to be used, and Stage 3, the institutionalization of the solutions. In examining these stages we shall attempt to determine the extent to which the process and decisions at each stage were affected by the processes in the earlier stages and determined the character of the decisions at later stages. In this fashion we hope to achieve some sense of the interrelationship between the basic social process and the decision making and problem solving requirements.

In the sections which follow, devoted to each of these stages in turn, we shall first present a natural history account of the events and process of that stage and then analyze these events in terms of their contribution to the problem solving process. In the final section we shall focus on those factors especially important in the development of this case paying particular attention to the culture and social organization of the community.

First Stage--Defining the Problem

The notice that Schilling AFB would be closed came as a surprise and shock to the community. Although it was known that a number of military installations would be closed, Salinans, including those close to military affairs, generally believed that Schilling AFB would not be included. There was generally good reason for their optimism: modernization of base facilities had been recently undertaken; the Commanding Officer of the 310th Aerospace wing was in Arizona accepting an award for Schilling's top flight performance in cost reduction; and a Chamber of Commerce Committee was at Walker AFB to explain how to establish an effective base-community relationship as a result of Air Force recognition of the successful Salina-Schilling relationship. U.S. Senator Carlson said, "I had no inkling that it would be closed. I was surprised and shocked." Senator Pearson and Rep. Dole were also caught by surprise. Similarly, the high ranking Air Force officers at the Base had no forewarning.

On the evening of November 19, just a few hours after the Announcement, there was an informal meeting of city leaders including Chamber of Commerce officers, city commissioners, the Mayor and the City Manager. Widespread concern among the citizens of Salina was reported, the need for some positive action to allay unrest and anxiety was noted, and the suggestion that the city and Chamber jointly appoint a special committee to handle the crisis was approved. The City Manager issued a statement after this meeting in which he defined the closing as a problem that could be solved. He said:

Now is the time for Salinans to cinch their belt buckles and show Kansas we're bigger than the situation. We agreed that the worst thing that could happen to Salina now is for everyone to take a defeatist attitude and say that we can't go forward. This would be one of the most injurious things that could happen. We knew that sooner or later, Schilling would close--

we have always been aware of the possibility.
In the long run, the closing of Schilling could be beneficial, if Salinans will go to work.

The City Manager went on to point out that the recently completed 701 Plan for community development had many qualifications because of uncertainty about the future of the Base. He said considerable bitterness had been expressed by citizens over the short notice of the closing. However, he felt that short notice might actually expedite the City mobilizing all its resources to meet the crisis.

The next day, the editor of the Salina Journal, expressed this same interpretation in an editorial:

Whether or not SAFB can be revived or must be buried, the shock of the news has its good aspects for Salina as well as its bad. We are reminded that we are here to serve central and northwest Kansas and that is our prime reason for existence. We are at the hub of the highways; few towns are as fortunate. We have a good sound economic future, with or without the base. We have good leadership and good people. A crisis either knits a town together or disintegrates it. Let's reach for our bootstraps.

Emphasizing this view in action, the City Commission acted to place an industrial development tax levy on the April ballot only four days after the Announcement. Mayor Rundquist said of this:

Our needs have not changed. Salina will go on. There will be, certainly, a period of adjustment and it's going to hurt, but we can become a greater city because of this adversity.

About the same time, Commissioner R. W. Bull expressed the view indirectly:

The men and women of the Air Force families constitute the real and lasting loss Salina will

suffer--Salina has profited from the base, not only in our economic life but because of its people. They have been a part of our community and many have been interested in our civic life. They come and go, but their coming and going have left a great deal with us. We will recover from the economic impact of the closure, I have no doubt. But we're going to lose what these fine people have brought to us and we are going to miss them very much.

And, Commissioner Gaylord Spangler invited the people of Salina "to make their ideas known to the City government and the Chamber of Commerce on how we might best utilize what we have." There was immediate response to this invitation, both in letters to the editor of the Salina Journal and direct communications to the City Commission.

From the start there was hope by some at least that the solution to the problem lay in getting a reversal of the decision despite Secretary McNamara's statement on November 20th that his decision was "absolutely, unequivocally, without qualification irrevocable." This hope was fostered by the fact that at least a half dozen different armed forces groups arrived at the Base to check on its utilization and possible equipment for their programs. This hope led to the organization, with OEA help, of a meeting in Washington for December 14th which was preceded on December 9th by a town hall meeting to sample community sentiment and to provide advice for the delegation to the pentagon.

Members of the delegation privately told the research team that they felt the visit to Washington would fail to change the decision, but that it might open up channels of assistance and, most important, it would boost the morale of the community in that it was a positive effort and showed that the community leadership was doing everything it could to alleviate the crisis.

Editor Austin informed Salinans in full and with wit and good humor what happened to their delegation. They

received the "full treatment" from Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Eugene Zuckert, Secretary of the Air Force. After explaining in detail why technological changes in instruments of defense had made Schilling AFB obsolete with no remaining military mission the Pentagon officials suggested OEA would be glad to help Salina in working out plans with General Services Administration, Federal Housing, Federal Aviation Administration, Small Business Administration, and the various other alphabetical agencies. The OEA officials arranged to come to Salina on January 13, 14, and 15, 1965. In the meantime Congressman Dole opened an office in Salina, with a direct line to Washington, where activities of adjustment could be coordinated.

The various community leaders, the City Commission, the Chamber of Commerce, and others were going ahead with their discussion of ways to respond to the problem if in fact the Department of Defense decision could not be changed. The rapidity with which forward-moving activities took place after the Washington meeting testifies to the extent of this behind-the-scenes activity while the community was awaiting the results of the Washington hegira.

This first stage came to an end on December 24th, ten days after the Washington meeting, with the creation of the Schilling Development Council (SDC) and the appointment of a seven-man Coordinating Committee by the City and the Chamber of Commerce. This Council and its Coordinating Committee were given broad powers to act on behalf of the community in working out plans for the solution of the problems created or intensified by the closure of the Base. From this point on there was no question but that the situation was an economic problem to be solved, that it could be solved and that by properly exploiting the elements of the situation a better community could be achieved.

From one point of view it would appear that little had happened in this first month of the problem: leaders had met, public statements had been made about the problem, members of the community talked of little else in public

meetings and in informal gatherings, and a delegation had been sent to Washington on an impossible errand. In one sense what didn't happen is perhaps most significant: though the citizens were concerned and interested they were calm and generally rational in their response, though they were surprised they were not immobilized, and though some were fearful, anxious, and pessimistic most were hopeful and forward looking.

Yet from the point of view of later events in the problem solving process we can see that there were three important characteristics of this period:

1. Immediate, collective action;
2. by established community officials and agencies;
3. which defined the situation, specified the problem and established the goals for the community.

In the rest of this section we wish to focus attention on two aspects of this stage in order to understand how it contributed to the directions the community took in response to the crisis: 1) the character of the response at this stage and 2) the definition of the situation and the definition of the problem and community goals.

CHARACTER OF THE RESPONSE

There are three major factors that can be identified as significant in determining the character of the response of Salina to the Base closing Announcement--decisive early action by leaders, early definition of the situation by leaders, and the definitive character of the DOD announcements. Lying back of these and contributing to them are four more general factors--implicit preparedness, the quality of community organization and leadership, reassurance from the environment and what we have called the culture of control. Each of these contributed to the problem-solving and militated against the crisis form of response.

DECISIVE EARLY ACTION

That leadership is necessary is no surprise to any

reader of this report, but it is not always true that leaders do what is necessary in crisis events. It is then an important fact of the Salina case that the established leaders--the editor of the paper, the Mayor, the City Manager, the Chamber of Commerce leaders and others--acted quickly and effectively. This action had three major functions: 1) by focussing attention upon the leaders and by the quality of the action any tendencies toward public unrest were inhibited; 2) the action by the established, regular leadership and community organization the situation was defined as a normal one not requiring unusual responses; and 3) the quick action was both a reaffirmation of the legitimacy of their leadership and an expression of the previous legitimation.

EARLY DEFINITION

Unknown, strange and incomprehensible events are more conducive to random, irrational, and crisis behavior than are events which are explicable, clearly defined and for which responses are available. One of the major aspects of the early action by the leaders was the attempt to define the situation in meaningful as well as hopeful terms. The early and frequent statements by a variety of public officials, but most especially the extensive newspaper stories and editorials in the Salina Journal served to place the event within the world of the known and hence the world that could be controlled.

DECISIVENESS OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Even with Secretary McNamara's clear-cut and "absolutely final" statements there was still some hope for an attempt to secure a review of the decision. It is probable that if the Announcement of the closing of the Air Force Base had been given with any less decisiveness or if there had been any suggestion of wavering by Washington officials, then Salina might have spent much more time and wasted much of its energy and effort in what would have probably been fruitless attempts to reverse the inevitable.

IMPLICIT PREPAREDNESS

Although the manifest response was incredulity that

Schilling was included in the closings, nevertheless there is evidence that there was a latent recognition of this possibility and an implicit preparedness for it in the orientations of the members of the community. Not only had there been the closing of the Smoky Hill Base in 1949, only fifteen years earlier, but there had also been a continual process of expansion and contraction as wings moved in and out. Similarly, Salina had experienced the variations resulting from the movement of construction crews on the interstate highway systems. The 701 Plan published in September, 1964, comments on the changing roles of Schilling AFB and the dramatic effects these have had on the economy. It specifically recognizes that the future of military installations is difficult to forecast and hence argued for the need for industrial expansion to provide economic stability for the community. Although it is difficult to measure such a factor it is likely that Salinans were more prepared for the Announcement than they consciously admit. Their underlying attitudes and orientations would then foster the view that this was a known and expected and thus normal situation.

THE QUALITY OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

The decisiveness and effectiveness of the early action by the community leaders probably reflects both the quality of men selected for leadership in Salina and the degree of institutionalization of their leadership. Salina has a long history as an integrated, well organized community with few manifest schisms or open differences between population segments or interest groups. This is an important background factor which helps account both for the confidence with which leaders acted and for the high degree of cooperation between the several leadership organizations.

The particular character of the problem required a kind of total community response not possible through any single existing institution. The creation of the special committee, representing the community as a whole and legitimized by both the Chamber of Commerce and the City government was thus of special significance. That it could be created

so quickly with few formal arrangements suggests that there is a longer history of cooperation among the several institutions and their officials.

The handling of the representation to Washington particularly reflects the skill of the leaders. It is clear from the data that few if any of the community leaders had any confidence in the possibility of changing the decision. To support the attempt thus seems irrational except as an expert piece of community dynamics. The visit to Washington had two major consequences: 1) it closed for good at an early point the irrational and debilitating hope by some that the problem could be done away with, and 2) it assured all members of the community that the leaders were taking account of their interests and were "doing everything possible" in the situation and thus provided a further legitimization of the established leadership.

REASSURANCES

The record of this period indicates two kinds of reassurances that Salina received from its environment. The importance of this factor alone would be slight, but it served to confirm and give support to the definition of the situation being developed by the leaders. The most obvious reassurances were the offers of continuing assistance received from the governmental structure, the several legislators from the district and the Federal agencies, especially the Office of Economic Adjustment. These were important not only as offers of help, but also as assurances that others were concerned with what happened in Salina.

The second kind of reassurance came from other communities in the region which had faced and weathered similar events. These were usually in the form of newspaper editorials which assured Salina that though things looked black it too could survive. Though subtle and indirect each of these kinds of communications were important in defining the situation as a solvable problem.

CULTURE OF CONTROL

Salinans in common with others in the region evidence

an underlying conception of the world and a set of beliefs that is a compound of a belief in God and a faith in one's own efforts. It is optimistic in the sense that hard work will triumph against great odds, and it is moral in the sense that those who are wronged will win in the end. It is a point of view that comes out of the great plains frontier that is perhaps best summarized by the title of a film produced for farmers, "By Their Own Hands", involving the orientations of independence, activity, self-reliance, and "taking the bull by the horns." These orientations appear to underlie the City Manager's early statement--"Now is the time . . . to cinch our belt buckles and show Kansas . . . the closing of Schilling could be beneficial if Salinans will go to work"-- and in the many public statements which followed.

DEFINING THE GOALS

The closing of a facility such as Schilling AFB has a number of consequences for local communities: social, political, cultural, and economic. From the first, Salina defined its problem primarily as an economic one. Despite the references to the loss of friends and personnel resources, despite the recognition by some that the loss of the Base would influence the world view of Salinans and their children, and despite the apparent impact upon a number of existing social clubs and other organizations the problem was seen almost entirely in economic terms. The major orientation of the community and of its leaders was to the economic impact of the Base closing--the loss of purchasing power, the reduction in pay rolls, the loss of tax base, the threat of depressed real-estate market.

The most immediate factor which can account for this definition of the problem is the 701 Plan discussed at a public meeting the night before the Announcement of the closing of the Base. But behind this lies the general belief system of the community and the underlying conceptions and orientations implicit in Salina's history.

THE ROLE OF THE 701 PLAN

For some months the community had been systematically

working on a plan for community development in which many persons had been involved and to which many had contributed. The generation of this plan required the specification of and consensus upon goals for the future of the community. In addition it spelled out a variety of programs for reaching these goals. It was particularly fortuitous that this plan had been developed just immediately prior to the Announcement of the closing of Schilling AFB for it provided for and symbolically represented a community agreement about its future. That it was so recent meant that this was a viable document and one to which Salinans could give allegiance. The goals and means for responding to the crisis were thus at hand.

Second State--The Mobilization of Resources

By mid-December, 1964, the situation had been defined as a problem-solving one and not as a crisis, established leadership had asserted its legitimacy to act, and the goals to be achieved had been defined. In particular the problem had been defined as basically an economic one and as an elaboration of the continuing problems already identified in the 701 Plan. As a consequence many solution activities had already been identified, institutionalized, and initiated. The Base closing Announcement merely gave greater pertinence and immediacy to this work. Thus, the Economic Development Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, already charged with the search for new industry, was encouraged to quicker and more intensive effort. It is in this sense that many of the activities characteristic of the third stage of problem solving began within this period. We shall discuss these in the next section.

At this point in the history of the crisis it appeared to the community that three things needed to be done 1) the mobilization of existing agencies and programs for intensive effort on the solution of the economic problems, 2) the search for additional solution activities, and 3) the planning for the exploitation of the Base facilities as part of the solution. The second stage began when the responsibilities for these activities were delegated to the specially created Schilling Development Council. In this section we are primarily concerned with the nature of this organization and the activity it carried out on behalf of the community.

Both Mayor Rundquist and president-elect Engstrom of the Chamber of Commerce had recognized the need for a broadly-based, flexible community agency to coordinate the Schilling re-development. Secretary Vance of Defense and Mr. Bradford of OEA had also recommended the formation of a community agency with broad powers through which Federal officials could deal with the community. So both the City Commission and the Chamber of Commerce were asked and gave their heads

authority to jointly appoint a coordinating council. On December 24, 1964 the following persons were named to the seven-man Coordinating Committee of the Schilling Development Council: the vice-president of the Kansas Power and Light Co., the business agent of the Hoisting Engineers Union, a City Commissioner, the chairman of the Industrial Development Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, a lawyer, the president of a building and loan association and the editor of the Salina Journal. In addition there was an advisory committee made up of the Mayor, the City Manager, the Chairman of the County Commissioners, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Commerce Manager, the Superintendent of Schools and several others representing different interests in the community to a total of 15 members. Members of this advisory board met with the executive committee only when information or advice were needed, or when there was a special task to perform.

The early jurisdiction and operating procedures of the Schilling Development Council were uncertain and it had no funds of its own. The City could give no financial assistance as there were no budgeted funds for this. The Chamber of Commerce was on a limited budget but made enough funds available for the Council to operate. Many Council members contributed the money for their own expenses. For three months the Wilson Engineering Company contributed the services of Robert McAuliffe to serve as the Executive Officer of the Council. McAuliffe had helped engineer the construction of Schilling AFB, had also built other bases, and was the author of the 701 Plan for future development of Salina.

The first task of the SDC was to prepare for the visit of OEA and other Federal and State officials on January 13-15, 1965. Small groups of Salina citizens and some other Kansans were organized to meet with these officials concerning the potential uses of the Base and other aspects of community development. Among the special interests around which small groups were organized were airport, education, highways, hospital, housing, industry, small business, parks and recreation, urban renewal, utilities, and vocational training.

A public meeting was held the evening of January 14 at

which Bradford and other Federal officials spoke to an audience of over 1,400 persons. They described how they had assisted other communities and how they could help Salina. The keynote of Bradford's remarks was,

What happens to the base depends upon decisions made in Salina by Salinans... . We don't have the brains and we certainly don't have the gall to say that we in Washington know what is best for Salina. The people who know that are the people who live here. But there can be, if Salina wants it, help and counsel. The leadership and decisions, however, must come from Salina.

This was basic OEA policy and it gave Salina the mandate to make its own decisions.

On January 22 the Schilling Development Council announced its first major policy decision:

Schilling Air Force Base's future use is to be tied to industrial expansion. The aim is to create jobs and pay rolls for Salina and the area. At the same time the Council does not rule out other uses which have been suggested.

Chairman Williamson said that many suggestions for use of various parts of the Base have been received, that all would receive consideration and that more ideas were welcome.

In the meantime, other developments were underway. The City Commission set February 23 as the date for a special bond election of \$1.1 million for the City's share of a jointly-occupied city-county governmental center and \$675,000 for a new public library. The bonds carried by a ratio of 2 to 1 giving official public endorsement of the point of view and essential optimism of the position taken by community leaders since the closing Announcement. The need for a new civic center had been discussed for several years and a feasibility study had been included as a supplement to the 701 Plan. Regional representatives of HHFA, who had been

in Salina for the January 14 town meeting had suggested that an urban renewal program could help finance the site costs of the proposed civic center. The mayor reconvened an eight-man committee which had earlier studied the joint occupancy proposal and it and the City Commission recommended that the City should seek urban renewal funds, and thus began what became Urban Renewal Project #1.

The Salina school district had already decided to open an area vocational technical school in the fall of 1965. Now the school administrators postponed action on a proposed February bond issue for a new building in anticipation that some of the surplus buildings at Schilling AFB might serve their purpose. They also began action to try to keep equipment on the Base that would be useful in vocational training.

On January 16, 1965 a team of educators from Kansas State University visited Salina to investigate the possibilities of Schilling AFB as a site for a technical institute which they felt was needed to complement the State's educational resources. Such an institute had been recommended in the Eurich Report on Higher Education in Kansas in 1962. Dean Paul Russell of Kansas State University had assembled additional data from engineering and technical societies indicating the need for technical training that might be given at such an institution. Dean Russell said,

We have proposed a technical institute several times but the cost has appeared prohibitive. But now with Schilling available at virtually no cost, an institute could be opened with the least possible investment. The Salina location would be ideal.

Thus began the effort of the Schilling Development Council to mobilize the resources of the community to establish the Schilling Technical Institute in Salina, and its establishment became one of the major activities of the Schilling Development Council in its four months of life. Enabling legislation was necessary in order to organize a governing board and to provide the necessary finances. The Development Council provided the leadership and effort to accomplish this.

Salina's representatives led the effort within the legislature. Chairman Williamson of the Development Council led the parade of witnesses that testified for the Schilling Institute bill. Business, professional and labor leaders in Salina utilized all their normal lobbying procedures in favor of the bill. The aircraft industries testified to the need for technicians. Newspaper editors from other towns lent their support. A local business man who had been one of the principal contributors to Governor Avery's campaign fund and a friend since boyhood, was asked to use his influence with the Governor. As one informant said, "We lobbied like hell," and the effort was successful for Schilling Technical Institute was created by the Kansas Legislature in April 1965, and a delegation of 25 Salina citizens went to Topeka to see the Governor sign the bill.

The Technical Institute later applied for the use of 195 acres of land on the Base which included some 18 structures to become classrooms and laboratories and some 31 other buildings to house, feed, and otherwise care for students. When the final Technical Institute package was granted it contained 68 buildings valued at \$2,149,000. Salinans anticipated that the Institute might become another major state educational institution with a projected enrollment of 1,500. The budget for 1966-67 was \$647,954 of which only \$211,200 was from the State general fund, the rest coming from Federal funds and student fees.

Thus the Schilling Development Council's first major project was successful in that it disposed of a large and important part of the physical structures of the Base for a purpose that was socially valuable. It might eventually attract a large number of students and staff to Salina and thereby expand the economy, with a minimum cost in State funds and little local expenditure.

Through the leadership of the Schilling Development Council task forces of the community's leaders were formed to promote the various sectors of adjustment such as the development of new economic enterprise, effective use of the Base hospital, development of the airport, and promotion of educational activity. Each of these aspects was

placed in the hands of leaders who had some special skill and interest in that particular activity for the most part they were successful local business leaders who worked hard at their assigned tasks, often to the neglect of their own business. They collaborated frequently with each other and used regular informal channels of communication and influence that they were accustomed to using. They mobilized the influence and relationships they had built up through the years in their normal activities to effect the special community objectives they took on.

The Schilling Development Council coordinated its activities in industrial and economic development closely with the Economic Development Committee (EDC) of the Chamber of Commerce. A local attorney was chairman of the Economic Development Committee and a member of the Schilling Development Council. This made possible a close coordination of the activities of these two groups. In Stage Three we shall describe the activities of the EDC during this period which were part of their normal mandate, though intensified and coordinated with the SDC.

As part of its assistance to the Economic Development Committee's activities the SDC produced a brief brochure, "Schilling Bonanza Available to Industry," which was available by January 31, 1965. This brochure was distributed broadcast by Salina businesses and citizens in their routine contacts with customers and suppliers.

From the beginning the Schilling Development Council had been primarily concerned with the development of a policy for the use of the Base as a whole. On March 16, 1965 it announced a five-part proposal that would be sent to various Washington agencies for their approval. This included: 1) An airport "package" including a municipal airport and supporting facilities, 2) The Salina area vocational school in a five-building complex, 3) The proposed technical institute with supporting facilities as described above, 4) Medical or educational use of the Base hospital and community facilities area, 5) Sites and or buildings for industry.

The Schilling Development Council was purely an ad hoc

planning body without authority to tax or to receive property. With the development of the proposal for the use of the Base facilities the necessity for a legally competent body became apparent. The OEA had pointed out that special authorities had worked well in other areas. As a consequence local attorneys studied the laws regulating such special agencies as port and airport authorities and drew up a bill for presentation to the State Legislature that they thought would meet Salina's needs. Typical of the procedures used during this period was that the first draft of the measure was approved at a meeting of City commissioners, other City officials, representatives of the executive committee of the Chamber of Commerce and the Schilling Development Council.

The proposal, which became Senate Bill No. 235, authorized the City Commission to create a five-man board which would administer activities of a Salina airport and which had authority to acquire property at Schilling for conversion to civilian use. The Airport Authority was to have the power to own, maintain, operate, improve, develop, and dispose of such property. It could levy taxes up to three mills and issue general obligation bonds, revenue, bonds, and warrants to provide the necessary revenues with the consent of the City Commission.

With the passage of this bill and its publication in the official state paper on April 16, 1965 and the passage of Salina City Ordinance No. 6854 on April 26, 1965 establishing the Salina Airport Authority under the provisions of this bill, the activities of the Schilling Development Council were transferred to the Airport Authority and the period of first mobilization came to an end only five months after the DOD Announcement.

When the Schilling Development Council was disbanded and its activities assumed by the Airport Authority, the Salina Journal carried a "Well Done" editorial for John Williamson, chairman:

For four months he has neglected his business.
He has been everywhere but on the job that pays his

salary. John has been busy working for Salina. As head of SDC, he has been guiding the change over of the base from military to civilian uses. It has been a pioneer job, unchartered, full of problems, headaches, complicated chores. And Williamson has done it well, so well that formally constituted boards may now take over. It is not often that a large corporation like KPL has such an excess of public spirit that it will not only allow but encourage one of its key executives to tackle such a civic assignment.

Williamson was only one of at least twenty civic leaders of Salina of whom the same might be said during this period of meeting the crisis and mobilization of resources.

During this period from December 24th to April 26th there were many activities in the community that are meaningful and important primarily as part of the maintenance of morale, mobilization of manpower, and incentive to effort. Typical was the special public relations committee created by the Chamber of Commerce "to sell Salina to Salinans" and to encourage support for the recruitment of industry. The committee called all filling station attendants to a special meeting to explain the effort and to distribute badges bearing the slogan "Ask Me about Salina--City on the Move." Store clerks were given similar buttons which read "Shop Salina--City on the Move." Similar efforts were made with the various community service organizations.

One purpose of these programs was the conscious effort to "get everyone into the picture" with a task to perform. One consequence of this was that a very large number of Salina residents did become actively involved in the re-adjustment process at one time or another.

A similar evidence of commitment and the success of the mobilization to the task was that two Salina union locals, the carpenters and brickmasons, pledged themselves to forego a wage increase for a year as their part of the recovery effort. They had previously opened negotiations asking for

10 cents an hour increase as of April 1, 1965 and an additional increase of 15 cents on April 1, 1966. The Salina Builder's Association applauded this as "civic-minded and unselfish."

This stage was also marked by close and effective cooperation of City government, County officials, the Chamber of Commerce, Board of Education. While County government had sometimes been at odds with those desiring community development, they now collaborated fully. Similarly, motel owners who had earlier opposed the Community Inn and Convention Center plans now not only ceased their opposition, but also bought stock in the enterprise.

Two major processes can be discerned in Stage Two:

1) The mobilization of the special effort necessary to the problem solving process and 2) the further narrowing of the problematic and unsolved by the institutionalization of the problem solving activities. At the start of the second stage there had been an implicit decision that the problem of the Base closing could be solved by an elaboration and intensified implementation of the economic development plans already established and underway and by the effective utilization of the Base property. To solve the problem then it was necessary only to give the necessary impetus to the activities of the Economic Development Council, to implement other programs supportive of this plan, and to find an agency which would take over the responsibility of the development of the Base property.

The effectiveness of the mobilization is demonstrated not only by the involvement of many people, but also by the support given by all segments of the population to programs which were now defined as part of the recovery effort.

The major factors in this effective mobilization appear to be 1) the definition of the problem in terms of known problems, that is, in terms of problems whose solution activities are known and part of the skills of the community, 2) the added goal of becoming a better community as a result

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of the crisis, and 3) the implicit conception and recognition that the special effort needed was for a short period.

Stage Three--Institutionalization

The fortuitous circumstance (though one demonstrating Salina's strength and organization as a community) that the comprehensive 701 Plan had been prepared just prior to the closing Announcement made it possible for Salina to avoid much of the problem-solving, crisis-meeting activities that other communities would have to undertake after such an Announcement. Community goals had been discussed and agreed upon, a wide variety of programs had been developed for reaching those goals, and the activities necessary to carrying out those programs had been allocated to various community agencies either directly or implicitly.

As a consequence once the problem had been defined as fitting within the general set of problems identified in this plan, it was necessary only to intensify and speed up the programs and activities already enunciated. That is, it was possible for Salina to move directly from problem definition to problem solution without the usual steps of goal definition, means identification, and technique development with the attendant problems of gaining consensus.

As we indicated earlier one criterion for the solution of community problems is the institutionalization of the solution activities, the allocation of these activities to a permanent, on-going organization or set of organizations which have the special responsibility for carrying out these activities thus relieving the community in general of concern with them. In this sense, except for the exploitation of the Base property and facilities, the problem was solved by January, 1965, for by that time the Base closing had been identified as merely an intensification of existing and known problem of economic development and was thus turned over to the existing agencies for their effort and implementation. In this section we will describe these several agencies and the ways in which their continuing assignments were intensified and affected by the Base closing. We shall then go on to a description of the new agency, the Salina Airport Authority, created to specifically handle the utilization of the Schilling AFB property. The major continuing agencies were the

Economic Development Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, the City and County Governments, and several other less central organizations which we shall briefly mention.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

The Economic Development Committee, though officially a part of the Chamber of Commerce, is in many ways an arm of the community at large, and with 128 members in January 1965 it included a wide range of interests and specialized skills. The major tasks of the committee as defined by the 701 Plan were to secure the kind of industrial and financial institutions which would expand Salina's economic base and make it more stable, less subject to fluctuations.

The Committee began its intensive efforts after a meeting on January 29, 1965 at which the Chairman reported that several industrial prospects had already been contacted. Although the need for a fulltime industrial prospector for the Chamber of Commerce had been recognized and a search for a suitable person was then going on, the Chairman warned the group that "We must do much of this ourselves."

On February 5, a task force of 17 men agreed to accept assignments for following up industrial prospects. Once a person was assigned to a particular prospect the individual was responsible for all contacts and obtaining the necessary information. This, however, might involve a large number of Salina men contributing relevant data to the project. For example, on March 2, three representatives of the EDC visited a firm in the East. One was a realtor and knew land values and land availability, another was a journalist who had handled labor negotiations for his paper and knew the labor situation, and the third was an official of the local power company who knew about utility rates, power supply, water supply, and the like. About a dozen Salina men assembled information on shipping rates, transportation time schedules, labor cost, labor supply in specific classifications, and water and sewage information. Over 300 man-hours of research went into this presentation, and most of those actively involved were already well-informed in their specialized fields.

There was an effort to coordinate the local activities with those of the Kansas Economic Development Commission. On February 14, 1965, several Salina officials attended the Governor's Economic Development Conference in Topeka and there contacted an industrial relocation specialist in private practice who later was active in some of the efforts to attract industry to Salina. On April 12, the Kansas Economic Development Commission met in Salina to inspect the facilities available at the Base.

Many of the leaders in the Economic Development Committee and the Schilling Development Council had devoted very large amounts of their time to civic enterprise to the neglect of their own business and professional interests during this period of December 1964 through April 1965. The Chairman of the EDC resigned in the middle of March stating that he simply had to return to his professional practice. At this time the operating policy of the EDC was changed by the two new co-chairmen taking a less active role, placing more of the responsibility upon the professionals, and using the EDC as a sounding board and as consultants rather than as promoters. The Economic Development Committee was very active during the mobilization period, but after July 1965 the services of a professional industrial developer relieved the members of much of the detail allowing them to serve more in the nature of an advisory committee. The consultation with committee members was broadened at the same time the detailed work became more centralized. The basic committee consisted of 60-80 members, but there was a smaller executive committee that was the main working body composed of the co-chairmen, the industrial development specialist and a representative of the Chamber of Commerce Board. The 17-man task force described earlier then became the sounding board for this executive committee which met frequently.

After the industrial developer was hired the EDC members have not taken any trips specifically to attract new industries. The Committee's view is that the firms should come to Salina if they want to understand the possibilities of locating there. The EDC did not employ private consultants and did not feel the need of them, because in most cases the various

firms initiated the contacts.

The EDC has been closely identified with each of the other agencies involved in the response to the crisis. The integration of efforts has been indicated in the description of the brochure prepared by the SDC and the activities of the Public Relations committee in "selling Salina to Salinans." In addition, although the EDC has no legal authority, it does work closely with the City Commission and its activity is supported in part by the City's industrial levy. A committee composed of both Chamber and Commission members determine the amount of money given to the Chamber for industrial development purposes.

The EDC and the Salina Airport Authority (to be discussed later) have overlapping responsibilities. The SAA tends to see the EDC function as that of locating lessees to the Base rather than elsewhere in Salina. There is an effort at integration in that one member of the SAA sits with the EDC steering committee.

The most significant episode in the economic aspects of recovery of Salina was the decision of Westinghouse to locate a fluorescent lamp factory there. This was a tremendous boost to the morale of the community for the construction of a \$25 million plant with the potential employment of 500 persons was a striking achievement of the Economic Development Committee. The company had planned expansion for some time and had investigated sites in some 20 states. Its vice-president in charge of the southwest region, formerly a salesman for the Wichita-Salina area, had suggested Salina as a likely location. In late April 1965 quiet inquiries and requests for data were made of the Chamber of Commerce. Then various Westinghouse representatives visited the community and met with community leaders who assembled the required information. At least 20 persons in Salina worked to obtain the necessary data but the primary responsibility rested with the co-chairmen of EDC, the Chamber of Commerce board representative on EDC, the Chamber of Commerce secretary, and the realtor who arranged the land acquisition. The Chamber of Commerce president was particularly important in

the initial negotiations. One of these said that five persons spent the equivalent of 90 days each on the Westinghouse promotion, without any special compensation.

Close cooperation between City, County and company provided the necessary utilities and roads with some of the expenses paid from City and County industrial development funds.

Another inducement to the company was an agreement to freeze the assessed valuation of the plant for a period of ten years. It was the first time this provision of Kansas law had been used in Salina. This arrangement was worked out jointly by the County commissioners, County assessor, and Westinghouse officials.

The impact of the crisis stimulated the cooperation and willingness of County officials to make the concessions described above. One informant asserted that if Westinghouse had attempted to come in a year earlier they would have found a different attitude and might have concluded that Salina was not interested in them. He thought the experience of attempting to attract industry had educated County officials to the realization that an assessment freeze might ultimately raise the assessed valuation of a county far more than was lost by the tax concession.

Westinghouse officials said that they were attracted by physical advantages, the excellent transportation facilities, and the people. Vice President R. H. Wagner said,

We feel that the attitude of the people in the Salina area is such that the new operation will be a complete success. I think the thing about this community which impressed me most was the enthusiasm and friendliness of the local citizens.

The Westinghouse acquisition was important to the economy, but it was even more important for the morale of the citizens. A realtor said, "The success with Westinghouse

really put Salina over the hump. It was significant to other firms and bolstered the confidence of Salinans."

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

We have already indicated the importance of the Mayor, City Manager and City commissioners in the early months of the problem--their participation both informally and in their official capacities in the first meeting after the Announcement, their cooperation in establishing the Schilling Development Council, and in other events. The Westinghouse case cited above indicates another aspect of the City government's continued involvement in the problem-solving activities.

There was one program uniquely the responsibility of the governmental agencies that is important both for indicating how the Announcement spurred on programs that had been started as well as how the governments were an important part of the community-wide response to the problem. This was the Civic Center program which led to the development of two urban renewal projects.

For several years the need for more adequate City and County governmental buildings had been apparent. A firm of consulting engineers had been commissioned to make preliminary feasibility studies for a combined civic center. These were completed in the spring of 1964 and were summarized in the 701 Plan published in September.

After the Schilling Announcement the City decided to go ahead with its plans to participate in the joint proposal and on January 17th announced a bond election to be held February 23, 1965. This would authorize \$1.1 million in bonds for a new city building and \$675,000 for a new public library. The Board of Education had already accumulated \$350,000 for its share for administrative offices and the County had raised \$400,000 through its building levy.

The chairman of a 40-man Citizens' Committee to promote the bond issue probably stated the prevailing mood of the community with this campaign speech:

This isn't the time for Salina to put on an air of defeatism. We're moving into a new period of the development of our community. We can demonstrate our faith in ourselves by recognizing our needs and displaying our ability to satisfy those needs. Perhaps more than any other time in Salina's history we need to display our courage. If nothing else it will give our morale a terrific lift to know that our community is unafraid. Salina should project an image to industrial prospects of a progressive city, one which recognizes our needs and does something about them.

On the eve of the election in an editorial entitled, "Operation Bootstrap--Operation Courage" the Salina Journal pointed out that nearly every organization in Salina had endorsed the bond issues, and presented four economic and utilitarian arguments concluding: "The whole state is looking at Salina--How is the town standing the loss of Schilling? Will it go up or down?" and "National industry is looking at Salina. Is it a progressive town? Is it a good factory site? Will employees and executives want to live there?"

The bond proposal carried two to one. The Chamber of Commerce lauded the result saying, "it will do much to convince existing and future industrial prospects that Salina is truly a city on the move." One industrial prospect called the day after the election to learn its outcome as did the OEA from Washington. The Chamber of Commerce informed its other industrial prospects of the results saying, "This election holds great importance to our industrial efforts."

In the early planning for the Civic Center there had been some talk of applying for Urban Renewal funds, but no steps had been taken toward this. The possibility of using such funds for site acquisition had been suggested by the visiting team which included HHFA officials. However, they made it very clear that the initiative had to come from Salina: "It's up to you" whether or not to apply for urban renewal funds. Regional HHFA officials then visited the City on January 22nd.

The first positive step toward tying urban renewal to the civic center came on March 15, 1965 when the City Commission appointed 72 citizens to an advisory committee to explore the prospects, advantages, and liabilities of using urban renewal. The committee was very broadly based in an effort to represent and obtain the viewpoints of all segments of the community.

The advisory committee, after a public meeting, recommended that the City Commission proceed by applying for an urban renewal planning grant which it did on March 23. Regional officials met again on March 30 with 60 members of the advisory committee emphasizing the need for community-wide support. Objection was raised by some citizens at the meeting that the civic center project would do little to clear the blight in Salina as there were more deteriorated areas elsewhere. However, out of 125 dwellings in the area, the HHFA rated 95 as deficient. Regional officials also pointed out that the City must appoint an Urban Housing Agency to administer the urban renewal program if it wanted to proceed further.

On April 6, 1965 the City Commission passed the two resolutions prerequisite for urban renewal: 1) that a blighted area exists in Salina, and 2) it believes the best method to combat this blight is by the creation of an urban renewal agency. These paved the way for the appointment on April 13 of a five-man Urban Renewal Agency.

After it organized the Agency applied to HHFA for a loan for planning purposes. This loan is repayable only if the project is completed. The City Commission by resolution approved this step. On April 27 ten Salinans took the application to the regional office in Ft. Worth.

The proposal was approved by HHFA on June 10 and \$90,545 was loaned to the Salina Agency for planning. Nine hundred and fifty-two thousand and fifteen dollars were ear-marked for the project. The next step was to hire personnel and to prepare a detailed program of site acquisition, socio-economic studies and architectural studies. The first full time director of Urban Renewal assumed his duties on August 1, 1965.

A second project was proposed later in the year for which planning funds and approval were secured primarily for industrial development uses. However, from this point the history is more typical of urban renewal projects than it is of the problem with which we are concerned.

SALINA AIRPORT AUTHORITY

The Salina Airport Authority is the only continuing agency specifically created as a result of the crisis event and the only one whose activities were not simple elaborations of pre-crisis programs. With the definition of the loss of Schilling as primarily an intensification of existing economic problems the only unique character of the event was the availability of the airbase for use in solving the community problems.

The basic policies and goals for the exploitation of the Base facilities had been worked out by the Schilling Development Council in the five-package proposal submitted to Washington before the creation of the Airport Authority. The task of the new agency was thus the implementation of these plans and it is in this sense that it represents the final solution to the community problem created by the Schilling AFB closing.

In fact, major steps had already been made for the disposition of the Base property by the time the Airport Authority was created in mid-April 1965. The central responsibility of the Authority was to work out the land transfers necessary for the division of the Base into the five packages defined by the original proposal. This involved working closely with the General Services Administration, and with potential users as well as with other community agencies in order to secure the various kinds of assistance and cooperation required in each case.

AIRPORT PACKAGE

The first "package" to be worked out by the Airport Authority was the airport itself involving 1827 of the 3034 acres in the Base. It includes both the mammoth runways, the

airfield apron and about 40 buildings--the hangars, warehouses, motor pool, water and sewage treatment facilities, and the "Minute Manor" which became the highway patrol training center. These facilities made it possible for the Airport Authority to move the Salina Municipal Airport to the Base and eventually to establish one of the outstanding non-metropolitan airports in the United States.

About 30 buildings in the airport package are not needed for the use of the airport proper. These became available for lease to help support the cost of operating the airport, and thus the Salina Airport Authority in conjunction with the Economic Development Committee continued the active search for potential industrial users. Since several of these buildings were hangars, and there were the advantages of the nearby airport, this search focussed especially on the aircraft industry and closely related activities.

By January 10, 1966 the General Services Administration had approved the transfer of the "airport" package to the Airport Authority, this usage having been previously cleared by the Federal Aviation Agency. By March 5, 1966 the Authority had completed the leasing of the hangars, but noted it had plenty of other buildings that would be suitable for industrial use. On May 14, 1966 it proposed that the city of Salina annex the Base to facilitate police and fire protection, street maintenance, and to operate the water and sewage facilities that came with the airport package. This was accomplished on July 27, 1966 with the City Commission approving a tax stabilization plan designed to be attractive to industries considering locating on Base property.

BASE HOSPITAL PACKAGE

Perhaps the most difficult and certainly the most complex problem for the Airport Authority concerned the disposition of the Base hospital facilities. This was a difficult problem because these were the prime assets of the Base, quick disposition for medical or education purposes was desired so that less appropriate use could be avoided, several different groups made claims upon it, and several of the proposals

involved the necessity for legislative and other State government action.

When the Schilling Development Council was formed in late December 1964 it set up a sub-committee to undertake the disposition of the Base hospital. When the public meetings were held with the Federal officials in January 1965 the meeting on the Base hospital was attended by the President of the Kansas Association for Retarded Children who was interested in establishing better facilities for the care of the retarded. In cooperation with Salina physicians, and others in Salina and around the State attempts were made to have the State legislature establish a center for the mentally retarded in the Base hospital. However, the Chairman of the State Board of Social Welfare was opposed to the plan and persuaded the governor to disapprove the request.

Following this the Chairman of the SDC committee worked to interest various other groups in the use of the facilities. His activities were so extensive that it was said he approached every group with a medical or health related interest except the Christian Scientists.

Subsequent to the February 17th decision against the mental retardation center and with the failure of the SDC committee to find any health related use Kansas Wesleyan University, a small liberal arts college located in Salina, began to develop plans for the use of the hospital, the Bachelor Officers Quarters and the officers club for a split-campus program. The University obtained a planning grant from the Ford Foundation and engaged a firm of consultants. At first there was divided opinion in the college itself as to the wisdom of this plan, however the staff eventually decided to make a proposal and thereafter vigorously pushed the plan. In a special meeting in July the Kansas Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, the parent body of the college, voted in favor of this plan. On July 11, 1965 the Kansas Wesleyan proposal was submitted to the Surplus Property Utilization Division of HEW.

In the meantime the State Department of Vocational

Rehabilitation became interested in the same facilities.

The Chairman of the SDC committee was told of this interest and he invited the State Director of Vocational Rehabilitation to come to Salina to survey the possibilities on June 22nd. Three days later he wrote the Chairman of the SDC committee a long letter sketching out the uses that Vocational Rehabilitation could make of the hospital facilities. In this he asked for an expression of community sentiment concerning having handicapped persons as trainees in the community.

On July 2, 1965 the chairman of the SDC committee called a special meeting of the Chamber of Commerce. He read the letter and called for a vote on the proposal. There was unanimous agreement that Salina should try to get such a center. Following this meeting the Chairman of the new Airport Authority wrote the Director a letter reiterating that the Authority and the Community wanted the center. Copies of this were sent to all agencies which would have to act on the Vocational Rehabilitation proposal.

It was then necessary for the State Board of Vocational Rehabilitation which had approved the plan on July 9th to secure the Governor's approval to go ahead with the plan. This involved complex administrative and political issues but a number of politically powerful and important persons and groups got behind the proposal and pressured the Governor for a favorable decision. On August 4th the Governor announced that the State was making application for the Base hospital and some other structures for use as a vocational rehabilitation center, and on August 6th this application was made to HEW.

The community now faced a difficult problem with two competing applications for the same Base facilities. Most of the community leaders felt that the rehabilitation center proposal was more socially useful and thus more clearly met one of the basic principles of surplus property disposal. Furthermore it would bring outside money into Salina, whereas the Wesleyan proposal would likely require additional local support such as the college had regularly sought in the past.

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Some citizens were not enthusiastic about Wesleyan's mission and were opposed to expansion plans. It is possible that some were not favorable on sectarian grounds, at least this interpretation was made by some Wesleyan supporters.

On the other hand, many community leaders were loyal supporters of Kansas Wesleyan and they were now placed in the position of having to make a difficult choice. For a while it was hoped that HEW would make the decision. This it steadfastly refused to do, insisting that the community had to come up with a unified program. Consequently, influential persons in the Chamber of Commerce and the Airport Authority put pressure on the Kansas Wesleyan administration and late in September the college withdrew its application.

The Airport Authority offered the college a lease on 25-30 acres of open land for an athletic field so that its present field could be used for academic expansion. KWU decided against this. In March 1966 a fund drive to raise \$2.5 million for a new science hall, a new dormitory and to improve faculty salaries was announced. Many of the men named to lead the drive to obtain these funds were the same ones who pressured the college to withdraw its application. They were religiously diversified and only one a KWU man. One informant, a central figure in the community, said: "All these men view the drive and KWU as a community effort. It's not that they care about KWU as a school. This is a community deal. You wouldn't have had this feeling before the closing of Schilling AFB."

OTHER EVENTS

Out of the many things which happened in Salina after November 19, 1964 we have described those which seem to best illustrate the way Salina went about solving its problem and which reveal the underlying social processes. Some of these have unique features. For example, the Community Inn and Convention Center plan, bogged down until the Base closing, suddenly turned it into a viable project because of a change in sentiments.

We could have detailed the many cases of successful

recruitment of industry, but these would add little to our present knowledge of the community processes and their contribution to the economic wellbeing of Salina can be more adequately described by the economist's measures. We could have extended our descriptions to show the details of the many political events outside of Salina that led to decisions which affected Salina's efforts and success. But we were here more concerned with what Salinans did than with the political process of Kansas or the United States. We have, however, tried to show how Salina through its leaders and other influential citizens affected these political decisions for this tells us something about Salina.

Finally, we could have extended our descriptions further into the future. For the most part we have been content with what happened from November 1964 through the summer of 1965. We could have shown the many steps taken during 1966 and 1967 to get the urban renewal projects underway, the activities necessary to moving the airport and the organization of the Vocational Rehabilitation Center. But these are normal routine activities with little relevance to the community problem solving process. As we have indicated once a community turns its problem-solving activities into the routine operations of an established agency it has from a social process point of view, returned to normal. One evidence of this is the fact that the period of intensive volunteer effort by the community had ended by July 1965. By this time paid professionals had been hired, and community members had become advisors and consultants rather than the workers themselves.

In the final section of this report we turn to an analysis and specification of the important community processes and factors in this case.

Analysis of the Case

Salinans and others defined the Base closing as primarily an economic problem and for this reason there is much interest in whether Salina will be as well or better off because of the community activities than if the Base had not closed. This answer appears to be "yes" for two reasons. First of all, Salina chose problem-solving activities that are generally thought to be necessary to and effective in meeting this kind of a problem. Secondly, these techniques have begun to pay off with the attraction of new industries to the community and the establishment of other socially and economically valuable uses of the Base facilities. Furthermore, there is some indication that the Base closing was instrumental in speeding up a variety of projects that might have lagged or failed without the special attention and interest generated in the attempt to solve the Base-closing problem. However, whether Salina will be better off in the long run is much more difficult to determine for the further we go in time from the Base closing the more the economic welfare of the community is affected by conditions and events that have little to do with that fact or with the techniques the community chose to solve the economic problem. New problems will arise and new adaptations will have to be made.

It is in this sense that the importance of what happened following the Base closing Announcement is measured not so much by economic indicators as by the ability of the community to respond to a crisis in an organized, systematic and rational fashion. Therefore our interest in this report has been directed toward a description of the extent to which Salina's response was of this form and an analysis of the factors which made this possible.

Just as a detective must account for motive, means and opportunity so must we account for morale, capability, and the situational contributions which were necessary to the successful action. In addition, though the detective may take the crime as given, we must account for the choices

Salina made, the directions in which it went. Salina is a success story because there was high morale as indicated not only by public expressions of sentiment, but more importantly by the many people who invested long hours, days and weeks to the effort required. Salina is a success story because it was able to take organized effective action to utilize the resources available to it, and to quickly establish the chosen action in community institutions. Salina is a success story because the situation provided the opportunity and the resources necessary to doing what it chose.

If it were necessary to pick a single factor in that success we would have to choose the existence of the 701 Plan as that factor. But the existence of this plan is itself an expression of a variety of factors that probably would have led to a successful outcome even without the plan itself. The plan therefore is symptomatic of more fundamental factors and conditions. In this section we wish to describe the major cultural, social organizational, and situational factors that appear to have been essential or specially significant to the Salina success story.

THE CULTURE: BELIEFS AND CONCEPTIONS

All groups have basic beliefs, sets of values, and a world view that influences what they perceive and supplies them with a more or less orderly and comprehensive picture of the world. Clyde Kluckhohn has pointed out that there is a "philosophy behind the way of life of every individual and of every homogeneous group at any given point in their histories."¹

More than many American communities Salina is just such a homogeneous group. Not only are most Salinans descendants

1. Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value Orientations in the Theory of Action" in Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds.) Toward a General Theory of Action, New York: Harper Torch-books, 1962, p. 409.

of immigrants primarily from Scandinavia with a strong common cultural orientation, but most have lived all of their lives within this cohesive community. They share ways of thought and perception with others in the Midwest, but they have brought an integration and synthesis that is concensually validated so that each has confidence that his views are also those of his neighbor. They may disagree on some things but it is disagreement within a context of general agreement.

Symptomatic of this cultural integration and consensus was the almost instantaneous common interpretation of the situation. Although social and cultural consequences were recognized--and for some these would be the only directly appreciable consequences--nevertheless the commonly accepted view was that the closing was an economic blow and that what had to be solved were the economic consequences and not the others.

Certain elements of this common culture were particularly significant in shaping the ways in which Salina acted and in defining the community approach to the crisis event. We have already indicated some of these in the First Stage, especially those which we called the "control" conceptions leading Salinans to feel that they should take responsibility for what was happening and not just passively accept an unkind fate. Other elements of special significance in their actions are the following:

The community embraced a sort of economic interpretation of history, although they would have been shocked if they had recognized the Marxian source of such a viewpoint. They were dedicated to the proposition that economic health of the community was prerequisite and basic to all other aspects of community life. It is probably for this reason that so little community attention was given to the social and cultural consequences of the Base closing.

Combined with this general economic interpretation of life was a preference for private enterprise as the better form of economic organization. Therefore, their attention was directed almost exclusively to the recruitment of industry,

rather than to other forms of activity to replace the lost pay rolls and to diversify the economy.

Closely related to these conceptions is the general set of beliefs of the "Protestant Ethic" with its emphasis upon hard work and the virtue of striving. With this went an essentially optimistic view that everything would come out all right if the community used its own initiative for "God helps those who help themselves."

Part of this general ethic, reinforced by the pioneer days of a century earlier when life in central Kansas was really rugged, was the belief that existing resources should be utilized and not wasted. This made for a willingness to convert Base facilities to some useful purpose even though not part of the economic development plan.

One of the major traditions of rural Kansas, associated with the belief in individual initiative, is a suspicion of government, large organizations and urban ways. This appears to have been lost in Salina, perhaps because it more than many Kansas communities has been closely tied to the outside world through its economy, the military Bases, and the long tradition of higher education. In any case Salinans have accepted the belief that it is proper for the government to render services to the community that are necessary and unattainable through private efforts. Most citizens were willing to accept urban renewal programs although they might be opposed to such governmental activity on principle. Similarly there was a willingness to accept whatever benefits the various governmental agencies might be able to hand out such as Federal aid to education or vocational rehabilitation. It was also believed to be proper to accept any governmental assistance available to promote private enterprise, such as Small Business Administration, or FHA loans.

Culture is not a dead hand of the past. These beliefs, often logically inconsistent, provided background and disposing conceptions not causes of action. They provided Salina with basic orientations and points of view which did not need to be argued, and in this way served as a base for decisions

and judgments that did and had to take account of the facts of the situation, the availability of resources, and the needs of the community.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: INTEGRATION, LEADERSHIP,
INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Communities vary in the degree of their organization and integration. In some there are large population segments, distinguished by ethnic, racial or economic characteristics, which do not participate in the central institutions or have institutions of their own which work at cross purposes to those of the rest of the community. Even when there is no segmentation of the population there may be a separation of institutions and agencies so that the schools, the City government, the industries and the other voluntary associations go their own uncoordinated ways.

Such communities have little capacity to act as a whole without a long process of ideological and organizational integration often involving considerable stress, agreements are hard to reach, morale is low and hence recruitment of effort is difficult, and activities tend to be uncoordinated and discontinuous.

Salina, however, was at the other extreme. There was a strong community organization before the crisis that was expressed in a variety of ways. We know too little generally to specify all that is necessary to such organization but it is probable that the homogeneity of the population, the lack of large and separated ethnic or economic groups was one important condition. Negroes and Spanish-Americans are the only minority groups in the community and they are so small and poorly organized that they do not present any separate united front on community issues. Similarly, there was no history of economic conflict in the community. Business people, grain dealers and landowners who constituted the power structure of the community all had the same basic economic point of view. While there was significant labor organization, the leaders had excellent working relationships with business interests and were central participants in

the community. The president of the Schilling Development Council, a business executive, and its secretary, a labor leader, both pointed with pride to the fact that they had jointly headed all the school bond election campaigns in Salina without failure.

Another important factor in Salina's strong social organization was the existence of active local news media, the newspaper and radio, which served before and during the crisis as important instruments of community identity, consensus and self-awareness. Community news channels are difficult to develop where a community is within the immediate environment of a large metropolitan center thus Salina's geographical location was probably important in its social organization.

These news media were especially important as instruments of community organization throughout the post-Announcement events. Most especially the Salina Journal provided a continuous chronicle of events and a commentary on them which helped to maintain morale and mold opinion.

But the strength of existing social organization was probably most clearly expressed in the nature and activities of leadership. For many years there had been a central corps of community leaders, business and professional men, who had frequent contacts. Most of them had offices within a block of each other and many were housed in the same building. In the usual routines of life these men were in frequent contact with each other: telephone conversations, frequent breakfast and luncheon meetings in connection with various business and civic endeavors and informal discussions on the golf course were established ways of interaction that were readily focussed upon the crisis.

The quality of these leaders is also a significant commentary on the level of social organization. The community was able to select for formal leadership in its several institutions men who had considerable skill and a real interest in the community. Because of the competence and effectiveness of the leaders it would be easy in the Salina case to overestimate the role and importance of leadership. That there

were competent and capable leaders is as much a reflection of the social organization's ability to recruit, maintain and legitimize such leaders as it is a reflection of the persons themselves.

Another important expression of the level of social organization was the presence of many particular organizations which could be utilized in the problem solving effort because they were integral parts of the community. The Chamber of Commerce, the professional societies, the school system, the medical society and the several agencies of government had long established habits of cooperation and coordination so that each could be used as a part of an integrated response to the problem situation. The Chamber of Commerce was especially important in this not only because it was the one voluntary association with an established interest and competence in the problem area, but also because it was large and broadly based. In addition to the usual businessmen the membership included professional men such as doctors, lawyers, engineers and educators as well as labor leaders.

Finally, the importance of community organization is found in the established community relations with important elements of its political and social environment that made possible the utilization of this environment in solving its problem. The business, professional, labor and other special interest groups all had established relationships with powerful political figures in the State and with State agencies of various kinds. These relationships were effectively utilized whenever it was necessary to secure action by the State Government.

SITUATIONAL FACTORS

A number of factors in Salina's situation made certain courses of action possible and rational while restricting others. Some of these factors were indirectly important in maintaining morale for they provided a relatively rich set of resources to be used in responding to the crisis and those reinforced the cultural optimism. These situational factors are of three types: a) economic factors, b) social factors, and c) political factors.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

1) It was helpful that the crisis occurred at a time when the national economy was expanding. Old and new enterprises were seeking locations for growth. This made it easy and logical for Salina to adopt the recruitment of industry as a major problem solving activity.

2) The economy of Salina was fundamentally based on agriculture and its function as a regional trade center. These sources of wealth were not affected by the closing of the Base. Hence, there were economic resources in the community available for use in reconstruction. People in the grain trade for example, exerted influence and contributed financially to the response programs which did not directly affect them.

3) The geographic location of the community makes it a potential center of ecological dominance for all of Northwestern Kansas. This fact was important in the decisions of several enterprises. It also provided opportunity for expansion of the economic base independent of industrial, or governmental activities. Other climatic and geographic factors including favorable transportation routes make Salina attractive to various enterprises. These favorable circumstances were recognized by the community and exploited in its programs and were significant in maintaining morale. The community had something to work with.

SOCIAL FACTORS

1) The community was extremely fortunate to have both engineering and military specialists who knew the facilities of the Base and their possible application for civilian use. One of these men had helped construct the Base and because of the civic spirit of his employer his services were contributed to the community for three months at the time of crisis. He was then employed for three months by the Airport Authority and for an additional time by OEA. This provided a knowledge of resources capable of adaptation to non-military uses that made for effective use of the Base.

The Base commander likewise exhibited an attitude of desiring to help the community in all possible ways. As an old supply officer who had previously dismantled military installations, he was adept in cutting red tape, and in making available for civilian use the material declared surplus. The non-commercial activities that located at the Schilling AFB benefited greatly from his attitude and skill.

2) The extraordinary harmonious relationships that had been developed in previous years between the community and Base personnel was important in various ways. Salina had won national recognition for this in military circles and it was rewarded in the time of crisis by the military personnel doing all they could to ease the strain of adjustment. This close relationship also increased the difficulty of adjustment because it resulted in the rupture of close friendships and the loss of influential and able military people who had assumed important positions in the institutional life of the town.

3) A situational factor affecting the attractiveness of the Salina area for industrial activity was the quality of the Salina labor market. Over 59 per cent of those over 25 years of age had completed high school or more, 10 per cent had completed college and only 2 per cent had completed less than 5 years of schooling. This level of education suggests adaptability to training in new techniques and procedures. Rural values that emphasized a fair day's work for a fair day's wage predominated. There was an ample supply of women who were willing to be attracted into the labor force that made the area attractive to employers whose work was best adapted to women. Prevailing wage scales were lower than those in highly unionized urban areas. While there was a low rate of unemployment, prospective employers felt an adequate supply of workers could be attracted into the community if necessary. Certainly there was adequate housing to take care of any workers new to the community.

4) Indirectly important in many ways was the nature of the Salina community itself and its attractiveness as a place to live. The quality of its population, the vitality of its leadership, the presence of good educational facilities, the

friendliness of its citizens, the optimism, courage, and determination shown in a host of cooperative activities, all interacted to produce a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy reflected in its slogan "Salina - City on the Move."

POLITICAL FACTORS

The availability of established Federal programs that could be applied to the Salina situation was an important resource. The General Services Administration had elaborate procedures for the disposition of surplus property throughout the Federal establishment that were ready for application in this case. Urban renewal was a general program easily adaptable to assist in Salina. The Kansas Economic Development Council was already established to attract industry to Kansas and its resources and skills were readily available for use in Salina. There were a host of Federal agencies ready to assist in various aspects of such a crisis. OEA had been set up by the DOD for the specific purpose of easing contract phase-outs and military installation closings. HHFA, FHA, HHD, SBA, HEW were Federal agencies that lent assistance in one or more phases of the Salina adjustment. The OEA played the prime function of suggesting ways the community might use these agencies and their programs as well as expediting applications caught in the toil of bureaucratic procedure within the agency.

In addition there were several state programs awaiting opportunity for expansion or implementation that could be used by Salina. The Rehabilitation Center is a case in point. The agency director was merely awaiting a favorable opportunity to establish a new center for the need was easily demonstrated. The combination of new federal legislation providing financial support with the availability without cost of suitable facilities at Schilling provided that opportunity. Similarly, a new technical institute for Kansas had been advocated for a number of years. Its establishment awaited the favorable combination of planning by professional educators, outside the community, the availability of suitable buildings at Schilling AFB for little cost, and skilled political maneuvering by Salina leaders.

CONCLUSION

There was much that was fortuitous in the Salina adjustment to the closing of Schilling AFB: a small well-organized community which had just completed an assessment of its purposes and goals, with a culture that gave it a base for selecting actions appropriate to the problem, and an environment that provided a variety of useful social and economic resources. The integration and organization of the community was a significant factor in creating the morale necessary to taking action, its organization and culture provided it with the competence for that action, and the situation in which it existed gave it the opportunity.

All of this suggests that successful cases of community adaptation to such crisis events are those in which the community is successful before the crisis arises. To the extent that communities fail under the impact of a crisis event, to the extent that such an event evokes crisis behavior rather than problem-solving action, to that extent they are already failing communities. In such situations handbooks of "what to do till the doctor comes" can have little use for it is impossible to build community organization overnight. Furthermore such crisis events in such communities may serve to widen the schisms and increase latent conflicts rather than reduce them making the problem of collective consensual action that much more difficult.

The Salina case indicates that the actions taken by the DOD and by the Office of Economic Adjustment were helpful and important. It was important that the basic decision was explicit and cleancut and that there were no later indications of vacillation or reconsideration. This certainly reduced the time and energy spent on useless endeavor and forced the community to face its problem directly.

It was important that the Federal government took the posture that it was Salina's problem and Salina's decisions. Salina would have probably assumed this position anyway, but in any lesser community this could be a crucial fact in the community organization.

Finally, it was important to morale and facilitating of organization that the Federal government took an interest in Salina, was concerned about what would happen to it, and that agencies such as OEA were ready to assist in the implementation of programs. A community can quickly lose morale and the impetus for its activities if it comes to see the governmental environment as a morasse through which it cannot penetrate and if it feels that no one cares about its existence. Without this much energy could have been wasted in useless and debilitating attacks upon the government and governmental agencies.

State government and State agencies were utilized in accomplishing some of the subsidiary goals, but generally State government seemed much less able to come to the assistance of the community. The utilization of State help depended much more on the nature and quality of Salina's involvement in the political process and its own competence to influence political decisions than upon the structure of the government.

The crucial elements in the case were thus those of local community organization reflected in strong and competent leadership, in the integration of the variety of associations and agencies, and most especially in the existence of the 701 Plan which provided the concensually validated long-range goals in terms of which the community could act. This community organization was reflected in the fact that Salina was able to act within the problem-solving and avoid the crisis behavior form of community response.

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PHASE III
DOD MANPOWER IMPACT AND ADJUSTMENT¹

INTRODUCTION

The focus of this phase of the study is on the employment impact on more than 80,000 Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel whose jobs were transferred or eliminated when Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, announced on November 19, 1964, the scheduled closure of 80 domestic defense installations. This economy measure, scheduled for completion within the next ten years, eliminated 63,714 DOD civilian jobs and transferred to other DOD installations another 18,586 jobs.

In order to minimize the impact of base closure action on its employees, DOD established a comprehensive assistance program designed to guarantee an alternative job opportunity for every displaced career employee. In addition to the stipulated guarantee that every worker would be offered a suitable employment opportunity within DOD, this assistance program included the following operational elements: the establishment of the Automated Priority Placement System, or the Centralized Referral System (CRS); the payment of the moving or relocation costs associated with the acceptance of a new DOD position; an income protection guarantee which assured employees that their existing rate of pay would be maintained for a two year period if they remained DOD employees; the provision of retraining services in cases where warranted; and the provision of severance pay for those workers who resigned from their federal jobs. Because DOD arranged such a unique program of manpower assistance for all its displaced workers, the resultant change in their employment status was shaped in a special way. Aside from

1. Prepared by Ronald R. Olsen, The University of Kansas. He wishes to acknowledge the extremely helpful assistance in collecting data provided by William C. Valdes, Department of Defense, David H. Clark, The University of Maine, David W. Stevens, Pennsylvania State University, and Theodore Taylor, Texas Technological College.

the personal psychological trauma of change which faced all but the most adventurous of the workers, DOD created a near full employment setting and, in doing so, maximized the integrity of each worker's opportunity for continued employment. Although the reaction of the workers to DOD base closures resulted in marked changes in their employment status, the results were relatively unique when compared to similar instances in the history of economic change. Never before had an employer so enhanced the mobility of its displaced employees by deliberately and effectively widening their employment opportunities beyond the boundaries of local labor markets.

IMPACT AT ALL INSTALLATIONS

With few exceptions, from November 1964 to July 1967, the transfer and elimination of the jobs of the DOD civilian personnel proceeded as scheduled. The general impact of

TABLE 1

THE EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF 65 DOD INSTALLATIONS, NOVEMBER 1964 TO JULY 1967

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Personnel	48,484	100.00
Placements	32,418	66.86
Transferred with positions	7,309	15.07
Other DOD	20,871	43.05
Other federal	2,025	4.18
Other	2,213	4.56
Separations	16,066	33.14
Resignations	4,227	8.72
Declinations of job offers	4,627	9.54
Retirements	6,535	13.49
Other	677	1.39

Source: Reports of Civilian Personnel, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense-Manpower, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

base closure actions on the employment status of DOD civilian employees is summarized in Table 1.¹ By July 1967, closure had been completed at 47 of the 65 bases and all but about 5,000 of the 53,726 career employees at these 65 installations had transferred with their job, had been placed in another job, or had separated from federal employment.

Base closure changed the employment status of all the civilian employees. Nearly one-third of the workers left their jobs with the federal government, a rate of separation much higher than the rate of attrition normally experienced by DOD or by all departments of the federal government.² The average rate of separation for the Department of Defense during the five year period 1962-1966 was 5.07 per cent of total DOD employment and, on a quarterly basis, ranged from 3.52 to 8.76 per cent, an average and a range much below the separation rates for the career employees at the 65 installations.

Despite the fact that the separation rate at the 65 bases was high when compared to normal experience, it should be noted that more than 60 per cent of the employees did show a decided preference for continued federal employment as evidenced by their willingness to change their locations or jobs, or more often both: 15 per cent of the employees transferred with their positions; 43 per cent moved to another job within DOD; and 4 per cent of these career employees accepted a job with some other department of the federal government.

A few of the displaced workers, 4.56 per cent, were reported as being placed outside of the federal government

1. For complete information on all 65 bases see the Appendix, Table 1, pp. 187-204.

2. (Complete tabular information on the general separation experience of the federal government and the Department of Defense is detailed in the Appendix, Table 2, pp. 205-208).

in jobs with local government or private industry. This recorded response to base closure clearly understates the extent to which workers were able to take advantage of alternative employment opportunities within the local labor market area and simply reflects a lack of knowledge on the part of the base personnel officers about employment adjustments within the local area. The 2,213 placements outside the federal government measures only the placements of this kind that were known to base personnel officers.

TABLE 2

DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AT 65 DOD INSTALLATIONS
WITH RIGHTS TO TRANSFER WITH THEIR POSITION,
NOVEMBER 1964 TO JULY 1967

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Personnel with transfer rights	13,142	100.00
Transfers accepted	7,309	54.09
Transfers rejected	5,833	45.91

Source: Reports of Civilian Personnel, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense-Manpower, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

The extent to which the Department of Defense provided the displaced workers with viable job opportunities is reflected in part by the response of the workers whose jobs were not eliminated but which were instead transferred with the base function. For example, as Table 2 shows, although more than 7,000 workers transferred with their position, nearly 6,000, 46 per cent of those who had this right to transfer balked at such a change: 2,042 of these employees chose another job with the federal government and the other 3,791 employees elected to quit their federal jobs.

In addition to those employees who elected to transfer with their positions, more than one-half of the workers at the 65 bases were placed in federal government jobs or in some non-federal job. Nearly 85 per cent of the employees who were placed continued to work for DOD. As Table 3 indicates, a number of workers who decided to continue their careers as federal government employees were only able to do so by accepting a job at a lower grade or wage-board level than that which they held at the time of base closure. Of the nearly 23,000 workers who continued to

TABLE 3

PLACEMENTS IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS OF
DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY CLOSURE OF 65 DOD
INSTALLATIONS, NOVEMBER 1964 TO JULY 1967

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Placements	22,895	100.00
Same or higher grade	17,103	74.70
Lower grade	5,792	25.30
DOD Positions	20,870	100.00
Same or higher grade	15,922	76.29
Lower grade	4,948	23.71
Other Federal Positions	2,025	100.00
Same or higher grade	1,181	58.32
Lower grade	844	41.68

Source: Reports of Civilian Personnel, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense-Manpower, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

work for the federal government, three-fourths of them, 17,103, were placed in jobs at the same or higher grade level. The remaining one-quarter, 5,792 workers, had to

accept lower grade positions in order to maintain their status as federal employees. In general, a smaller proportion of the employees who continued to work for DOD, 24 per cent, were required to accept lower grade positions than the proportion of employees who were placed in other federal jobs, 42 per cent.

The greatest change in the employment status of the DOD civilian employees is reflected by the volume of separations at the 65 bases. As is shown in Table 4, more than 16,000 workers, approximately one-third of the employees who left the bases, ended their careers as federal government employees: 26 per cent of them formally resigned; 29 per cent of the employees were separated after rejecting suitable job offers; 41 per cent retired from federal service; and the remaining 4 per cent of those who separated either died or were discharged for cause.

TABLE 4

SEPARATION OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY
CLOSURE AT 65 DOD INSTALLATIONS, NOVEMBER 1964 TO JULY 1967

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Separations	16,066	100.00
Resignations	4,227	26.31
Declination of suitable job offer	4,627	28.80
Personnel with transfer rights	3,791	23.60
Personnel without transfer rights	836	5.20
Retirements	6,535	40.68
Other	677	4.21

Source: Reports of Civilian Personnel, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense-Manpower, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

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It is clear that the retirement rate among the employees at these bases was speeded by base closure actions. The general retirement rate for all DOD employees from 1962 to 1966 was never greater than one per cent and averaged less than .5 per cent. If the retirement experience for all DOD employees was assumed to be representative for all of the 65 bases and, if these quarterly DOD retirement rates were accumulated in order to describe a time pattern of attrition, the two and one-half year accumulated average retirement rate for all DOD employees for the five years, 1962-1966, was 6.4 per cent; less than half the retirement rate for the employees at the 65 bases where closure actions occurred.

The extent to which base closure action resulted in a separation rate in the form of resignations which was above a "normal" resignation rate was even more striking. Nearly 9,000 workers elected to quit their federal jobs either by means of a formal resignation or as a consequence of being separated after declining suitable job offers. This resignation rate of slightly more than 18 per cent for the DOD civilian personnel at the 65 bases was nine times higher than the general resignation rate for all DOD employees (2 per cent) during the five year period, 1962-1966.

Of the 8,854 employees who quit their federal jobs, 4,227 formally resigned their position while the other 4,627 were separated from federal employment as a consequence of their refusal to accept a suitable job offer, a de facto resignation. 3,794 of the employees who rejected a suitable job offer were employees who also had the right to transfer with their positions but declined to do so; exhibiting the availability of relatively attractive employment opportunities in the local area, or a strong attachment for the local community, or both.

It is interesting to note that following the announcement of the scheduled closure of DOD bases the adjustment response of the DOD civilian personnel often proceeded at a

faster pace than the actual phase-out of the service functions of the bases. At 35 of the 65 DOD installations the career employees left their jobs before the functional capability of the base was transferred or closed down. In such cases, the service capability of the base was not seriously hindered by this action as the jobs left vacant by departing career employees were filled by the appointment of temporary employees. The extent to which the adjustment to closure action on the part of the civilian employees proceeded more rapidly than the actual transfer or phase-out of the base functions is indicated by the fact that 6,357 temporary employees, 13 per cent of the 48,484 positions vacated at the 65 DOD installations, were hired in order to keep the bases operational until closure was actually completed.

Clearly, base closure actions radically changed the employment status of all the DOD civilian employees at the 65 DOD installations. The retirement and resignation rates that accompanied closure action were unusually high when compared to normal experience. Yet, the employment impact of base closure actions on the DOD civilian workforce at the bases was so total in its affect that it is impossible to judge whether the resulting rate of separation was high or low in the sense that it reflected the imposition of a serious economic burden upon the displaced workers. In order to provide a more complete description of the reaction of the DOD civilian personnel to base closure action and in order to obtain additional information as a basis for evaluating the impact of closure on the employment status of the employees, the focus of the next section of this phase of the study is on the employment status of the DOD civilian personnel at four selected bases.

MANPOWER IMPACT AT FOUR SELECTED AIR FORCE BASES

The four bases selected for a detailed description of the effect of base closure on the employment status of the DOD civilian workers, Schilling Air Force Base, Dow Air Force Base, Olmstead Air Force Base, and Amarillo Air Force

Base, were chosen for this phase of the study for much the same reason that they were selected for Phase I: the bases were located in different parts of the country where local economic conditions were different; the time pattern of scheduled closure was different for each base; and, in one case, the function of the installation and the size and functions of the workforce differed. Moreover, for this phase of the study, the selection of these bases has the added advantage of placing the resultant pattern of worker response to closure in juxtaposition to the assessment of the economic impact of closure in these communities presented in Phase I of the study.

The differential impact of closure action at the four bases as well as the overall impact of closure at all DOD installations is summarized in Table 5. Because the economic conditions of the respective communities differed, because the time schedule of closure action differed, and because the occupational and personal characteristics of the civilian personnel at each were different, there were different response patterns to closure by the civilian workers at each of the bases.

Schilling Air Force Base

Schilling Air Force Base was located in a relatively small and isolated community. The total civilian workforce of Salina, Kansas numbered less than 20,000. Although the complement of military personnel at the base numbered 5,000, the DOD civilian workforce was at a rather modest 333. Most of the civilian personnel were men. The women workers at the base were all graded personnel who accounted for one-third of the total civilian workforce. Male graded or white collar workers made up 44 per cent of the Schilling civilian workforce while the remaining 23 per cent were male wage-board or blue collar employees. More than three-quarters of the civilian personnel at the base were from 35 to 64 years of age. Only 6 per cent of the workforce was 65 years of age or over and just 3 per cent were under 25 years of age. Male workers accounted for more of the workers who were 65 years of age and over and most of the younger workers (under 25 years of age) were women.

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TABLE 5

**EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE AT 65 INSTALLATIONS AND AT FOUR SELECTED AIR FORCE BASES,
NOVEMBER 1964 TO DECEMBER 1967**

	65 DOD		Schilling		Dow	
	Installations		Air Force Base		Air Force Base	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Personnel	48,484	100.00	333	100.00	200	100.00
Placements						
DOD	32,418	66.86	245	73.58	121	60.50
Other	28,180	58.12	232	69.68	105	52.50
	4,238	8.74	13	3.90	16	8.00
Separations						
Resignations	16,066	33.14	88	26.42	79	39.50
Retirements	8,854	18.26	54	16.22	50	25.00
Other	6,535	13.48	30	9.00	21	10.50
	677	1.39	4	1.20	8	4.00

(continued)

TABLE 5 (continued)

	Olmstead		Amarillo	
	Air Force Base	Per cent	Air Force Base	Per cent
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
Personnel	10,324	100.00	1,249	100.00
Placements	6,436	62.34	856	68.53
DOD	6,260	60.64	797	63.81
Other	176	1.70	59	4.72
Separations	3,888	37.66	393	31.47
Resignations	1,696	16.42	247	19.82
Retirements	2,087	20.23	129	10.31
Other	105	1.01	17	1.34

Source: Reports of Civilian Personnel, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense-
 Manpower, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.; Service Record
Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Offices, Schilling, Dow and Olmstead
Air Force Bases, Personnel Service Records, Form 50, Personnel Office,
Amarillo Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force.

The bulk of the workers, two-thirds of them, had been employed by the federal government for more than 10 years. In general, the male personnel at Schilling had longer tenure of service with the federal government than was the case for the female personnel. Nearly 80 per cent of the men had worked for the federal government for more than 10 years while only 44 per cent of the women had more than 10 years of service. Moreover, nearly one-quarter of the women had worked for the federal government for less than 5 years while only a little more than 10 per cent of the men had less than 5 years of service.

The closing of Schilling Air Force Base, which was scheduled for completion by July 1965, eliminated the jobs of the 333 DOD civilian workers and ended the military service functions of the base: the B-47 Aircraft at Schilling Air Force Base were phased-out by April 1965; the Refueling Aircraft at Schilling were transferred to other Air Force bases; and the Atlas F Missile Squadron at the base was deactivated.

Closure action proceeded rather rapidly and, by the middle of 1965, 222, two-thirds of the career employees had left Schilling. Although the functional service capability of the base ended by July 1965 a greater length of time was required before the base was finally closed and all civilian employees were gone. More than 80 per cent of the workers had either moved to other federal government jobs or separated from federal employment by the end of 1965. At the end of the next year, 326, 98 per cent of the workforce, had left the base and all of the 333 employees held other federal jobs or had resigned or retired from government employment by the middle of 1967.

The general impact which this closure action had on the employment status of the DOD civilian personnel at Schilling Air Force Base is depicted in Table 6.¹ Most

1. For greater detail of the impact of closure on the civilian personnel see the Appendix, Tables 3-12, pp. 209-223.

TABLE 6

**EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF SCHILLING AIR FORCE BASE, 1965**

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Personnel	333	100.00
Placements	245	73.58
Air Force jobs	171	51.35
Other DOD jobs	61	18.33
Other federal jobs	13	3.90
Separations	88	26.42
Resignations	54	16.22
Retirements	30	9.00
Other	4	1.20

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel
Office, Schilling Air Force Base, Department of the
Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

of the workers, nearly three-fourths of them, continued to work for the federal government, 70 per cent of whom remained employees of the Air Force. The 88 workers who separated did so by resigning, retiring, or in a few cases as a result of death or discharge for cause. The separation rate at Schilling Air Force Base, the proportion of the employees who decided to end their federal government careers, was 26 per cent. This separation rate was below the 33 per cent rate of separation which was experienced by the more than 48,000 civilian workers at the 65 DOD installations where similar closure actions occurred.

The pattern of separation by the Schilling employees also was different than the way DOD employees in general elected to end their federal government careers. At the

65 DOD installations where closure action occurred, 55 per cent of the civilian workers who separated did so by resigning their jobs and 40 per cent of them decided to retire. At Schilling Air Force Base 63 per cent of the employees who separated resigned and 35 per cent chose retirement.

Not unexpectedly, different types of Schilling workers reacted to the closure of the base in different ways. For example, the generally higher salaried, skilled male graded or white collar workers had the lowest separation rate, 14 per cent, whereas the rate was highest for the lower paid, lesser skilled male wage-board or blue collar workers of whom 32 per cent decided to end their careers with the federal government. In light of the fact that comparable employment opportunities in the local labor market for the male white collar employees were fewer in number, it is not surprising that they exhibited a relatively strong attachment to their federal government jobs.

Differences in the pattern or the type of separation which was elected by the displaced employees was also related to general personal and occupational characteristics. Nearly all, 90 per cent, of the female graded or white collar employees who separated from their federal jobs did so by resigning. Whereas very few of the women workers at Schilling retired, one-half of the male blue collar workers who left federal employment elected to retire and 44 per cent separated by resigning from their jobs.

When the workers reaction to closure is related to broad age groupings, the results are what one would generally expect. The separation rate for employees who were between 35 and 64 years of age was 21 per cent, 67 per cent of whom decided to resign their jobs. The highest separation rate was experienced by the employees who were 65 years of age and over. 76 per cent of these older workers separated, 94 per cent of whom retired from government service. Contrasting with the experience of the older workers is that of the young, those who were under 25 years of age, for whom the separation rate was 20 per cent, all in the form of resignations.

The lowest separation rate experienced by any specific type of worker within a general age grouping was the separation rate of the white collar male workers between 35 and 64 years of age - their separation rate was 12 per cent. The eldest of the male blue collar workers, those who were 65 or more years of age, had the highest separation rate by far, 92 per cent. Every one of them elected to retire. Expectedly, a contrasting pattern of separation was experienced by workers under 35 years of age, nearly all of whom, 95 per cent, separated from their federal jobs by resigning (the one exception was a disability retirement).

Despite the fact that most of the employees at Schilling Air Force Base had over 10 years of service with the federal government, 26 per cent of these longer tenure employees separated from government employment. Somewhat surprisingly, the separation rate was very nearly the same regardless of whether workers had over 10 years of service, 5 to 10 years of service, or less than 5 years of service with the federal government.

Among particular types of workers, somewhat unexpectedly, the lowest separation rate, 10 per cent, was experienced by male white collar workers with less than 5 years of service and also by male white collar workers who had worked for the federal government from 5 to 10 years. More in line with what one might expect, it was the female white collar worker with less than 5 years of service who had the highest rate of separation, 38 per cent, all of whom separated by resignation.

Male blue collar workers with more than 10 years of employment at Schilling accounted for most of the retirements; 60 per cent of them separated by retiring. In contrast to this experience, with one exception (a disability retirement), all of the employees at the base who had less than 10 years of service with the federal government separated by resigning from their federal jobs.

When Schilling Air Force Base was closed, 88, 26 per cent of the 333 of the civilian employees ended their federal

government careers. The other 245 workers who decided to maintain their status as federal government employees found that in nearly every instance to do so required that they relocate outside the local labor market area. As Table 7 shows, 237, 97 per cent of the 245 workers who were placed in other federal jobs had to move outside the local area. Only 8 employees were able to continue their careers with the federal government and remain within the local labor market area. The relative number of male white collar workers, male blue collar workers or female white collar workers who had to relocate outside the local area did not differ much, although the proportion was slightly lower for the female white collar workers. 5 of the 80 women who were placed in other federal jobs were able to remain within the local labor market area and only 3 of the 165 men were able to do so.

The displaced workers at Schilling who sought to maintain their status as federal employees discovered that it was not only necessary for most of them to change their geographic location, but for some it also meant that they had to accept jobs at lower grade classifications or wage-board levels than they had held at Schilling Air Force Base. In this regard, the general experience of the different types of workers was approximately the same. Approximately one-fourth of the workers had to accept lower level job assignments.

The comprehensive assistance program which was established by the Department of Defense did operate to minimize the employment impact of base closure at Schilling. The 88 workers at the base who left their federal jobs received either severance pay or the benefits of the federal retirement system. The other 245 workers who decided to stay in federal employment were assisted by the Department of Defense in this effort. When these workers did move to a new DOD job the direct expenses of moving were paid for by the Department of Defense and the workers were also assured that their rate of pay for the next two year period would be at least as high as it had been at Schilling.

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TABLE 7

PLACEMENTS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE
OF SCHILLING AIR FORCE BASE, 1965 OUTSIDE OR WITHIN THE LOCAL LABOR MARKET AREA

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Placements	165	100.00	80	100.00	245	100.00
Outside						
Local Area	162	98.18	75	93.75	237	96.73
Within						
Local Area	3	1.82	5	6.25	8	3.27

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

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TABLE 8

PLACEMENTS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE
OF SCHILLING AIR FORCE BASE, 1965 BY GRADE CLASSIFICATIONS OR WAGE-BOARD LEVELS

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Placements	165	100.00	80	100.00	245	100.00
Same or						
higher grade	122	73.94	58	72.50	180	73.47
Lower grade	43	26.06	22	27.50	65	26.53

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air Force
Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

Although none of the employees at Schilling were recommended for retraining services, nor did any receive retraining services, a number of the employees did use the Centralized Referral System. Despite the fact that the DOD placement service was a rather new innovation that was established simultaneously with the beginning of closure at Schilling Air Force Base, 84 workers, one-fourth of the workforce at the base registered with CRS. Of the 84 registrants from Schilling Air Force Base, 74, nearly 90 per cent, were placed in a federal job. Only 10 of these registrants ended their careers as federal employees. Of the total CRS registrants placed, two-thirds of them were placed in DOD jobs directly by CRS, while the other one-third located their new jobs through customary channels.

Dow Air Force Base

Dow Air Force Base, unlike Schilling Air Force Base, was scheduled for gradual closure or phase-out to be completed by the middle of 1968: the SAC mission was consolidated at Barksdale Air Force Base and the Air Defense Command Fighter Interceptor Squadron was relocated to Otis Air Force Base by July 1968. Although the timing of closure at this base differed from the schedule at Schilling, the number of military and civilian personnel directly affected by the closure action was virtually the same in both cases. The military complement at Dow numbered 5,000 and the number of civilian employees whose jobs were eliminated by the closure action totaled 339. Moreover, like Schilling Air Force Base, this base was located in a relatively small isolated community. The local labor force of the greater Bangor area numbered slightly less than 30,000 workers.

Despite the fact that the basic service functions of Dow Air Force Base were maintained during the three years following the year-end 1964 announcement of closure, a fairly substantial number of the career employees at the base did adjust their employment status during this three year period. By the end of 1965, 78, 23 per cent of the DOD civilian workers had either accepted employment with the federal govern-

ment elsewhere or separated from their federal jobs. At the end of the second year of scheduled closure, 109, 32 per cent of the civilian employees had left the base and, by the end of the third year, 200, nearly 60 per cent of the original workforce of 339 had left their jobs at Dow.

A majority of the civilian personnel were men. All of the women workers at the base were graded personnel and accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the total workforce. Male graded or white collar workers made up 30 per cent of the workforce while male wage-board or blue collar employees accounted for 23 per cent of the total. Nearly 70 per cent of the DOD civilian personnel at the base were between 35 and 64 years of age. 6 per cent of the workforce was 65 years of age or more and a similar percentage of the Dow workers were under 25 years of age. Most of the workers under 25 years of age were women and none of the male blue collar workers were this young.

A majority of the 200 workers who had left Dow Air Force Base by the end of 1967, nearly 60 per cent, had worked for the federal government for more than 10 years. In general, the male workers had longer tenure of service with the federal government than did the female employees. Nearly three-fourths of the men had been employed by the federal government for more than 10 years while less than 40 per cent of the women had as much as 10 years of government service. Furthermore, nearly one-fourth of the female workers had worked for the government for fewer than 5 years while only 8 per cent of the men had less than 5 years of service.

In spite of the fact that 60 per cent of the Dow workforce was no longer employed at the base by the end of 1967, the functional capability of the base was not seriously affected by this action. The jobs left vacant by the departing career employees were filled by temporary employees. For example, by July 1967, the 137 jobs which were left vacant by the departure of a like number of career employees were filled by the appointment to these vacated positions of 127 temporary employees.

The impact of closure action at Dow Air Force on the employment status of the DOD employees whose jobs were scheduled for elimination is summarized in Table 9.¹ 200 of the 339 workers whose jobs had been eliminated continued to

TABLE 9

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Personnel	200	100.00
Placements	121	60.50
Air Force	85	42.50
DOD	20	10.00
Other federal	16	8.00
Separations	79	39.50
Resignations	50	25.00
Retirements	21	10.50
Other	8	4.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

work for the federal government: 121, 60 per cent of the 200 workers who had left the base held other federal jobs, 90 per cent of whom remained employees of the Air Force. During the three years following the November 1964 announcement of closure, 79 workers, 40 per cent of those who left

1. For greater detail of the impact on the DOD civilian personnel see the Appendix, Tables 13-22, pp. 224-239.

the base, left their federal jobs: 50 employees resigned; 21 retired; and 8 employees were no longer employed by the federal government as a result of death or discharge for cause.

At the end of 1967, 139 of the original 339 career employees were still employed at the base. 21 of these workers intended to utilize the DOD placement service, CRS, in order to continue their federal government careers. 52 of the remaining employees who were eligible intended to retire from federal service, and the other 66 expressed an intention to stay in the Bangor labor market area.

40 per cent of the 200 employees who left Dow Air Force Base decided to end their federal government careers. This separation rate was higher than the 33 per cent rate of separation which resulted because of closure action at all of the 65 DOD installations.

The pattern of separation, the way in which the Dow employees decided to leave their federal jobs, differed from the separation pattern for all 65 DOD bases. A higher proportion of the separations at Dow were resignations than was the case at all closing installations, 63 per cent as compared to 55 per cent. The proportion of the employees who retired was lower at Dow Air Force Base than at all of the 65 installations, 35 per cent as compared to 40 per cent.

As would be expected, different types of workers reacted to the closure of the base in different ways. As was the case at Schilling Air Force Base, the male graded or white collar workers had the lowest separation rate, 13 per cent, as contrasted to the highest rate of separation, 58 per cent, for the female employees. The patterns of separation also differed with differences in the employees personal and occupational characteristics. Not only did a very high proportion of the women end their federal government careers but more than 85 per cent of them did so by resigning from their jobs. In marked contrast with the separation pattern of the female workers, only a little more than 30 per cent of the male blue collar workers at Dow terminated their

status as government employees by resignation. More than half of them, 55 per cent, elected to retire.

When the impact of closure is related to the workers age, the results are what one might expect. Workers between 35 and 64 years of age exhibited a relatively strong attachment to federal employment. The separation rate for this age group was 31 per cent, nearly 60 per cent of whom resigned their jobs and almost 30 per cent decided to retire. The highest separation rate was experienced by Dow's youngest employees. Nearly two-thirds of the employees who were under 25 years of age left their jobs, all by resignation.

The lowest separation rate for any specific type of worker within a general age grouping was the rate for the male white collar workers who were between 25 and 34 years of age. Only one worker out of 14 in this age class separated - he resigned his job. The separation rate for this particular group of white collar workers was lower than the relatively low separation rate, 12 per cent, experienced by male white collar workers between 35 and 64 years of age. Just as the female workers in general had the highest separation rate, it was female workers in specific age groupings who had a relatively low preference for their government jobs. Nearly 80 per cent of the female workers between 25 and 34 years of age separated from federal government employment, all by resignation. The separation rate was nearly as high, 70 per cent, for the female workers who were under 25 years of age all of whom quit their jobs. While the young workers at Dow separated by resigning their jobs, expectedly, the eldest of the Dow employees, those who were 65 years of age or over, all separated from their jobs by retiring from federal service (with the exception of 2 workers in this age class who died).

As predictable as the resulting impact of closure is when related to the worker's age, the response pattern to closure tends to be equally predictable when related to the worker's length of employment with the federal government. In general, Dow workers who had the longest tenure of service with the federal government exhibited the greatest

attachment to their federal jobs. For workers with more than 10 years of service the separation rate was 31 per cent as contrasted to a 63 per cent separation rate for workers who had less than 5 years of service. This same separation experience characterized the response to closure for the long tenured as compared to the short tenured male blue collar workers and female workers. The pattern was somewhat different for the male white collar workers. The lowest separation rate, 8 per cent was experienced by those who had 5 to 10 years experience in federal employment as compared to a separation rate of 14 per cent for male white collar workers with more than 10 years of federal service.

Not unexpectedly the pattern of separation, the way in which the Dow employees elected to end their federal government careers, was very much related to their years of service with the federal government. With one exception all of the employees who had 10 or fewer years of service separated from federal employment by resigning their job. A majority of the employees who had more than 10 years of federal service separated by retiring from federal employment with male blue collar workers accounting for a much greater proportion of retirements than did the white collar workers.

As the closing of Dow Air Force Base proceeded following the initial announcement of scheduled closure, a number of the DOD civilian workers, 71, 90 per cent of all separations (8 workers died), chose to remain in the local area and, as a consequence, resigned (50 workers) or retired (21 workers) from their federal jobs. The remaining 121 workers who decided to retain their status as federal employees found that in nearly every case the decision to do so necessitated relocation outside the local labor market area. Only 3 employees, less than 3 per cent of the total placements, were able to continue their careers as federal government employees without moving outside of the local market area.

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TABLE 10

PLACEMENTS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR
FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967, OUTSIDE OR WITHIN THE LOCAL LABOR MARKET AREA

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Placements	89	100.00	32	100.00	121	100.00
Outside						
Local Area	88	98.88	30	93.75	118	97.52
Within						
Local Area	1	1.12	2	6.25	3	2.48

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force Base,
Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

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TABLE 11

PLACEMENTS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR
FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967, BY GRADE CLASSIFICATIONS OR WAGE-BOARD LEVELS

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Placements	89	100.00	32	100.00	121	100.00
Same or higher grade	82	92.13	28	87.50	110	90.91
Lower grade	7	7.87	4	12.50	11	9.09

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force Base,
Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

In addition to the fact that nearly all of the 121 workers who left their jobs at Dow had to relocate outside the labor market of Bangor, Maine in order to continue their careers as federal employees, some of these employees also had to accept lower grade or wage-board level jobs. As shown in Table 11, of the 121 workers who were placed in other federal jobs, 11, 9 per cent, had to accept lower grade positions than those they left at Dow Air Force Base.

The gradual and steady adjustment in its employment status which the Dow workforce made during the first three years prior to base closure was aided by the comprehensive manpower assistance program which the Department of Defense set up to minimize the burden of such an adjustment. The workers who separated from their federal jobs received either severance pay in cases of resignations or the benefits of the federal retirement system. The 121 workers who preferred to remain federal government employees were assisted in the endeavor by the Department of Defense. The workers who moved were reimbursed for the cost of moving and when relocated in their new jobs were assured that their rate of pay during the next two year period would be at least as high as it had been for the last job they held at Dow Air Force Base.

It is interesting to note that workers at Dow adjusted their employment status without benefit of the retraining services that were available to them or without using the DOD placement service. By mid-1967 none of the employees at Dow had registered with the Centralized Referral System. Using customary information channels about alternative job opportunities within the local labor market and within the federal government, the Dow employees apparently found the provision of severance pay adequate to make the adjustment within the local market and the payment of moving costs sufficient to enable them to relocate in other federal jobs.

Olmstead Air Force Base

The Middletown Air Materiel Area installation or, as it was more commonly known, Olmstead Air Force Base, was

located in a relatively large metropolitan area. The total civilian workforce of the Harrisburg metropolitan economy totaled approximately 185,000.

The make-up of the personnel at the base differed markedly from that at Schilling and Dow Air Force Bases. At Olmstead the civilian personnel far outnumbered the military: DOD civilian employees totaled more than 10,000 as compared to only 1,300 military personnel. Most of the civilian personnel at the base were men. Nearly all of the women personnel were graded employees who accounted for 15 per cent of the base workforce. The few female wage-board employees made up only 1 per cent of all DOD civilian workers at the base. Male blue collar workers accounted for more than 50 per cent of the Olmstead workforce and male white collar workers were almost one-third of the workforce. Three-quarters of the civilian personnel at the base were between 35 and 64 years of age. Only 1 per cent of the workforce was 65 years of age or more, all male personnel. Very few of the base personnel were less than 25 years of age, 2 per cent, of whom all were women.

83 per cent of the Olmstead workers had more than 10 years of service with the federal government as compared to only 4 per cent who had worked for the federal government for less than 5 years. None of the male blue collar workers had less than 5 years service and only 1 out of 4 workers who had been employed for less than 5 years was a male white collar worker. In general, the male employees at Olmstead had somewhat longer tenure of service with the federal government than was the case for female personnel. 84 per cent of the male workers had worked for the federal government for more than 10 years while 73 per cent of the female workers had more than 10 years service.

The closing of Olmstead Air Force Base, a major engine repair and overhaul center for the Air Force, provided that all functions of the base would be phased-out and transferred to other Air Force logistical bases by July 1969. The transfer of the service functions of the base and the displacement of the DOD civilian personnel proceeded rather rapidly following the initial announcement of scheduled

closure. By the end of 1965 more than 40 per cent of the employees were no longer at Olmstead, and, at the end of the following year, 80 per cent of the employees had left the base. At the close of the third year, 1967, base closure was virtually complete as more than 96 per cent of the civilian workers had left their jobs.

To some degree the phase-out of the DOD civilian personnel proceeded faster than the phase-out of the service functions of the base. Although by the middle of 1967 more than 90 per cent of the workforce had left their jobs, the slower phase-out of the service functions of the base required the addition of nearly 1,000 temporary employees to fill jobs left vacant by the departed career employees in order to maintain the minimum service capacity of the still active base.

The jobs of more than 10,000 DOD career employees were either transferred (6,727) or eliminated with the closure of Olmstead Air Force Base. The general impact of this action on the employment status of the DOD civilian personnel is summarized in Table 12.¹ A majority of the workers, 62 per cent, continued to work for the federal government, slightly more than 40 per cent of whom remained employees of the Air Force. 3,888, 38 per cent of the Olmstead workforce, left their federal jobs, a separation rate greater than the 33 per cent rate of separation which characterized the response of the 48,000 civilian workers at all the DOD installations where similar closure action occurred.

The pattern of separation by the employees at Olmstead differed markedly from the way in which DOD employees in general and the employees at Schilling, Dow, and Amarillo Air Force Bases elected to end their federal government

1. For greater detail of the impact on the DOD civilian personnel see the Appendix, Tables 23-32, pp. 240-254.

careers. At the 65 DOD installations where closure action had been carried out, 55 per cent of the civilian workers who separated did so by resigning their jobs, and, at the other three Air Force Bases more than 60 per cent of the personnel who separated resigned their jobs. Only 42 per cent of the Olmstead workers terminated their federal careers by resignation while 53 per cent who separated elected to retire.

TABLE 12

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Personnel	10,324	100.00
Placements	6,436	62.34
Transfer with position	1,676	16.23
Air Force (non transfers)	977	9.47
Other DOD	3,607	34.94
Other federal	176	1.70
Separations	3,888	37.66
Resignations	1,696	16.42
Retirements	2,087	20.23
Other	105	1.01

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel
Office, Olmstead Air Force Base, Department of
the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

Of course, different types of the personnel reacted to the closure action in different ways. For example, the male white collar workers had the lowest separation rate among the general classes of workers. The highest separation rate

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was experienced by the few female blue collar workers all of whom separated from federal government employment. However, they made up only 1 per cent of the workforce and represent a somewhat unique class of workers for this reason alone. The next highest separation rate, 48 per cent, was experienced by the male blue collar workers, who, by contrast to their female counterpart, as a class of workers accounted for the greatest proportion of the civilian personnel at the base.

Differences in the pattern or the type of separation which was elected by the employees differed depending upon the workers' personal and occupational characteristics. It is interesting to note that at Olmstead Air Force Base a fairly significant proportion of men and women were able to retire from federal government employment. Female white collar workers had the highest proportion of resignations, 59 per cent, and yet one-third of these workers elected retirement. The male white collar workers at the base accounted for the smallest proportion of resignations and, of course, on the other hand, for the highest proportion of the retirements as 65 per cent of the separations for this class of workers were retirements. Of the male blue collar workers who left federal employment less than half resigned; 54 per cent chose to retire.

When the reaction of the Olmstead workers to the closure action was related to their age, the results were not quite what might be expected. Except for the few male workers who were 65 years of age, all retirements, the strongest attachment for continued federal employment was exhibited by the youngest workers, all of whom decided to continue their federal government careers. Because of the extreme tightness of the local labor market and, consequently, the abundance of job opportunities available to experienced workers, the three-fourths of the Olmstead workforce who were between 35 and 64 years of age had the highest separation rate, 39 per cent. Even the workers who were between 25 and 34 years of age exhibited a stronger attachment for federal employment than those who were older. Their separation rate was 32 per cent. The same general separation

response characterized both the male white collar and male blue collar workers, with the younger among them demonstrating the strongest preference for their federal jobs. The exception to this general pattern of reaction occurred with respect to the female white collar workers where the separation rate was highest for those between 25 and 34 years of age. Slightly more than 50 per cent of them left their federal government jobs.

The general type or pattern of separation seems to have been fairly well dictated by the age characteristics of the workforce. All of the male and female workers who were less than 35 years of age separated by resigning from their jobs, and male workers who were 65 years of age separated from federal employment by choosing to retire. For the workers between 35 and 64 years of age, the bulk of them, more than 60 per cent, separated by retiring from federal government service.

In spite of the fact that more than 80 per cent of the personnel at Olmstead had worked for the federal government for more than 10 years, 40 per cent of them decided to leave their federal jobs. Somewhat unexpectedly, as was the case when the workers' response to closure was related to age, the highest rates of separation were experienced by the longer tenured while the lowest separation rates were experienced by workers who had the fewest years of service with the federal government. The same general separation experience was characteristic among particular types of workers. The longer was the tenure of service the higher was the rate of separation with the lowest separation rate, 14 per cent, experienced by female white collar workers with less than 5 years of service. Again, this apparently greater attachment to federal government employment by the lesser tenure employees at Olmstead probably reflected the existence of the greater employment opportunities for the longer tenured, more experienced workers as well as the stronger attachment to the local community of the older, more settled male workers.

Predictably, all of the workers who separated and had held their federal jobs for 10 or fewer years resigned their

jobs. Among the different types of workers who had worked for the federal government for more than 10 years it was the male white collar workers who, relatively, accounted for the highest proportion of retirements.

With the closure of Olmstead Air Force Base, nearly 4,000, 38 per cent of the DOD civilian personnel, elected to remain within the metropolitan area thus ending by resignation or retirement their federal government careers. The rest of the employees, the 6,436 who decided to remain federal government employees, found that, with few exceptions, to do so necessitated relocation outside the local labor market area of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Only 176, slightly less than 3 per cent of the workers, were able to remain within the local labor market area. None of the female workers were able to remain within the metropolitan area and only 141, 5 per cent of the male white collar workers were able to do so.

Furthermore, those workers who sought to maintain their status as federal government employees found that not only was it necessary for most of them to change their geographic location, but for some it also meant that they had to accept jobs at lower grade classifications or wage-board levels in order to do so. As Table 14 shows, a few of the workers who relocated, 211, 3 per cent, had to accept jobs at lower grade classifications or wage-board levels: 35, 3 per cent of the 1,131 female white collar workers, accepted lower grade jobs; 141, nearly 6 per cent of the 2,546 male white collar workers were placed in lower grade jobs; and 35, 1 per cent of the 2,759 male blue collar workers were placed in lower wage-board level positions.

All of the elements of the comprehensive manpower program which was established by the Department of Defense to soften the employment impact of base closure action on DOD civilian workers were more fully operative at Olmstead Air Force Base than at any other of the 65 DOD installations where closure action occurred. 3,888 workers who left their federal jobs at the base received either severance pay or retirement benefits. The other 6,436 workers who continued

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TABLE 13

PLACEMENTS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR
FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 OUTSIDE OR WITHIN THE LOCAL LABOR MARKET AREA

	Male		Female		Total	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>Personnel</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>Personnel</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>Personnel</u>
Placements	5,305	100.00	1,131	100.00	6,436	100.00
Outside						
Local Area	5,129	96.68	1,131	100.00	6,260	97.27
Within						
Local Area	176	3.32	0	.00	176	2.73

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Olmstead Air Force
Base, Department of the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

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TABLE 14

PLACEMENTS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR
FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY GRADE CLASSIFICATIONS OR WAGE-BOARD LEVELS

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Placements	5,305	100.00	1,131	100.00	6,436	100.00
Same or higher grade	5,129	96.68	1,096	96.91	6,225	96.72
Lower grade	176	3.32	35	3.09	211	3.28

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force Base,
Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

in federal employment were assisted in this effort by the Department of Defense. These workers, the bulk of whom had to move to a new geographic area, were reimbursed for all of the direct costs of relocation and, in the event that their new job required the acceptance of a lower grade or wage-board level, they were assured that their rate of pay would remain the same as it had been at Olmstead for the next two years.

Although not very many DOD employees at all of the 65 installations requested or received retraining services, a relatively large number of the workers at Olmstead Air Force Base were deemed in need of retraining and received retraining services.¹ 551 employees, slightly more than 5 per cent of the Olmstead workforce, were retrained at the expense of the Department of Defense. 406, approximately 70 per cent of those who were retrained, were successfully placed in other lines of work.

In addition to the relatively important role played by retraining activities in easing the impact of closure for the civilian employees at the base, a sizeable number of the Olmstead workers used the DOD placement service, CRS. 3,125 employees, one-third of the Olmstead workforce, registered with the Centralized Referral System. Of the total number of Olmstead registrants 48 per cent were placed in other jobs, 877 directly as a result of the services of the placement system, while the remaining 629 workers found their jobs through customary channels. The remainder of the CRS registrants, 1,619, more than 50 per cent of the Olmstead workers who registered with CRS, decided to terminate their federal government careers and did so by either resigning or retiring from their jobs.

1. Only 656, a little more than 1 per cent of the more than 48,000 DOD civilian employees who were affected by closure action at 65 installations were judged to need retraining services.

Amarillo Air Force Base

Amarillo Air Force Base is located in a relatively isolated community which is a fairly large regional marketing center. The total civilian labor force of the Amarillo market numbered approximately 60,000 during the first three years following the original announcement of base closure. As was the case at Schilling and Dow Air Force Bases, the complement of military personnel at Amarillo numbered slightly more than 5,500 as compared to a civilian workforce of almost 1,600.

Most of the civilian personnel at the base were men and nearly all of the women workers who accounted for one-third of the total civilian personnel, were graded employees. Only 2 per cent of the civilian workers were female wage-board or blue collar workers. Male graded or white collar workers accounted for 40 per cent of the Amarillo civilian personnel while the remaining 27 per cent of the base workforce consisted of male blue collar employees.

The closure of Amarillo Air Force Base which was to be completed by July 1968 provided for the functional transfer of 283 jobs and for the elimination of the jobs of the remaining 1,307 DOD civilian workers: all SAC aircraft were to be relocated at Pease Air Force Base by June 1966; and all Air Force technical training activities were to be relocated to other major permanent installations by July 1968. In fact, the closure schedule was changed a number of times and by the end of 1967 no noticeable change in the functional activity of the installation had occurred. However the employment status of the 1,590 civilian workers who were employed at the base at the time of the November 1964 announcement of closure did change a great deal. By the end of 1965, 31 per cent of the original workforce was

1. (Additional information on the distribution of the Amarillo civilian workforce could not be made because of certain deficiencies in the available data.)

no longer employed at Amarillo Air Force Base and, at the end of the second year of scheduled closure, 46 per cent of the employees had left the base. By July of the third year of closure action, 893, 56 per cent of the workers, had either accepted employment with the federal government elsewhere or separated from their federal jobs and, by the close of the year, 1967, 1,249, 79 per cent of the original Amarillo workforce had ended their careers at the base.

Despite the fact that the bulk of the workforce at the base did react to the announced schedule of closure, the functional activity of the base was not particularly affected by this action. The jobs which were vacated by departing career employees were filled by the appointment of temporary employees. For example, although 893 workers, 56 per cent of the career employees, had left the base by July 1967, nearly all of the jobs of these workers were filled by 821 temporary workers who were appointed to the vacated positions.

Although the degree of actual base closure which occurred (or didn't occur) at Amarillo Air Force Base differed markedly from the closure action which occurred at Schilling, Dow, or Olmstead Air Force Bases, the resulting impact on the employment status of the DOD civilian personnel at the base was very much similar to the workers' reaction at the other bases. The impact of this announced closure action at Amarillo on the employment status of the civilian personnel at the base is summarized in Table 15.¹ Most of the workers who left their jobs at Amarillo Air Force Base, 856, 69 per cent of them continued to work for the federal government, most of whom who remained employees of the Air Force. By the end of 1967, 393, 31 per cent of the 1,249 employees who left the base, separated from their federal jobs: 247, 20 per cent of the workers, resigned; 129, 10 per cent of the workers, retired; and 17, 1 per cent of the workforce lost their jobs by death or discharge for cause.

1. For greater detail of the impact on the DOD civilian personnel see the Appendix, Tables 33-36, pp. 255-263.

TABLE 15

**EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF AMARILLO AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967**

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Personnel	1,249	100.00
Placements	856	68.53
Transfer with position	143	11.45
Air Force	592	47.40
Other DOD	62	4.96
Other	59	4.72
Separations	393	31.47
Resignations	247	19.82
Retirements	129	10.31
Other	17	1.34

Source: Personnel Service Records, Form 50, Personnel Office
Amarillo Air Force Base, Department of the Air
Force, Amarillo, Texas.

It is of some interest to note that although a number of the jobs were to be transferred with some of the base functions and not eliminated, not all of the 283 employees who had the right to transfer with their position elected to do so. Only 143, 51 per cent of the workers who had this right chose to exercise it.

31 per cent of the workers at Amarillo decided to leave their federal government jobs. This separation rate was almost the same as the rate of separation which characterized the response of the 48,000 civilian workers at all DOD installations where similar closure action occurred.

The proportion of the civilian personnel who separated and elected to resign from their federal jobs was relatively high, 65 per cent, and very much similar to the experience at Schilling and Dow Air Force Bases. Only 32 per cent of the workers who left their federal jobs retired.

As was the case at the other bases, the general personal and occupational characteristics of the workers accounted for different patterns of reaction to the announcement of base closure. At Amarillo, it was generally higher salaried and more skilled white collar workers who exhibited the greatest attachment for their federal jobs. 19 per cent of the male graded employees decided to end their careers with the federal government.¹ Not unexpectedly, it was the female white collar workers who exhibited the least attachment to their federal jobs and who had the highest separation rate among the different types of workers at the base: 47 per cent of the female graded employees left federal employment.

Of the 1,249 DOD civilian personnel at Amarillo Air Force Base who reacted during the three years following the announcement that the base would be closed and that their jobs would be either transferred or eliminated, nearly 400, 31 per cent of the employees, decided to remain in the area and did so by either resigning or retiring from their federal government jobs. The other 856 workers who decided to maintain their federal government careers found that, with few exceptions, to do so required that they relocate outside the local labor market area of Amarillo, Texas. Only 25 employees, 3 per cent of the workers who were placed in other federal jobs were able to remain within the local area. Of the 632 male employees who continued to work for the federal government, only 4, slightly more than one-half

1. (Limitations with respect to the availability of complete data did not permit a more complete description of the pattern of separation action related to personal or occupational characteristics, nor was valid data available in order to relate the workers response at Amarillo to age or length of service characteristics.)

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TABLE 16

PLACEMENTS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF THE AMARILLO
AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 OUTSIDE OR WITHIN THE LOCAL LABOR MARKET AREA

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Placements	632	100.00	224	100.00	856	100.00
Outside						
Local Area	628	99.36	203	90.63	831	97.08
Within						
Local Area	4	.64	21	9.37	25	2.92

Source: Personnel Service Records, Form 50, Personnel Office, Amarillo Air Force
Base, Department of the Air Force, Amarillo, Texas.

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TABLE 17

PLACEMENTS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF THE AMARILLO
AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY GRADE CLASSIFICATIONS OR WAGE-BOARD LEVELS

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Placements	632	100.00	224	100.00	856	100.00
Same or higher grade	580	91.77	146	65.18	726	84.81
Lower grade	52	8.23	78	34.82	130	15.19

Source: Personnel Service Records, Form 50, Personnel Office, Amarillo Air Force
Base, Department of the Air Force, Amarillo, Texas.

of 1 per cent, all of whom were blue collar workers, were able to continue their careers with the federal government and remain within the local labor market area. By contrast 9 per cent, 21 of the 224 female workers who were placed in other federal jobs found it possible to stay within the local area. Of the few women workers who were able to remain within the local labor market most of them were white collar or graded employees.

Not only was it necessary for nearly all of the workers who decided to maintain their status as federal employees to move outside the local area but, for a number of them, it also meant that they had to accept lower grade classification or wage-board level jobs in order to do so. As is depicted in Table 17, 130 employees, 15 per cent of the 856 workers who continued to work for the federal government, had to accept jobs at a lower grade or wage-board level. The proportion of men that had to do so was substantially lower than the proportion of women employees who were required to accept a lower grade job. 35, 9 per cent, of the 398 male white collar placements accepted lower grade positions, while 17, 7 per cent of the 234 male blue collar workers had to take lower wage-board level jobs if they wanted to work for the federal government. Among the female workers who were placed in other federal jobs, none of the blue collar workers were placed in lower wage-board level positions, but 78, 38 per cent, of the 207 female white collar placements were required to take lower grade positions.

Some of the elements of the DOD assistance program did aid the civilian personnel at Amarillo in making employment adjustments to the scheduled and anticipated closure of the base. The workers who separated from their federal jobs received either severance pay or retirement benefits. The other workers who decided to move to new federal jobs were reimbursed by DOD for the direct costs of relocation and for those workers from whom relocation required the acceptance of a lower grade position the receipt of the higher rate of pay which they had received while working at Amarillo was assured for the next two year period of employment.

During the three years following the initial announcement that Amarillo Air Force Base would be closed, 1,249 of the Amarillo civilian personnel adjusted their employment status and did so without utilizing the computerized DOD placement service and without requesting or receiving the retraining services which DOD made available to them. Apparently the range of employment opportunities within the local labor market and within the federal government which were made known to them through normal or customary channels was sufficient for their purposes.

Summary

The reaction patterns of the DOD civilian personnel at Schilling, Dow, Olmstead and Amarillo Air Force Bases was different for workers whose personal and occupational characteristics were different. At all four of the bases it was the male graded or white collar workers who demonstrated the greatest preference for continued employment with the federal government. The separation rate for this type of worker was always markedly below that of any other regardless of age or length of employment with the federal government. The reaction of the other types of workers, male blue collar workers or female white collar workers, was not as uniformly characteristic at all of the four bases as was the case with male white collar workers. At two of the bases, Dow and Amarillo, it was the female graded or white collar worker who had the highest separation rate, while at the other two bases the male blue collar workers demonstrated the least preference for their federal jobs. This much greater willingness on the part of the male blue collar and female white collar workers to give up their federal jobs, in large measure, reflected a wider range of alternative employment opportunities within the local labor market areas.

The pattern or type of separation among workers who decided to end their federal government careers was relatively consistent at each of the four bases. The female white collar workers, who were generally younger and had a lesser attachment to the workforce as reflected by their

length of tenure in their federal jobs, had a higher percentage of resignations from federal government employment, and, on the other side of the coin, the male workers at all of the four bases accounted for the greatest proportion of the workers who decided to end their federal government careers by retirement.

In addition to the way in which the personal and occupational characteristics of the workers shaped their reactions to closure, differences in the labor market area of the community within which the base was located, differences in the timing of actual closure actions, and differences in the service functions of the base accounted for different patterns of reaction on the part of the DOD civilian personnel at each base. The quickness of closure and the relatively low absorption capacity of the small labor market in Salina (unemployment rate of more than 5 per cent) explains why fewer Schilling workers decided to remain in the local area whereas the gradual closure action at Dow Air Force Base and the relative tightness of the Bangor labor market (unemployment rate of less than 2 per cent) accounts for the high separation rate among the employees at this base. The high proportion of DOD workers at Olmstead who separated from their federal jobs reflected the high absorption capacity of the large and very tight labor market in the Harrisburg metropolitan area (unemployment rate of 2 per cent), while the absence of any real closure action at Amarillo enabled workers there to carefully survey their alternative employment opportunities in a local market where labor was scarce (unemployment rate of 2-5 per cent), a circumstance which is reflected by the relatively low separation rate among the workers at this base.

One of the most striking differences in the reactions of the DOD employees to closure at the four bases was the much different separation experience which characterized the response of the civilian personnel at Olmstead Air Force Base. Here, in contrast to the other bases, the older and longer tenured workers exhibited a lesser preference for continued federal employment than did the younger shorter tenured employees. The different occupational duties per-

formed by the workforce of this base and the extreme tightness of the local labor market provided the older, longer tenured, more experienced workers here, who undoubtedly had strong personal ties to the local community, with the advantage of choosing from among a wide range of employment alternatives in the local area.

Most of the DOD civilian personnel who continued their careers as federal government employees were able to do so and remain employees of the Department of Defense. This experience was similar for the employees at all four bases. 98 per cent of the employees at Olmstead Air Force Base who kept their federal jobs stayed within the Department of Defense and between 87 and 93 per cent of the placements at Schilling, Dow and Amarillo were within DOD. Moreover, not only were most of the employees able to continue their careers within the Department of Defense, but a relatively high proportion of the displaced workers were able to remain with the same branch of service within DOD, the Air Force. 93 per cent of the employees at Amarillo Air Force Base who were placed were relocated within the Air Force, while at Schilling and Dow the proportion of civilian workers who moved to new federal jobs and remained within the Air Force was 69 and 70 per cent respectively. Somewhat curiously, although 98 per cent of the placements of the Olmstead workers were within the Department of Defense, only 42 per cent of those who relocated to new federal government jobs remained employees of the Air Force. This lesser attachment to the Air Force by these workers reflected a stronger demand for the particular skills of the Olmstead workforce by the other service departments.

At Schilling and Dow Air Force Bases all of the jobs of the DOD civilian personnel were eliminated with the closure of the base. By contrast, closure action at Olmstead Air Force Base eliminated only a little less than 45 per cent of the DOD civilian jobs and, at Amarillo Air Force Base, scheduled closure called for the elimination of all but 18 per cent of the jobs. In both cases, the jobs not eliminated were scheduled for transfer to other DOD installations. At all of the 65 DOD installations where closure action

occurred, more than 22,000, of the nearly 54,000 jobs that were affected were transferred to other DOD installations. At all of the 65 DOD installations, only one-third of the workers who had the right to transfer with their position elected to do so. A smaller proportion of the Olmstead workers who had the right to transfer with their position did so; only one-quarter (1,676) of the 6,727 Olmstead workers who could have transferred with their jobs decided to do so, while at Amarillo Air Force Base slightly more than one-half (143) of the 283 DOD civilian personnel with the right to transfer with the base function chose to make this transfer.

At all of the Air Force bases the workers who decided to relocate in new federal jobs uniformly had to move outside the local labor market area. Only 2 or 3 per cent of the employees were able to remain in federal employment and stay within the local area. With one exception, a slightly higher proportion of female workers found it possible to relocate and stay within the local labor market area. The exception was the male white collar workers at Olmstead of whom 6 per cent were able to remain within the local labor market and find jobs with the other service depots in the local area. At Schilling Air Force Base where closure action occurred very soon and where employment opportunities in the relatively small local labor market were limited, 27 per cent of the workers who moved to new federal government jobs accepted relocation at lower grade classification or wage-board level. This proportion was somewhat higher at Schilling Air Force Base than it was for the displaced DOD civilian workers at all 65 DOD installations. The proportion of workers who found it necessary to accept lower grade jobs at the other three Air Force Bases, Dow, Olmstead, and Amarillo, was much lower than at Schilling or at all of the 65 bases: 9 per cent of the Dow placements were in lower grade jobs; 3 per cent of the Olmstead workers placed were relocated in lower grade positions; and at Amarillo, 15 per cent of the placements were required to accept lower grade jobs. The pattern of placements of different types of workers at lower job levels was generally the same at all

four bases, the exception being the female white collar workers at Amarillo Air Force Base of whom 38 per cent relocated at lower job levels.

THE CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM

When the schedule for the closing of 80 domestic military installations was announced on November 19, 1964, almost simultaneously it was announced that the Department of Defense would guarantee the job opportunity of each displaced career employee. A basic ingredient of this job offer guarantee was the establishment on December 17, 1964 of the DOD Automated Priority Placement System - the Centralized Referral System (CRS). This computerized placement system was established in order to bring suitable job opportunities to the attention of displaced workers. Within the confines of the Department of Defense, CRS expanded the job market for DOD employees to world-wide limits and, by so doing, altered to a significant degree the nature of the economic impact or burden which is the normal fare of workers whose employing enterprise ceases to function. Although the establishment of this placement service was initially designed to soften the impact of closure on the civilian employees at the various installations, it has also operated to the benefit of the Department of Defense by expanding the scope of the market for each of its separate agencies and installations that have needed experienced employees. This extra dividend of the placement system which has accrued to DOD has been particularly apparent during recent years when the needs of DOD installations in the face of general labor shortages have expanded with the escalation of the Vietnam War.

In order to speed the process of adjustment to base closure, the Centralized Referral System used high speed computers to match displaced personnel with available jobs. However, the responsibility for placement and the success of the placement system turned primarily on the willingness of the personnel officers at specific installations to effectively use it and also on the displaced employee's willingness to accept relocation, a normal consequence of

any job offer. At two week intervals a "stopper sheet" for every installation in which a displaced worker indicated an interest was distributed to DOD installations. The personnel officer at the installation was required to consider the available candidates for any vacant position before he could use an employee at the base or hire from his normal labor market.

The worker who voluntarily participated in the placement system had the obligation of not imposing unreasonable restrictions on his preferences for geographic and occupational relocation. When the employee received an offer of a job, he was permitted 24 to 48 hours to accept or reject it. While the time allowance for the worker to make a decision was restrictive, for the system to work, the time allowance for worker decision could not be too long. If the worker rejected a suitable job offer, his guaranteed job opportunity, he was then assigned a lower priority within the placement system, and if he subsequently declined a second job offer, he was withdrawn from the system.

During the several years following the 1964 year-end announcement of closure action and the establishment of the Centralized Referral System, the placement system played a singular role in maintaining the integrity of the job opportunity of displaced workers. In particular, CRS operated to the advantage of the "harder-to-place" displaced employees. Fewer than half, 20,000 of the 48,000 workers displaced during the first two and one-half years registered with CRS, and, of the 20,176 workers who were registered, only 27 per cent were placed directly by the system. As time passed following the initial announcement of closure and as employment opportunities within DOD and throughout the domestic economy expanded substantially with improvement in general economic conditions and with the increased demand imposed upon the federal government and the economy by the Vietnam War, fewer and fewer displaced workers used the placement system. Of the slightly more than 20,000 workers from 48 DOD installations who were registrants of CRS during its first two and one-half years of operation, two-thirds of them had registered during the first year, 1965, and by

the middle of 1966 90 per cent of them had used or were using the placement service. From July 1966 until May 1967 only about 2,400 more workers requested service of CRS. At Schilling and Olmstead Air Force Bases, where closure action occurred rather quickly, a number of displaced workers used the placement system. By contrast, at Dow and Amarillo Air Force Bases, where the employment impact of closure occurred at a later date, none of the affected civilian personnel registered with CRS. These different patterns of use at these different Air Force Bases reflect to some degree the fact that the placement system provided service primarily for the hard-to-place workers, a class of workers whose numbers declined markedly as their alternative job opportunities expanded during 1966 and 1967.

The overwhelming majority of the registrants in the Centralized Referral System were men. Displaced women employees, who ostensibly were willing to accept relocation, accounted for only 17 per cent of the displaced workers from the 80 installations who registered with CRS. Nearly all of the women registrants were graded personnel; female blue collar workers accounted for less than 1 per cent of all CRS registrants. Male blue collar workers as a class accounted for the highest percentage of registrants, 62 per cent while only 21 per cent of the registrants were male graded or white collar workers.

The displaced workers who registered with the DOD placement service were generally older and longer tenured employees than was the case at Schilling, Dow, Olmstead and Amarillo Air Force Bases. 87 per cent of the CRS registrants were between 35 and 64 years of age, a proportion which was characteristic of each general type of registrant whether white or blue collar, male or female workers. The only noticeable difference in the distribution by the different age classes between types of workers was that the female registrants were somewhat younger than their male counterparts.

Not only were most of the registrants relatively older than DOD employees in general, but they were also longer tenured workers. 82 per cent of the CRS registrants had been employed by the federal government for more than 10 years and only 4 per cent of the registrants had less than 5 years of service with the federal government. The pattern as between male and female workers differed rather substantially. Most of the male workers, 87 per cent, had over 10 years of experience with the federal government while only 2 per cent of them had worked for less than 5 years in their federal jobs. By contrast only 60 per cent of the female registrants had over 10 years of service and 14 per cent of them had less than 5 years of service.

The extent to which CRS did function to preserve the job opportunity of displaced workers is shown by the summary of the resultant employment status of the 20,000 registrants who were displaced by closure action at 48 bases.¹ Table 18 summarizes the employment status of these workers who voluntarily decided to use the service of the DOD Centralized Referral System during the period following the November 1964 announcement of closure through May 15, 1967.² More than 60 per cent of the 20,176 workers who registered with CRS maintained their status as federal government employees or were placed in private industry. Although more than 12,000 of the registrants were placed, only 27 per cent of the registrants (or 40 per cent of all placements) were placed directly by CRS. Of the other placements, 27 per cent (5,531) were placed within the Department of Defense, 3 per cent (696) of the registrants were placed in other federal jobs, 2 per cent

1. (The Centralized Referral System operated as the placement system for all displaced workers within the Department of Defense and not just for those who were displaced at the 80 bases which are the concern of this study.)

2. For greater detail of the impact on the CRS registrants see the Appendix, Tables 37-48, pp. 264-291.

TABLE 18

**EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED
REFERRAL SYSTEM JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 15, 1967**

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Registrants	20,176	100.00
Placements	12,220	60.57
By CRS	5,427	26.90
DOD	5,531	27.41
Other federal	696	3.45
Reinstated at releasing		
installation	340	1.69
Private industry	226	1.12
Separations	7,956	39.43
Resignations	925	4.53
Declinations of job offers	5,092	25.24
Retirements	1,831	9.08
Other	108	.53

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems,
Defense Electronics Supply Center, U.S. Department
of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

(340) were reinstated at the releasing installation, and 1 per cent (226) of the registrants were recorded as being placed in private industry. In all of the latter cases the usual or customary channels of placement were utilized, not the DOD placement service.

39 per cent of the workers who were registered with CRS elected to end their federal government careers: 5 per cent by direct resignations; 25 per cent by de facto resignations as they declined a second job offer and consequently forfeited their right to use the placement system; 9 per cent of the registrants elected to retire;

and less than 1 per cent of the workers who had registered died or were discharged for cause.

As might be expected, and as was the case at Schilling, Dow, Olmstead and Amarillo Air Force Bases, different types of workers who registered with CRS reacted to the impact of closure and to the opportunities for placement in other jobs in different ways. As was true at each of the four bases, the generally higher salaried and more skilled male graded or white collar workers who registered with CRS demonstrated greater preference for continued federal employment. Although the rate of separation for this type of worker was higher for those in the placement system than it was at the individual bases, the separation rate of 29 per cent was the lowest for any particular class of workers. The highest separation rate, 44 per cent, was experienced by the male wage-board or blue collar registrants.

The general pattern of separation or the type of separation which was elected by the DOD civilian employees who were registrants of CRS was different than the separation pattern at the individual bases. A greater proportion of the registrants in the placement system who separated from their federal jobs did so by resignation: 77 per cent of all the registrants who separated resigned from their federal jobs; 23 per cent elected to retire. The general pattern of separation was approximately the same for all classes of workers although a somewhat higher proportion of the female registrants resigned as compared to the experience of the male employees in the placement system.

If the reaction of the CRS registrants to the impact of closure is related to broad age groupings the results are what would generally be expected. The separation rate for registrants between 35 and 64 years of age was 39 per cent, 70 per cent of whom resigned from their federal jobs. The separation rate for those who were older and younger was higher than for this age group.

The lowest separation rate for any specific type of worker within a general age grouping was experienced by the white collar male workers between 25 and 34 years of age.

This group had a separation rate of 26 per cent, all of whom resigned their federal jobs. The oldest of the male blue collar registrants, those who were over 65 years of age, had the highest separation rate, 75 per cent, most of whom elected to retire from federal service. Except for some disability retirements, the pattern or type of separation action which characterized the different workers in different age classifications is what would be expected: the younger workers accounted for most of the resignations and the older workers for the retirements.

For all of the registrants of the placement system the rate of separation was approximately the same regardless of the employees length of service with the federal government, a separation rate of 39 per cent. Between different types of workers, the lowest separation rate, 24 per cent, was experienced by the male white collar registrants who had between 5 and 10 years of service with the federal government while the highest separation rate, 49 per cent, occurred among male blue collar registrants.

If the pattern or type of separation action chosen by the registrants is related to the different length of service classes, not surprisingly, the registrants with the fewest years of service accounted for a relatively greater proportion of resignations while those with the most years of federal government employment accounted for nearly all of the retirements.

A relatively large number of the resignations by the workers who were registered in CRS were declinations of suitable job offers. The refusal of an employee to accept a second suitable job offer amounted to a resignation from his federal job. Of all the resignations (including declinations of suitable job offers) by the DOD civilian workers at the 65 installations, one-third quit their federal jobs by submitting a formal resignation while the remaining two-thirds left their federal jobs by rejecting a second job offer. In contrast, a much higher proportion of the CRS registrants, 83 per cent, in effect quit their federal jobs by refusing to accept a second job offer.

During the several years following the November 1964 announcement of base closure action DOD transferred or eliminated the jobs of nearly 50,000 civilian workers. During this same period, slightly more than 20,000 of these workers whose jobs were affected by this action registered with the Centralized Referral System, indicating some degree of preference for continued employment with the federal government. However, for many this decision to maintain their status as federal government employees was often tempered by the necessity to relocate outside of the local labor market area. Of the 20,176 registrants of CRS, with few exceptions, 61 per cent continued to work for the federal government. Of the 12,220 who were placed in other jobs, 58 per cent found it necessary to relocate outside the local labor market area of the military installation where they had been previously employed. Nonetheless, it is somewhat surprising that a relatively high proportion of the total registrants placed, 42 per cent, were able to remain within the local area and continue their careers as federal government employees. The 5,170 employees who were able to relocate within the local area accounted for 26 per cent of all CRS registrants. The proportion of female workers who were able to continue in federal government employment and stay within the local labor market was much higher than the proportion of male employees who were able to do so: 59 per cent of the female registrants were placed in federal jobs within the local area of the releasing installation while only 39 per cent of the male registrants were able to get federal jobs in the local area. Still, in general the registrants of the DOD placement system were quite successful in maintaining their status as federal government employees and, at the same time, avoiding geographic movement. This general experience of the 12,000 placements who registered with CRS is distinctively different from the particular experience of the employees at either Schilling or Olmstead Air Force Bases.

Table 20 indicates that the ability of CRS registrants to remain federal government employees and, at the same time, avoid the trauma of geographic relocation depended upon whether the placements were made directly by the

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TABLE 19

PLACEMENT OF REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM,
JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967, OUTSIDE AND WITHIN THE LOCAL LABOR MARKET AREA

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Placements	9,984	100.00	2,236	100.00	12,220	100.00
Outside						
Local Area	6,125	61.35	925	41.37	7,050	57.69
Within						
Local Area	3,859	38.65	1,311	58.63	5,170	42.31

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics
Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 20

PLACEMENTS BY CRS AND BY OTHER MEANS OF REGISTRANTS
OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967,
OUTSIDE AND WITHIN THE LOCAL LABOR MARKET AREA

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
CRS Placements	4,298	100.00	1,129	100.00	5,427	100.00
Outside						
Local Area	3,130	72.82	579	51.28	3,709	68.34
Within						
Local Area	1,168	27.18	550	48.72	1,718	31.66
Other Placements	5,686	100.00	1,107	100.00	6,793	100.00
Outside						
Local Area	2,995	52.67	346	31.26	3,341	49.18
Within						
Local Area	2,691	47.33	761	68.74	3,452	50.82

Sourc. Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics
Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

Centralized Referral System or through more customary channels. As Table 20 shows, 32 per cent of the registrants placed directly by CRS were able to remain within the local labor market area of the releasing installation. On the other hand, when the CRS registrants were left to their own devices and used the customary and usual channels to obtain other federal jobs, a greater proportion were able to do so and stay within the local area. For example, of the 6,793 registrants who were placed by means other than the Centralized Referral System, 51 per cent were able to stay within the local labor market area. In both instances, whether placement was directly by CRS or by other means the proportion of women able to remain within the local area was higher than the proportion of men able to do so.

DOD civilian employees who were affected by base closure actions, and who had initial if not continuing preferences for remaining employees of the federal government, often found it necessary not only to alter their geographic location but sometimes accept a lower grade classification or wage-board level in order to continue their careers. As Table 21 shows, 31 per cent of the registrants who were placed elected to continue in federal government and, in deciding to do so, were required to accept lower grade jobs. The proportion of women accepting lower grade positions was somewhat higher than the proportion of men who had to do so, 36 per cent as compared to 30 per cent.

Table 22 provides some contrast of the extent to which registrants who decided to continue as federal employees were required to accept lower grade or wage-board level jobs when placed directly by CRS as compared to placement by other more customary means. As indicated in Table 22, 37 per cent of the 5,427 registrants who were placed directly by CRS had to accept a lower grade position in order to remain employees of the federal government. When the registrants of CRS were able to continue their careers by obtaining placement through channels other than CRS, a greater proportion of them were able to maintain their grade or wage-board level than was the case when placement was made directly by CRS: 1,784, 26 per cent of the 6,793 registrants

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TABLE 21

PLACEMENTS OF REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM,
JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967 BY GRADE CLASSIFICATIONS OR WAGE-BOARD LEVELS

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Placements	9,984	100.00	2,236	100.00	12,220	100.00
Same or higher grade	6,979	69.90	1,431	64.00	8,410	68.82
Lower grade	3,005	30.10	805	36.00	3,810	31.18

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics
Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 22

PLACEMENTS BY CRS AND BY OTHER MEANS OF REGISTRANTS
OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967,
BY GRADE CLASSIFICATIONS OR WAGE-BOARD LEVELS

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
CRS Placements	4,298	100.00	1,129	100.00	5,427	100.00
Same or higher grade	2,748	63.94	653	57.84	3,401	62.67
Lower grade	1,550	36.06	476	42.16	2,026	37.33
Other Placements	5,686	100.00	1,107	100.00	6,793	100.00
Same or higher grade	4,231	74.41	778	70.28	5,009	73.74
Lower grade	1,455	25.59	329	29.72	1,784	26.26

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics
Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 23

DECLINATIONS BY REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL
SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967 OF SECOND JOB OFFERS
BY GRADE CLASSIFICATIONS OR WAGE-BOARD LEVELS

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Declinations	4,110	100.00	982	100.00	5,092	100.00
Same or						
higher grade	3,939	95.84	891	90.73	4,830	94.85
Lower grade	171	4.16	91	9.27	262	5.15

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics
Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 24

DECLINATIONS BY REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL
SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967 OF SECOND JOB OFFERS OUTSIDE OR WITHIN
THE LOCAL LABOR MARKET AREA

	Male		Female		Total	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Declinations	4,110	100.00	982	100.00	5,092	100.00
Outside						
Local Area	571	13.89	106	10.59	677	13.30
Within						
Local Area	3,539	86.11	876	89.21	4,415	86.70

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics
Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

who were placed by means other than CRS had to accept lower grade positions in order to remain employees of the federal government. Regardless of whether placement was directly by CRS or through normal channels, a higher proportion of females as compared to male registrants had to accept lower grade jobs in order to maintain their status as federal employees.

Nearly 8,000 DOD civilian employees who registered with the Centralized Referral System ended their careers with the federal government. Most of these separations, 5,092, 25 per cent of all registrants, were de facto resignations in the form of declinations of a second suitable job offer. The somewhat surprising aspect of this type of separation action is the fact that the CRS job offers that were declined by registrants nearly always represented a job offer of the same or higher grade and, more often than not were jobs located within the local labor market area. Tables 23 and 24 summarize this aspect of the job offers declined by the registrants in terms of the grade or wage-board level and the geographic location of the job offers. As is indicated by Table 23, only 262, 5 per cent of the more than 5,000 job offers that were refused by CRS registrants were lower grade level jobs; only 9 per cent of the 982 jobs refused by female workers were lower grade positions and, an even smaller per cent, 4 per cent, of the 4,110 jobs refused by male workers were lower grade jobs. In a similar vein, only 13 per cent of the 5,092 job offers refused by registrants were located outside the local labor market area of the releasing installation: as few as 11 per cent of the 982 job offers declined by female registrants were located outside the local area and only 14 per cent of the 4,110 job offers declined by male registrants were jobs located outside the local labor market area. The overwhelming number of second job offer rejections by registrants of the Centralized Referral System were offers of positions of the same grade or wage-board level which were located within the labor market area of the releasing installation.

CONCLUSIONS

Every DOD civilian employee felt the impact of closure action. Each one had to adjust his employment status in some way: except for female secondary workers, all displaced workers had the option of another federal job or, within limits set by employment opportunities in the area, of a job in the local labor market; some, nearly one-quarter of the displaced employees, had, as an additional option, the specific right to move with their job to another installation; and a few others, the older workers, also had the option of remaining within the local area and retiring from federal employment.

Without doubt, the impact of base closure actions on the employment status of the DOD workers was an impact of substantial proportions. In general, the closing of the Defense installations resulted in a much greater proportion of the employees at these bases ending their careers with the federal government than would have been the case in the absence of base closure actions. Closure accelerated the rate of retirement, resulting in the retirement of two and one-half to five times as many workers as would have normally retired. The proportion of the DOD civilian employees who decided to quit their federal job because of base closure actions was also much higher than the rate of resignation normally experienced by the Department of Defense. Resignation rates at the bases which were closed were 8 to 12 times higher than normal DOD experience.

Furthermore, displaced workers who decided to continue their careers as federal government employees experienced a marked change in their employment status. Although most of the workers decided to remain employees of the Department of Defense, some had to accept lower grade positions in order to do so, and nearly all of the employees who continued to work for the federal government had to relocate outside the local labor market area, a necessary condition for continued federal employment that probably was welcomed initially only by the most adventurous of the displaced workers.

In spite of the complete change which base closure actions had on the employment status of the civilian employees, they were able to adjust rather rapidly to their changed circumstances. In general, the workforces at the DOD installations were much older and generally more skilled than the United States civilian labor force as a whole. More importantly, most of the DOD workers were of an age, length-of-service and general skill classes where normal labor force participation is virtually one hundred per cent. This is particularly true for male workers, (if not as much for the female workers) 35 to 64 years of age. Although it may be axiomatic that a worker's first preference, particularly if he is a home owner, is to remain within the local community, the employment adjustments made by the displaced DOD workers more often than not overwhelmed any such preference or attachment they may have had for their local communities. For most of the displaced workers it was the relative attractiveness of their alternative employment opportunities, whether they existed within the local area or not, that was the dominating factor in determining the adjustment which they made in their employment status. At all the bases, the majority of the workers demonstrated a preference for continuing their careers with the federal government despite the fact that this required them to overcome the strong economic and social ties which tended to bind them to the local community.

Aside from whatever personal trauma may have faced the civilian personnel where base closure occurred, the DOD manpower adjustment or assistance program clearly eased the process of adjustment which faced them. The DOD employees were quickly provided with factual information which matched their geographic and occupational preferences with employment opportunities within the Department of Defense. Although the DOD priority placement system, the Centralized Referral System, did not account for a majority of the placements of workers in other federal government jobs, it did play an important role at the margin and, by so doing, maximized the workers' decision options. The fact that the Department of Defense also provided its displaced employees with costless movement to a certain job opportunity meant that

the entire adjustment process for the employees was one of viable options. The option of another federal job was the workers' "bird-in-the hand", the yardstick they used to evaluate the relative attractiveness of all their options, and, in this very real sense, the integrity of the workers' opportunity to work was maintained.

Because base closure action came in a period of expanding employment opportunities throughout the domestic economy, its role diminished in importance quantitatively as more and more workers were able to get jobs locally and within the federal government by means of the customary or normal employment channels. This decline in use of CRS by the displaced workers primarily reflected an increase in the range of job opportunities faced by the displaced workers, and, did not reflect any decline in the capability or value of the DOD placement system.

The provision of retraining services was an important element of the general manpower adjustment program of the Department of Defense. Despite the fact that not many displaced workers were retrained, the fact remains that the existence of such services did maximize the workers complete range of employment options. Moreover, the absence of any great need for retraining services suggests the workers' existing skills were transferrable within federal employment as well as to private employment and that the general process of adjustment to base closure was completed with relative ease.

An indication of the extent to which the displaced employees options were widened or maximized by the DOD manpower adjustment program is indicated by the relatively large number of employees who had the right to transfer with their function but who, not limited to this option, refused to do so. For these workers, most of whom resigned from federal employment, the alternative employment opportunities were abundant and attractive enough to permit many of them to remain within their local labor market. Further confirmation of the existence of abundant and attractive local employment opportunities is provided by

the fact that nearly all of the offers of another DOD job refused by registrants of the Centralized Referral System were offers at the same grade level located within the local area.

The reaction of the workers at Amarillo Air Force Base to the announcement of scheduled closure was rather unique among all the bases and provides an indication or clue as to the nature of workers' job preferences. The closure of Amarillo Air Force Base never proceeded as scheduled during the three years after the initial announcement of closure. Yet, the employees, in the face of an expected if uncertain base closure action, adjusted their employment status: they left Amarillo Air Force Base. This reaction by the Amarillo employees suggests that, while some had a greater attachment to the local community than others, nearly all the career employees preferred, above all else, a high degree of defined certainty with respect to their job future and, clearly, they did not like the uncertainty that would have attended continued employment at this base. Of course, their ability to demonstrate their preference for certainty by leaving their jobs at the base was aided by the relative abundance of alternative opportunities in the local labor market and within the Department of Defense. This same preference for a certain or known job future was exhibited by displaced employees at all bases except those where closure occurred soon after the initial announcement. In general, DOD civilian employees adjusted their employment status at a pace much ahead of the actual phase-out or closure of the DOD installations.

It would be extremely useful if an assessment of the general employment impact which the closing of Defense installations had on DOD civilian employees could provide the basis for some inferences regarding the mobility characteristics of the displaced workers. Unfortunately, the classical concept of worker mobility is a will-o'-the-wisp. If mobility refers to the general capacity and willingness of displaced workers to move in order to maintain or improve upon their employment condition, then as a useful and meaningful concept it is devoid of any operational content.

Most of the DOD civilian employees were in the obvious sense mobile - they relocated outside the locality in other federal jobs. However, to conclude that the employees who remained within the local area were not mobile, that they did not have the capacity or the ability to move would be neither an interesting nor a valid conclusion. The simple observation that fewer of the workers at Schilling Air Force Base remained within the local community than was the case for workers at other bases does not warrant the conclusion that the workers at Schilling were the most mobile. It is only appropriate to conclude that the Schilling workers faced fewer employment opportunities within the local labor market than was the case at other bases, and meant that relatively more of them who were able and wanted to work had to move out of the local labor market area to do so.

In a similar vein, with one exception, it was the male graded or white collar worker, who was older and already had a somewhat lengthy career with the federal government, who, in terms of measurable geographic movement, demonstrated the highest degree of labor mobility. Certainly the willingness of this class of workers to move in order to maintain their federal government careers demonstrated a capacity for movement and a strong preference for continued employment with the federal government: a high degree of mobility. On the other hand, it also reflected the narrower range of alternative employment opportunities within local labor markets that were available for this class of workers who were in general of the professional administrator or technician type. It is interesting to note the exception to this circumstance. The older, longer tenured white collar male workers at Olmstead Air Force Base had less of an attachment for their federal jobs than did the younger male white collar workers. It was the extreme tightness of the Harrisburg labor market that made it relatively easier for the more experienced male white collar employee at Olmstead to get a good job in the local area than was the case at other bases and, hence, made it unnecessary for many of them to move any measurable distance.

In general, it is appropriate to conclude - a priori - that on the basis of general characteristics certain classes

of workers are less likely to move than are others. Female workers who are secondary wage earners, older workers near retirement age, and the very young workers, who are likely to be uncommitted in terms of careers, are less likely to move than the older, more skilled, primary wage earners whose known rate of participation in the labor force is for all practical purposes one hundred per cent. These workers will, if given the chance of alternative employment opportunities, select that job which in their view maximizes their individual preferences, and, in making their choice, more often than not they will demonstrate a high degree of mobility. Clearly, if the employment opportunities in the local area are nil, it is highly probable that the willingness of male white collar or blue collar workers to move in order to maintain their employment status (with the federal government) will be extremely high as will their measured degree of mobility.

Aided and abetted by a full employment economy and by a greatly expanded Defense budget, the Department of Defense successfully preserved for every one of its displaced employees the integrity of their opportunity to work. The establishment by the Department of Defense of an effective manpower adjustment program constituted a unique operational expression of an employer's responsibility to its employees, to the community, and to itself - a prototype for the future. By maximizing the employees' job opportunities, it minimized the heavy burden of persistent unemployment which has been the usual fare of displaced workers and, in particular, of the workers who have been displaced by Defense contract cut-backs or cancellations at private corporations. The

1. (See: The Dyna-soar Contract Cancellation, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 29, Washington, D.C., July 1965; Post Lay-Off Experiences: Republic Aviation Workers, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 35, Washington, D.C., August 1966; Martin Company Employees: Re-employment Experiences, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 36, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1966.)

lesson of a complete manpower program is there - an archetype for the future. Only problems of extended application remain, few of which are problems of technical feasibility.

Lastly, and of no little consequence, by effectively widening employment opportunities for its displaced employees, the Department of Defense softened the secondary employment impact which base closure had on other employees in local labor market areas. The result was that the manpower adjustment program of the Department of Defense not only operated to the benefit of its displaced civilian employees but indirectly benefitted the impacted communities as well as it facilitated in some measure the process of community adjustment to base closure.

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APPENDIX

TO

PHASE III

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TABLE 1

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DISPLACED BY
THE CLOSURE OF 65 DOD INSTALLATIONS, NOVEMBER 1964 TO JULY 1967

	Brookley AFB		Camp Parks	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	10,101	100.00	18	100.00
Transferred with position	1,800	17.82	0	.00
Other Placements	5,242	51.90	14	77.78
Separations	3,059	30.28	4	22.22
Retirements	1,075	10.64	3	16.67
Resignations	600	5.94	1	5.56
Declinations of job offers	1,260	12.47	0	.00
Other	124	1.23	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 1 (continued)

	Camp Hale		Lompoc AFS	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	11	100.00	2	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	0	.00
Other Placements	10	90.91	2	100.00
Separations	1	9.09	0	.00
Retirements	1	9.09	0	.00
Resignations	0	.00	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

	Madera AFS		Beale AFB	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	9	100.00	7	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	0	.00
Other Placements	6	66.67	1	14.29
Separations	3	33.33	6	85.71
Retirements	2	22.22	1	14.29
Resignations	1	11.11	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	2	28.57

(continued)

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TABLE 1 (continued)

	<u>Mill Valley AFS</u>		<u>Norton AFB</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Career Employees	6	100.00	6,662	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	1,344	20.18
Other Placements	4	66.67	3,469	52.07
Separations	2	33.33	1,822	27.35
Retirements	0	.00	371	5.57
Resignations	2	33.33	521	7.82
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	802	12.04
Other	0	.00	128	1.92

	<u>Oakland Army Terminal</u>		<u>Camp San Luis Obispo</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Career Employees	14	100.00	27	100.00
Transferred with position	3	21.50	0	.00
Other Placements	10	71.50	11	40.74
Separations	1	7.00	16	59.26
Retirements	1	7.00	4	14.81
Resignations	0	.00	3	11.11
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	9	33.33

(continued)

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TABLE 1 (continued)

	Lowry AFB		Orlando AFB	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	36	100.00	474	100.00
Transferred with position	2	5.55	207	43.67
Other Placements	29	80.56	172	36.29
Separations	5	13.89	95	20.04
Retirements	3	8.33	28	5.91
Resignations	1	2.78	54	11.39
Declinations of job offers	1	2.78	0	.00
Other	0	.00	13	2.74

	Hunter AFB		Macon NOP	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	616	100.00	915	100.00
Transferred with position	41	6.66	0	0.00
Other Placements	518	84.09	712	77.81
Separations	57	9.25	203	22.19
Retirements	33	5.36	68	7.43
Resignations	19	3.08	123	13.44
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Other	5	.81	12	1.31

(continued)

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TABLE 1 (continued)

	Cottonwood AFS		Mountain Home AFB	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Career Employees	13	100.00	8	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	0	.00
Other Placements	10	76.92	8	100.00
Separations	3	23.08	0	.00
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00
Resignations	2	15.38	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Other	1	7.69	0	.00
Chicago DSA				
	Per cent		Great Lakes NSD	
	Personnel	Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Career Employees	349	100.00	371	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	249	67.11
Other Placements	193	55.30	50	13.48
Separations	59	16.91	72	19.41
Retirements	23	6.59	18	4.85
Resignations	4	1.15	39	10.51
Declinations of job offers	32	9.17	0	.00
Other	0	.00	15	4.04

(continued)

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TABLE 1 (continued)

	Joliet Arsenal		Camp Atterbury	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	905	100.00	38	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	0	.00
Other Placements	766	84.64	29	76.32
Separations	139	15.36	9	23.68
Retirements	85	9.39	6	21.05
Resignations	8	.88	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	1	2.63
Other	46	5.08	0	.00
	Rockville AFS		Forbes AFB	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	12	100.00	20	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	0	.00
Other Placements	10	83.33	18	90.00
Separations	2	16.67	2	10.00
Retirements	0	.00	2	10.00
Resignations	1	8.33	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	1	8.33	0	.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 1 (continued)

	Schilling AFB		New Orleans AT	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Career Employees	333	100.00	812	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	250	30.79
Other Placements	240	72.07	266	32.76
Separations	93	27.93	296	36.45
Retirements	31	9.31	81	9.98
Resignations	34	10.21	175	21.55
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	30	4.19
Other	28	8.41	6	.73

	New Orleans DSA		Brunswick AFS	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Career Employees	43	100.00	5	100.00
Transferred with position	2	4.65	0	.00
Other Placements	30	69.77	4	80.00
Separations	11	25.58	1	20.00
Retirements	6	13.95	0	.00
Resignations	1	2.33	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	4	9.30	1	20.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 1 (continued)

	DOW AFB		Fort Custer	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	155	100.00	33	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	0	.00
Other Placements	85	54.84	20	60.61
Separations	70	45.16	13	39.39
Retirements	22	14.19	6	18.18
Resignations	40	25.81	6	18.18
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Other	8	5.16	1	3.03

	Custer AFS		Cut Bank AFS	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	2	100.00	9	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	0	.00
Other Placements	2	100.00	9	100.00
Separations	0	.00	0	.00
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00
Resignations	0	.00	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 1 (continued)

	<u>Glasgow AFB</u>		<u>Miles City AFS</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Career Employees	181	100.00	7	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	0	.00
Other Placements	111	61.33	7	100.00
Separations	70	38.67	0	.00
Retirements	4	2.21	0	.00
Resignations	64	35.36	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Other	2	1.10	0	.00

	<u>Hastings Naval Depot</u>		<u>Lincoln AFB</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Career Employees	252	100.00	359	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	0	.00
Other Placements	140	55.56	283	78.83
Separations	112	44.44	76	21.17
Retirements	29	11.51	26	7.24
Resignations	39	15.48	45	12.53
Declinations of job offers	30	11.90	0	.00
Other	4	1.59	5	1.39

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued)

	Reno ADS		Stead AFB	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Career Employees	16	100.00	491	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	28	5.70
Other Placements	14	87.50	324	65.99
Separations	2	12.50	139	28.31
Retirements	0	.00	33	6.72
Resignations	1	6.25	80	17.31
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	17	3.46
Other	1	6.25	4	.81
	Winnemucca AFS		Grenier Field	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Career Employees	0	.00	98	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	1	1.02
Other Placements	0	.00	60	61.22
Separations	0	.00	37	37.76
Retirements	0	.00	29	29.59
Resignations	0	.00	6	6.12
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	2	2.04

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued)

	Highlands AFB		Walker AFB	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	17	100.00	316	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	1	.32
Other Placements	13	76.47	223	70.57
Separations	4	23.53	92	29.11
Retirements	1	5.88	26	8.23
Resignations	3	17.65	36	11.39
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	27	8.54
Other	0	.00	3	.95

	Atlas F Squadron		Brooklyn Military	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	9	100.00	1,375	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	807	58.69
Other Placements	9	100.00	290	21.09
Separations	0	.00	278	20.22
Retirements	0	.00	218	15.85
Resignations	0	.00	42	3.05
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	4	.29
Other	0	.00	14	1.02

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued)

	Columbus DSA Supply Center	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel

97	100.00
15	15.46
73	75.26
9	9.28
8	8.25
0	.00
0	.00
1	1.03

	Dickinson AFS	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel

6	100.00
0	.00
6	100.00
0	.00
0	.00
0	.00
0	.00
0	.00

	Altus AFB	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel

2	100.00
0	.00
2	100.00
0	.00
0	.00
0	.00
0	.00
0	.00

	Davis Field	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel

182	100.00
0	.00
140	76.92
42	23.08
6	3.30
19	10.44
10	5.44
7	3.85

Career Employees
Transferred with position
Other Placements
Separations
Retirements
Resignations
Declinations of job offers
Other

Career Employees
Transferred with position
Other Placements
Separations
Retirements
Resignations
Declinations of job offers
Other

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued)

	Olmstead AFB		Ellsworth AFB	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	9,476	100.00	7	100.00
Transferred with position	1,676	17.69	0	.00
Other Placements	4,533	47.84	6	85.71
Separations	3,267	34.47	1	14.29
Retirements	1,420	14.99	0	.00
Resignations	362	3.82	1	14.29
Declinations of job offers	1,413	14.91	0	.00
Other	72	.76	0	.00

	Amarillo AFB		James Connally	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	893	100.00	651	100.00
Transferred with position	143	16.01	30	4.61
Other Placements	469	52.52	409	62.83
Separations	281	31.47	212	32.56
Retirements	92	10.30	95	14.59
Resignations	161	18.03	45	6.91
Declinations of job offers	16	1.79	68	10.45
Other	12	1.34	4	.61

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued)

	Dyess ABF		Fort Douglas	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	5	100.00	69	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	0	.00
Other Placements	5	100.00	41	59.42
Separations	0	.00	28	40.58
Retirements	0	.00	9	13.04
Resignations	0	.00	15	21.74
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	1	1.45
Other	0	.00	3	4.35

	Alexandria DSA Supply Center		Manassas AFS	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	139	100.00	10	100.00
Transferred with position	25	17.99	0	.00
Other Placements	105	75.54	4	40.00
Separations	9	6.47	6	60.00
Retirements	7	5.04	3	30.00
Resignations	2	1.44	1	10.00
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	2	20.00

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued)

	Hampton Roads Army Terminal		Fairchild AFB	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	285	100.00	15	100.00
Transferred with position	17	5.97	0	.00
Other Placements	233	81.75	13	86.67
Separations	35	12.28	2	13.33
Retirements	27	9.47	1	6.66
Resignations	5	1.75	1	6.67
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Other	3	1.05	0	.00

	Larson AFB		Naselle AFB	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	368	100.00	18	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	0	.00
Other Placements	244	66.30	9	50.00
Separations	124	33.70	9	50.00
Retirements	28	7.61	2	11.11
Resignations	57	15.49	4	22.22
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	3	15.66
Other	39	10.60	0	.00

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued)

	Guthrie AFS		Truax Field	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Career Employees	5	100.00	262	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00	11	4.20
Other Placements	5	100.00	163	62.21
Separations	0	.00	88	33.59
Retirements	0	.00	20	7.63
Resignations	0	.00	41	15.65
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	25	9.54
Other	0	.00	2	.76

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued)

	Francis E. Warren AFB	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Career Employees	13	100.00
Transferred with position	0	.00
Other Placements	12	92.31
Separations	1	7.69
Retirements	0	.00
Resignations	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	1	7.69
Other	0	.00

Source: Reports of Civilian Personnel, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense-
Manpower, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

TABLE 2

**SEPARATIONS FROM FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BY QUARTERS, 1962-1966**

<u>Year & Quarter</u>	<u>Federal ¹ Employment</u>	<u>Separations from Federal Employment</u>		<u>DOD Employment</u>
		<u>Total</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	
1962				
March....	2,444,411	108,020	4.42	1,060,900
June.....	2,499,168	131,465	5.26	1,069,543
Sept.....	2,487,990	168,338	6.77	1,067,435
Dec.....	2,477,605	120,317	4.86	1,066,824
1963				
March....	2,473,529	105,866	4.28	1,056,639
June.....	2,505,170	122,847	4.90	1,050,007
Sept.....	2,488,008	156,736	6.30	1,046,308
Dec.....	2,481,112	110,050	4.44	1,043,361
1964				
March....	2,474,783	101,530	4.10	1,039,270
June.....	2,483,968	126,955	5.11	1,029,756
Sept.....	2,460,029	148,503	6.04	1,026,266
Dec.....	2,463,659	104,741	4.25	1,019,382
1965				
March....	2,468,639	96,813	3.92	1,017,964
June.....	2,511,012	133,703	5.32	1,033,775
Sept.....	2,517,991	186,059	7.38	1,045,397
Dec.....	2,550,835	146,809	5.76	1,057,483
1966				
March....	2,609,685	146,446	5.61	1,088,208
June.....	2,736,341	159,937	5.84	1,138,126
Sept.....	2,770,697	246,264	8.89	1,184,448
Dec.....	2,838,417	166,051	5.85	1,229,779

(continued)

¹Excludes Congress, Architect of the Capitol, Judicial Branch and Maritime seamen in the Department of Commerce.

TABLE 2 (continued)

Separations from DOD Employment				
<u>Year & Quarter</u>	<u>Total Separations</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Resignations²</u>	
			<u>Total</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
1962				
March....	43,329	4.08	15,625	1.47
June.....	56,390	5.27	20,058	1.88
Sept.....	66,549	6.23	27,777	2.60
Dec.....	44,615	4.18	15,144	1.42
1963				
March....	41,669	3.94	14,809	1.40
June.....	51,632	4.92	18,425	1.75
Sept.....	56,734	5.42	23,768	2.27
Dec.....	38,714	3.71	13,280	1.27
1964				
March....	36,604	3.52	13,138	1.26
June.....	54,857	5.33	17,585	1.71
Sept.....	54,101	5.27	21,024	2.05
Dec.....	39,689	3.89	12,362	1.21
1965				
March....	35,818	3.52	13,067	1.28
June.....	53,458	5.17	17,702	1.71
Sept.....	68,193	6.52	23,458	2.24
Dec.....	61,707	5.84	21,227	2.01
1966				
March....	50,074	4.60	19,299	1.77
June.....	67,004	5.89	27,235	2.39
Sept.....	103,764	8.76	56,269	4.75
Dec.....	66,201	5.38	28,041	2.28

(continued)

²Resignations and separations or removals for abandonment of position.

TABLE 2 (continued)

<u>Year & Quarter</u>	<u>Separations from DOD Employment</u>			
	<u>Transfers³</u>		<u>Retirement, Disability and Death</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
1962				
March....	5,065	.48	6,229	.59
June.....	5,561	.52	7,099	.66
Sept.....	6,488	.61	6,557	.61
Dec.....	4,264	.40	5,809	.54
1963				
March....	4,370	.41	6,142	.58
June.....	4,196	.40	7,033	.67
Sept.....	4,429	.42	7,190	.69
Dec.....	3,548	.34	6,746	.65
1964				
March....	3,701	.36	5,696	.55
June.....	3,862	.38	6,832	.66
Sept.....	3,593	.35	7,662	.75
Dec.....	2,970	.29	6,705	.66
1965				
March....	3,735	.37	5,515	.54
June.....	5,143	.50	6,440	.62
Sept.....	13,775	1.32	10,434	1.00
Dec.....	12,465	1.17	9,441	.89
1966				
March....	12,643	1.16	2,319	.21
June.....	8,712	.77	4,670	.41
Sept.....	8,560	.72	10,565	.89
Dec.....	7,283	.59	7,693	.63

(continued)

³Separations to accept appointment in another Federal agency without a break in service of one work day.

TABLE 2 (continued)

<u>Year & Quarter</u>	<u>Separations from DOD Employment</u>			
	<u>Reduction in Force⁴</u>		<u>Other⁵</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
1962				
March....	1,052	.10	15,385	1.45
June.....	2,922	.27	20,750	1.94
Sept.....	1,784	.17	23,943	2.24
Dec.....	983	.09	18,415	1.72
1963				
March....	2,175	.21	14,173	1.34
June.....	2,734	.26	19,244	1.83
Sept.....	1,711	.16	19,636	1.87
Dec.....	1,330	.13	13,810	1.32
1964				
March....	2,497	.24	11,572	1.11
June.....	3,499	.34	23,079	2.24
Sept.....	3,056	.30	18,766	1.82
Dec.....	1,130	.11	16,522	1.62
1965				
March....	1,656	.16	11,845	1.16
June.....	1,689	.16	22,484	2.17
Sept.....	1,364	.13	19,162	1.83
Dec.....	1,234	.12	17,340	1.64
1966				
March....	1,916	.18	13,897	1.27
June.....	2,167	.19	24,220	2.12
Sept.....	1,112	.09	27,258	2.30
Dec.....	720	.06	22,464	1.82

Source: U.S. Civil Service Commission, Management Systems Division, Washington, D.C.

⁴Included are resignations in lieu of reduction in force as well as separations and furlough by reduction in force.

⁵Includes discharges, terminations of temporary employees, displacement of indefinite appointments and leave without pay and suspensions.

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TABLE 3

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE AND FEMALE PERSONNEL,
AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF SCHILLING AIR FORCE BASE, 1965

	Male		Female	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Personnel	222	100.00	111	100.00
Placements	165	74.32	80	72.07
DOD jobs	160	72.07	72	64.86
Other federal jobs	5	2.25	8	7.21
Separations	57	25.68	31	27.93
Resignations	26	11.71	28	25.23
Retirements	28	12.61	2	1.80
Other	3	1.35	1	.90

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air
Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

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TABLE 4

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE AND FEMALE PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF SCHILLING AIR FORCE BASE, 1965 BY GENERAL OCCUPATIONAL CLASS

	Graded				Per cent		Per cent		Per cent	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Personnel	77	111	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	188	100.00	100.00	100.00
Placements	66	80	85.71	72.07	77.66	72.34	146	77.66	72.34	72.34
DOD jobs	64	72	83.12	64.86	72.34	5.32	136	72.34	5.32	5.32
Other federal jobs	2	8	2.59	7.21			10			
Separations	11	31	14.29	27.93	22.34	18.09	42	22.34	18.09	18.09
Resignations	6	28	7.79	25.23	18.09	3.72	34	18.09	3.72	3.72
Retirements	5	2	6.50	1.80	3.72	.53	7	3.72	.53	.53
Other	0	1	.00	.90			1			

(continued)

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TABLE 4 (continued)

	<u>Wage-Board Personnel</u>	
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Per cent Male</u>
Personnel	145	100.00
Placements	99	68.28
DOD jobs	96	66.21
Other federal jobs	3	2.07
Separations	46	31.72
Resignations	20	13.79
Retirements	23	15.86
Other	3	2.07

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

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TABLE 5

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF SCHILLING AIR FORCE BASE, 1965 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Under 25</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 25-34</u>
Personnel	9	100.00	45	100.00
Placements	7	77.78	28	62.22
Separations	2	22.22	17	37.78
Resignations	2	22.22	16	35.56
Retirements	0	.00	1	2.22
Other	0	.00	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 5 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 35-64</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 65 over</u>
Personnel	258	100.00	21	100.00
Placements	205	79.46	5	23.81
Separations	53	20.54	16	76.19
Resignations	35	13.57	1	4.76
Retirements	14	5.43	15	71.43
Other	4	1.55	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

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TABLE 6

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE GRADED PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF SCHILLING AIR FORCE BASE, 1965 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	Personnel	Per cent Under 25	Personnel	Per cent 25-34
Personnel	3	100.00	12	100.00
Placements	3	100.00	11	91.67
Separations	0	.00	1	8.33
Resignations	0	.00	0	.00
Retirements	0	.00	1	8.33
Other	0	.00	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 6 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	Personnel	Per cent 35-64	Personnel	Per cent 65 over
Personnel	57	100.00	5	100.00
Placements	50	87.72	2	40.00
Separations	7	12.28	3	60.00
Resignations	5	8.77	1	20.00
Retirements	2	3.51	2	40.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

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TABLE 7

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE WAGE-BOARD PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF SCHILLING AIR FORCE BASE, 1965 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Under 25</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 25-34</u>
Personnel	0	-	9	100.00
Placements	0	-	4	44.44
Separations	0	-	5	55.56
Resignations	0	-	5	55.56
Retirements	0	-	0	.00
Other	0	-	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 7 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 35-64</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 65 over</u>
Personnel	123	100.00	13	100.00
Placements	94	76.42	1	7.69
Separations	29	23.58	12	92.31
Resignations	15	12.20	0	.00
Retirements	11	8.94	12	92.31
Other	3	2.44	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

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TABLE 8

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN FEMALE GRADED PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF SCHILLING AIR FORCE BASE, 1965 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	Personnel	Per cent Under 25	Personnel	Per cent 25-34
Personnel	6	100.00	24	100.00
Placements	4	66.67	13	54.17
Separations	2	33.33	11	45.83
Resignations	2	33.33	11	45.83
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 8 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	Personnel	Per cent 35-64	Personnel	Per cent 65 over
Personnel	78	100.00	3	100.00
Placements	61	78.21	2	66.67
Separations	17	21.79	1	33.33
Resignations	15	19.23	0	.00
Retirements	1	1.28	1	33.33
Other	1	1.28	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

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TABLE 9

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE
OF SCHILLING AIR FORCE BASE, 1965 BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	<u>Less than 5 years</u>		<u>5 to 10 years</u>		<u>Over 10 years</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>5 years</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>5 to 10</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>over 10</u>
Personnel	50	100.00	63	100.00	220	100.00
Placements	37	74.00	45	71.43	163	74.09
Separations	13	26.00	18	28.57	57	25.91
Resignations	13	26.00	16	25.40	25	11.36
Retirements	0	.00	2	3.17	28	12.74
Other	0	.00	0	.00	4	1.82

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

TABLE 10

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE GRADED
PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF SCHILLING AIR
FORCE BASE, 1965 BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	<u>Less than 5 years</u>		<u>5 to 10 years</u>		<u>Over 10 years</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>5 years</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>5 to 10</u>	<u>Personnel</u> <u>over 10</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>over 10</u>
Personnel	10	100.00	10	100.00	77	100.00
Placements	9	90.00	9	90.00	66	85.71
Separations	1	10.00	1	10.00	11	14.29
Resignations	1	10.00	0	.00	6	7.79
Retirements	0	.00	1	10.00	5	6.50
Other	0	.00	0	.00	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

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TABLE 11

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE WAGE-BOARD
PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF SCHILLING AIR FORCE
BASE, 1965 BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Less than 5 years		5 to 10 years		Over 10 years	
	Personnel	Per cent 5 years	Personnel	Per cent 5 to 10	Personnel	Per cent over 10
Personnel	14	100.00	17	100.00	114	100.00
Placements	12	85.71	12	70.59	75	65.79
Separations	2	14.29	5	29.41	39	34.21
Resignations	2	14.29	5	29.41	13	11.40
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00	23	20.18
Other	0	.00	0	.00	3	2.63

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

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TABLE 12

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN FEMALE
GRADED PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF SCHILLING
AIR FORCE BASE, 1965 BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Less than 5 years		5 to 10 years		Over 10 years	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Personnel	26	100.00	36	100.00	49	100.00
Placements	16	61.54	24	66.67	40	81.63
Separations	10	38.46	12	33.33	9	18.37
Resignations	10	38.46	11	30.56	7	14.29
Retirements	0	.00	1	2.77	1	2.04
Other	0	.00	0	.00	1	2.04

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Schilling Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Salina, Kansas.

ACDA/E-90

TABLE 13

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE AND FEMALE PERSONNEL
AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967

	Male		Female	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Personnel	124	100.00	76	100.00
Placements	89	71.77	32	42.11
DOD jobs	80	64.52	25	32.90
Other federal jobs	9	7.25	7	9.21
Separations	35	28.23	44	57.89
Resignations	12	9.68	38	50.00
Retirements	15	12.10	6	7.89
Other	8	6.45	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force
Base, Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

TABLE 14

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(continued)

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TABLE 14 (continued)

	<u>Wage-Board Personnel</u>	
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>Male</u>
Personnel	64	100.00
Placements	37	57.81
DOD jobs	33	51.56
Other federal jobs	4	6.25
Separations	27	42.19
Resignations	8	12.50
Retirements	15	23.44
Other	4	6.25

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

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TABLE 15

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY
THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Under 25</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 25-34</u>
Personnel	11	100.00	40	100.00
Placements	4	36.36	22	55.00
Separations	7	63.64	18	45.00
Resignations	7	63.64	18	45.00
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 15 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 35-64</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 65 over</u>
Personnel	138	100.00	11	100.00
Placements	95	68.84	0	.00
Separations	43	31.16	11	100.00
Resignations	25	18.12	0	.00
Retirements	12	8.70	9	81.82
Other	6	4.34	2	18.18

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

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TABLE 16

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE GRADED PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	Personnel	Per cent Under 25	Personnel	Per cent 25-34
Personnel	1	100.00	14	100.00
Placements	1	100.00	13	92.86
Separations	0	.00	1	7.14
Resignations	0	.00	1	7.14
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00
(continued)				

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TABLE 16 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 35-64</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 65 over</u>
Personnel	43	100.00	2	100.00
Placements	38	88.37	0	.00
Separations	5	11.63	2	100.00
Resignations	3	6.98	0	.00
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00
Other	2	3.33	2	100.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

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TABLE 17

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF CIVILIAN MALE WAGE-BOARD PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Under 25</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 25-34</u>
Personnel	0	-	8	100.00
Placements	0	-	5	62.50
Separations	0	-	3	37.50
Resignations	0	-	3	37.50
Retirements	0	-	0	.00
Other	0	-	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 17 (continued)

	Age 34 to 64		Age 65 over	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 35-64</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 65 over</u>
Personnel	51	100.00	5	100.00
Placements	32	62.75	0	.00
Separations	19	37.25	5	100.00
Resignations	5	9.80	0	.00
Retirements	10	11.61	5	100.00
Other	4	7.84	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

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TABLE 18

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN FEMALE GRADED PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	<u>Under Age 25</u>		<u>Age 25 to 34</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>Under 25</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>25-34</u>
Personnel	10	100.00	18	100.00
Placements	3	30.00	4	22.22
Separations	7	70.00	14	78.78
Resignations	7	70.00	14	78.78
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 18 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	Personnel	Per cent 35-64	Personnel	Per cent 65 over
Personnel	44	100.00	4	100.00
Placements	25	56.82	0	.00
Separations	19	43.18	4	100.00
Resignations	17	38.64	0	.00
Retirements	2	4.54	4	100.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

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TABLE 19

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR FORCE BASE,
DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Less than 5 years		5 to 10 years		Over 10 years	
	Personnel	Per cent 5 years	Personnel	Per cent 5-10	Personnel	Per cent over 10
Personnel	24	100.00	58	100.00	118	100.00
Placements	9	37.50	35	60.34	77	65.25
Separations	15	62.50	23	39.66	41	34.75
Resignations	15	62.50	22	37.93	13	11.02
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00	21	17.80
Other	0	.00	1	1.73	7	5.93

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force
Base, Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

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TABLE 20

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE GRADED
PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR FORCE BASE,
DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Less than 5 years		5 to 10 years		Over 10 years	
	Personnel	Per cent 5 years	Personnel	Per cent 5-10	Personnel over 10	Per cent over 10
Personnel	5	100.00	12	100.00	43	100.00
Placements	4	80.00	11	91.67	37	86.05
Separations	1	20.00	1	8.33	6	13.95
Resignations	1	20.00	1	8.33	2	4.65
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00	4	9.30

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force
Base, Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

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TABLE 21

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE WAGE-BOARD
PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR FORCE BASE
DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Less than 5 years		5 to 10 years		Over 10 years	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Personnel	1	100.00	17	100.00	46	100.00
Placements	0	.00	12	70.59	25	54.35
Separations	1	100.00	5	29.41	21	45.65
Resignations	1	100.00	4	23.53	3	6.52
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00	15	32.61
Other	0	.00	1	5.88	3	6.52

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

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TABLE 22

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN FEMALE GRADED
PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF DOW AIR FORCE BASE,
DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	<u>Less than 5 years</u>		<u>5 to 10 years</u>		<u>Over 10 years</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>5 years</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>5-10</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>over 10</u>
Personnel	18	100.00	29	100.00	29	100.00
Placements	5	27.78	12	41.38	15	51.72
Separations	13	72.22	17	58.62	14	48.28
Resignations	13	72.22	17	58.62	8	27.59
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00	6	20.69
Other	0	.00	0	.00	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Dow Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Bangor, Maine.

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TABLE 23

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE AND FEMALE PERSONNEL
AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967

	Male		Female	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Personnel	8,629	100.00	1,695	100.00
Placements	5,305	61.48	1,131	66.73
DOD jobs	5,129	59.44	1,131	66.73
Other federal jobs	176	2.04	0	.00
Separations	3,324	38.52	564	33.27
Resignations	1,379	15.98	317	18.70
Retirements	1,875	21.73	212	12.51
Other	70	.81	35	2.06

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Olmstead Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

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TABLE 24

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE AND FEMALE PERSONNEL
AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967
BY GENERAL OCCUPATIONAL CLASS

	Graded Personnel				
	Per cent		Per cent		Per cent Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Personnel	3,222	1,555	100.00	100.00	100.00
Placements	2,546	1,131	76.64	72.73	75.39
DOD jobs	2,405	1,131	72.40	72.73	72.50
Other federal jobs	141	0	4.24	.00	2.89
Separations	776	424	23.36	27.27	24.61
Resignations	211	247	6.35	15.89	9.39
Retirements	495	142	14.90	9.13	13.07
Other	70	35	2.11	2.25	2.15

(continued)

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TABLE 24 (continued)

	Wage-Board Personnel				
	Per cent		Per cent		Per cent
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Personnel	5,307	140	100.00	100.00	100.00
Placements	2,759	0	51.99	.00	50.65
DOD jobs	2,724	0	51.33	.00	50.00
Other federal jobs	35	0	.66	.00	.65
Separations	2,548	140	48.01	100.00	49.35
Resignations	1,168	70	22.01	50.00	22.73
Retirements	1,380	70	26.00	50.00	26.62
Other	0	0	.00	.00	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Olmstead Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

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TABLE 25

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE
CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	Personnel	Per cent Under 25	Personnel	Per cent 25-34
Personnel	177	100.00	2,227	100.00
Placements	177	100.00	1,519	68.21
Separations	0	.00	708	31.79
Resignations	0	.00	708	31.79
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 25 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	Personnel	Per cent 35-64	Personnel	Per cent 65 over
Personnel	7,780	100.00	140	100.00
Placements	4,740	60.93	0	.00
Separations	3,040	39.07	140	100.00
Resignations	988	12.70	0	.00
Retirements	1,947	25.02	140	100.00
Other	105	1.35	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Olmstead Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

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TABLE 26

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE GRADED PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE
CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	<u>Under Age 25</u>		<u>Age 25 to 34</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Under 25</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 25-34</u>
Personnel	0	-	777	100.00
Placements	0	-	636	81.85
Separations	0	-	141	18.15
Resignations	0	-	141	18.15
Retirements	0	-	0	.00
Other	0	-	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 26 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	Personnel	Per cent 35-64	Personnel	Per cent 65 over
Personnel	2,475	100.00	70	100.00
Placements	1,910	77.17	0	.00
Separations	565	22.83	70	100.00
Resignations	70	2.83	0	.00
Retirements	425	17.17	70	100.00
Other	70	2.83	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Olmstead Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

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TABLE 27

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF CIVILIAN MALE WAGE-BOARD PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE
CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	Personnel	Per cent Under 25	Personnel	Per cent 25-34
Personnel	0	-	1,168	100.00
Placements	0	-	743	63.61
Separations	0	-	425	36.39
Resignations	0	-	425	36.39
Retirements	0	-	0	.00
Other	0	-	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 27 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 35-64</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 65 over</u>
Personnel	4,069	100.00	70	100.00
Placements	2,016	49.55	0	.00
Separations	2,053	50.45	70	100.00
Resignations	743	18.26	0	.00
Retirements	1,310	32.19	70	100.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Olmstead Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

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TABLE 28

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF CIVILIAN FEMALE GRADED PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE
CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	Personnel	Per cent Under 25	Personnel	Per cent 25-34
Personnel	177	100.00	282	100.00
Placements	177	100.00	140	49.65
Separations	0	.00	142	50.35
Resignations	0	.00	142	50.35
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 28 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 35-64</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 65 over</u>
Personnel	1,096	100.00	0	-
Placements	814	74.27	0	-
Separations	282	25.73	0	-
Resignations	105	9.58	0	-
Retirements	142	12.96	0	-
Other	35	3.19	0	-

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Olmstead Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

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TABLE 29

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967
BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Less than 5 years		5 to 10 years		Over 10 years	
	Personnel	Per cent 5 years	Personnel	Per cent 5-10	Personnel	Per cent over 10
Personnel	387	100.00	1,414	100.00	8,523	100.00
Placements	317	81.91	1,026	72.56	5,093	59.76
Separations	70	18.09	388	27.44	3,430	40.24
Resignations	70	18.09	388	27.44	1,238	14.52
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00	2,087	24.49
Other	0	.00	0	.00	105	1.23

Source : Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Olmstead Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

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TABLE 30

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE GRADED PERSONNEL
AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967
BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Less than 5 years		5 to 10 years		Over 10 years	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Personnel	140	100.00	424	100.00	2,758	100.00
Placements	105	75.00	354	83.49	2,087	75.67
Separations	35	25.00	70	17.51	671	24.33
Resignations	35	25.00	70	17.51	106	3.84
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00	495	17.95
Other	0	.00	0	.00	70	2.54

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Olmstead Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

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TABLE 31

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE WAGE-BOARD PERSONNEL AFFECTED
BY THE CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967
BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Less than 5 years		5 to 10 years		Over 10 years	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Personnel	0	-	778	100.00	4,529	100.00
Placements	0	-	495	63.62	2,264	49.99
Separations	0	-	283	36.38	2,265	50.01
Resignations	0	-	283	36.38	885	19.54
Retirements	0	-	0	.00	1,380	30.47
Other	0	-	0	.00	0	.00

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Olmstead Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

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TABLE 32

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN FEMALE GRADED PERSONNEL
AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF OLMSTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967
BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Less than 5 years		5 to 10 years		Over 10 years	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Personnel	247	100.00	212	100.00	1,096	100.00
Placements	212	85.83	177	83.49	742	67.70
Separations	35	14.17	35	16.51	354	32.30
Resignations	35	14.17	35	16.51	177	16.15
Retirements	0	.00	0	.00	142	12.96
Other	0	.00	0	.00	35	3.19

Source: Service Record Cards, Standard Form 7, Personnel Office, Olmstead Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Middletown, Pennsylvania.

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TABLE 33

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE AND FEMALE PERSONNEL
AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF AMARILLO AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967

	Male		Female	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Personnel	833	100.00	416	100.00
Placements	632	75.87	224	53.85
DOD jobs	605	72.63	192	46.16
Other federal jobs	27	3.24	32	7.69
Separations	201	24.13	192	46.15

Source: Personnel Service Records, Form 50, Personnel Office, Amarillo Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Amarillo, Texas.

TABLE 34

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE AND FEMALE PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF AMARILLO AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967 BY GENERAL OCCUPATIONAL CLASS

	Graded					
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Per cent Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Per cent Female</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Per cent Total</u>
Personnel	494	100.00	389	100.00	883	100.00
Placements	398	80.57	207	53.21	605	68.52
DOD jobs	380	76.93	177	45.50	557	63.08
Other federal jobs	18	3.64	30	7.71	48	5.44
Separations	96	19.43	182	46.79	278	31.48

(continued)

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TABLE 34 (continued)

	Wage-Board Personnel				
	Per cent		Per cent		Per cent Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Personnel	339	27	100.00	100.00	100.00
Placements	234	17	69.03	62.96	68.58
DOD jobs	225	15	66.38	55.55	65.57
Other federal jobs	9	2	2.65	7.41	3.01
Separations	105	10	30.97	37.04	31.42

Source: Personnel Service Records, Form 50, Personnel Office, Amarillo Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Amarillo, Texas.

TABLE 35

Placements	Graded	Male			
		Per cent Graded	Wage- Board	Per cent Wage-Board	Per cent Total
	398	100.00	234	100.00	100.00
Under Age 25	3	.75	0	.00	3
Age 25 to 34	41	10.30	31	13.25	72
Age 35 to 64	351	38.20	203	86.75	554
Age 65 over	3	.75	0	.00	3
					87.66
					11.40
					.47

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TABLE 35 (continued)

Placements	Female			
	<u>Graded</u>	<u>Per cent Graded</u>	<u>Wage- Board</u>	<u>Per cent Wage-Board</u>
			<u>Total</u>	<u>Per cent Total</u>
	207	100.00	17	100.00
Under Age 25	26	12.56	0	.00
Age 25 to 34	46	22.22	0	.00
Age 35 to 64	135	65.22	17	100.00
Age 65 over	0	.00	0	.00
			224	100.00
			26	11.60
			46	20.54
			152	67.86
			0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 35 (continued)

Placements	<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
	856	100.00
Under Age 25	29	3.39
Age 25 to 34	118	13.78
Age 35 to 54	706	82.48
Age 65 over	3	.35

Source: Personnel Service Records, Form 50, Personnel Office, Amarillo Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Amarillo, Texas.

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TABLE 36

PLACEMENTS OF DOD CIVILIAN MALE AND FEMALE PERSONNEL
AFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF AMARILLO AIR FORCE BASE, DECEMBER 31, 1967
BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASS AND BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Male					
	<u>Graded</u>	<u>Per cent Graded</u>	<u>Wage- Board</u>	<u>Per cent Wage-Board</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Per cent Total</u>
Placements	398	100.00	234	100.00	632	100.00
Less than 5 years	5	1.26	7	2.99	12	1.90
5 to 10 years	69	17.33	27	11.54	96	15.19
Over 10 years	324	81.41	200	85.47	524	82.91

(continued)

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TABLE 36 (continued)

	Female			
	<u>Graded</u>	<u>Per cent Graded</u>	<u>Wage-Board</u>	<u>Per cent Wage-Board</u>
				<u>Total</u>
Placements	207	100.00	17	100.00
Less than 5 years	54	26.09	0	0.00
5 to 10 years	63	30.43	7	41.18
Over 10 years	90	43.48	10	58.82
				224
				100.00
				24.11
				31.25
				44.64

(continued)

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TABLE 36 (continued)

	<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Personnel</u>
Placements	856	100.00
Less than 5 years	66	7.71
5 to 10 years	166	19.39
Over 10 years	624	72.90

Source: Personnel Service Records, Form 50, Personnel Office, Amarillo Air Force Base, Department of the Air Force, Amarillo, Texas.

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TABLE 37

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF MALE AND FEMALE REGISTRANTS OF THE
DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967

	Male		Female	
	Personnel	Per cent Personnel	Personnel	Per cent Personnel
Registrants	16,664	100.00	3,512	100.00
Placements				
By CRS	9,984	59.91	2,236	63.67
DOD	4,298	25.79	1,129	32.15
Other federal	4,710	28.26	821	23.38
Reinstated at releasing installation	502	3.01	194	5.52
Private industry	294	1.76	46	1.31
	180	1.08	46	1.31
Separations				
Resignations	6,680	40.09	1,276	36.33
Declinations of job offers	807	4.84	118	3.36
Retirements	4,110	24.66	982	27.96
Other	1,680	10.08	151	4.30
	83	.50	25	.71

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics
Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 38

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF MALE AND FEMALE REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED
REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967, BY GENERAL OCCUPATIONAL CLASS

	Graded Personnel				
	Per cent		Per cent		Per cent Total
	Male	Male	Female	Female	
Registrants	4,176	100.00	3,213	100.00	7,389 100.00
Placements	2,959	70.85	2,026	63.64	4,985 67.47
By CRS	1,301	31.15	997	31.03	2,298 31.10
DOD	1,380	32.04	791	24.62	2,171 29.38
Other federal	156	3.74	183	5.70	339 4.59
Reinstated at releasing	76	1.82	44	1.37	120 1.62
installation	46	1.10	11	.34	57 .77
Private industry					
Separations	1,217	29.14	1,187	36.94	2,404 32.53
Resignations	137	3.28	110	3.42	247 3.34
Declinations of job offers	836	20.02	926	28.82	1,762 23.85
Retirements	219	5.24	129	4.01	348 4.71
Other	25	.60	22	.68	47 .63

(continued)

TABLE 38 (continued)

	Wage-Board Personnel					
	Male	Per cent		Female	Per cent	
		Male	Female		Female	Total
Registrants	12,488	100.00	299	100.00	12,787	100.00
Placements	7,025	56.25	210	70.23	7,235	56.58
By CRS	2,997	24.00	132	44.15	3,129	24.47
DOD	3,330	26.67	30	10.03	3,360	26.28
Other federal	346	2.77	11	3.68	357	2.79
Reinstated at releasing						
installation	218	1.75	2	.67	220	1.72
Private industry	134	1.07	35	11.71	169	1.32
Separations	5,463	43.75	89	29.76	5,552	43.42
Resignations	670	5.37	8	2.68	678	5.30
Declinations of job						
offers	3,274	26.22	56	18.73	3,330	26.04
Retirements	1,461	11.70	22	7.36	1,483	11.60
Other	58	.46	3	1.00	61	.48

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 39

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED
REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967, BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	<u>Under Age 25</u>		<u>Age 25 to 34</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Under 25</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 25-34</u>
Registrants	632	100.00	1,831	100.00
Placements	261	41.30	1,147	62.64
By CRS	95	15.03	590	32.22
Other	166	26.27	557	30.42
Separations	371	58.70	684	37.36
Resignations	64	10.13	165	9.01
Declinations of job offers	152	24.05	308	27.74
Retirements	152	24.05	4	.22
Other	3	.47	7	.38

(continued)

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TABLE 39 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	Personnel	Per cent 35-64	Personnel	Per cent 65 over
Registrants	17,525	100.00	188	100.00
Placements	10,754	61.36	58	30.85
By CRS	4,723	26.95	19	10.11
Other	6,031	34.41	39	20.74
Separations	6,771	38.64	130	69.15
Resignations	694	3.96	2	1.06
Declinations of job offers	4,390	25.05	42	22.34
Retirements	1,591	9.08	84	44.68
Other	96	.55	2	1.06

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics
Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 40

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF GRADED MALE REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD
CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967, BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Under 25</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 25-34</u>
Registrants	95	100.00	410	100.00
Placements	39	41.05	305	74.39
By CRS	18	18.95	146	35.61
Other	21	22.11	159	38.78
Separations	56	58.95	105	25.61
Resignations	13	13.68	33	8.05
Declinations of job offers	20	21.05	70	17.07
Retirements	23	24.21	0	.00
Other	0	.00	2	.49

(continued)

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TABLE 40 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	Personnel	Per cent 35-64	Personnel	Per cent 65 over
Registrants	3,633	100.00	38	100.00
Placements	2,600	71.57	15	39.47
By CRS	1,133	31.19	4	10.53
Other	1,467	40.38	11	28.95
Separations	1,033	28.43	23	60.53
Resignations	91	2.50	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	735	20.23	11	28.95
Retirements	186	5.12	10	26.32
Other	21	.58	2	5.26

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 41

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF WAGE-BOARD MALE REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD
CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967, BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	<u>Under Age 25</u>		<u>Age 25 to 34</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Under 25</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 25-34</u>
Registrants	308	100.00	968	100.00
Placements	79	25.65	559	57.75
By CRS	13	4.22	271	28.00
Other	66	21.43	288	29.75
Separations	229	74.35	409	42.25
Resignations	35	11.36	108	11.16
Declinations of job offers	77	25.00	294	30.37
Retirements	117	37.99	4	.41
Other	0	.00	3	.31

(continued)

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TABLE 41 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	Personnel	Per cent 35-64	Personnel	Per cent 65 over
Registrants	11,095	100.00	117	100.00
Placements	6,358	57.31	29	24.79
By CRS	2,702	24.35	11	9.40
Other	3,656	32.95	18	15.38
Separations	4,737	42.69	88	75.21
Resignations	525	4.73	2	1.71
Declinations of job offers	2,883	25.98	20	17.09
Retirements	1,274	11.48	66	56.41
Other	55	.50	0	.00

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics
Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 42

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF GRADED FEMALE REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD
CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967, BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent Under 25</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent 25-34</u>
Registrants	220	100.00	431	100.00
Placements	135	61.36	263	61.02
By CRS	59	26.81	159	36.89
Other	76	34.55	104	24.13
Separations	85	38.64	168	38.98
Resignations	16	7.27	22	5.10
Declinations of job offers	55	25.00	144	33.41
Retirements	11	5.00	0	.00
Other	3	1.36	2	.46

(continued)

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TABLE 42 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	Personnel	Per cent 35-64	Personnel	Per cent 65 over
Registrants	2,531	100.00	31	100.00
Placements	1,614	63.77	14	45.16
By CRS	775	30.62	4	12.90
Other	839	33.15	10	32.26
Separations	917	36.26	17	54.84
Resignations	72	2.84	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	716	28.29	11	35.48
Retirements	112	4.43	6	19.35
Other	17	.67	0	.00

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 43

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF WAGE-BOARD FEMALE REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD
CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967, BY AGE CLASSIFICATIONS

	Under Age 25		Age 25 to 34	
	Personnel	Per cent Under 25	Personnel	Per cent 25-34
Registrants	9	100.00	22	100.00
Placements	8	89.99	20	90.91
By CRS	5	55.56	14	63.64
Other	3	33.33	6	27.27
Separations	1	11.11	2	9.09
Resignations	0	.00	2	9.09
Declinations of job offers	0	.00	0	.00
Retirements	1	11.11	0	.00
Other	0	.00	0	.00

(continued)

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TABLE 43 (continued)

	Age 35 to 64		Age 65 over	
	Personnel	Per cent 35-64	Personnel	Per cent 65 over
Registrants	266	100.00	2	100.00
Placements	182	68.42	0	.00
By CRS	113	42.48	0	.00
Other	69	25.93	0	.00
Separations	84	31.58	2	100.00
Resignations	6	2.26	0	.00
Declinations of job offers	56	21.05	0	.00
Retirements	19	7.14	2	100.00
Other	3	1.13	0	.00

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics
Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 44

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967 BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	<u>Less than 5 years</u>		<u>5 to 10 years</u>		<u>Over 10 years</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Registrants	875	100.00	2,702	100.00	16,599	100.00
Placements	525	60.00	1,668	61.73	10,027	60.41
By CRS	263	30.06	772	28.61	4,391	26.45
Other	262	29.94	895	33.12	5,636	33.95
Separations	350	40.00	1,034	38.27	6,572	39.59
Resignations	84	9.60	183	6.77	658	3.96
Declinations of						
job offers	258	29.48	802	26.69	4,032	24.29
Retirements	3	.34	37	1.37	1,791	10.79
Other	5	.57	12	.44	91	.55

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 45

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF GRADED MALE REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967 BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	<u>Less than 5 years</u>		<u>5 to 10 years</u>		<u>Over 10 years</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>5 years</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>5-10</u>	<u>Personnel</u> <u>over 10</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>over 10</u>
Registrants	120	100.00	426	100.00	3,630	100.00
Placements	78	65.00	322	75.59	2,559	70.50
By CRS	46	38.33	160	37.56	1,059	30.17
Other	32	26.67	162	38.03	1,464	40.33
Separations	42	35.00	104	24.41	1,071	29.50
Resignations	16	13.33	32	7.51	89	2.45
Declinations of job offers	26	21.67	69	16.20	741	20.41
Retirements	0	.00	2	.47	217	5.98
Other	0	.00	1	.23	24	.67

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 46

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF WAGE-BOARD MALE REGISTRANTS OF DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967 BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	<u>Less than 5 years</u>		<u>5 to 10 years</u>		<u>Over 10 years</u>	
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>5 years</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>5-10</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Per cent</u> <u>over 10</u>
Registrants	280	100.00	1,354	100.00	10,854	100.00
Placements	144	51.43	728	53.77	6,153	56.69
By CRS	47	16.79	265	19.57	2,685	24.74
Other	97	34.64	463	34.19	3,468	31.95
Separations	136	48.57	626	46.23	4,701	43.31
Resignations	42	15.00	115	8.49	513	4.72
Declinations of job offers	91	32.50	479	35.38	2,704	24.91
Retirements	3	1.07	25	1.85	1,433	13.20
Other	0	.00	7	.52	51	.47

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Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 47

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF GRADED FEMALE REGISTRANTS OF THE DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967, BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Less than 5 years		5 to 10 years		Over 10 years	
	Personnel	Per cent 5 years	Personnel	Per cent 5-10	Personnel	Per cent over 10
Registrants	421	100.00	863	100.00	1,929	100.00
Placements	256	60.81	568	65.82	1,202	62.31
By CRS	139	33.02	326	37.78	532	27.58
Other	117	27.79	242	28.04	570	34.73
Separations	165	39.19	295	34.18	727	37.69
Resignations	22	5.23	36	4.17	52	2.70
Declinations of						
job offers	138	32.78	248	28.74	540	27.99
Retirements	0	.00	7	.81	122	6.32
Other	5	1.19	4	.46	13	.67

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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TABLE 48

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF WAGE-BOARD FEMALE REGISTRANTS OF DOD CENTRALIZED REFERRAL SYSTEM, JANUARY 1965 TO MAY 1967, BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

	Less than 5 years		5 to 10 years		Over 10 years	
	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent	Personnel	Per cent
Registrants	54	100.00	59	100.00	186	100.00
Placements	47	87.04	50	84.75	113	60.75
By CRS	31	57.41	22	37.29	79	42.47
Other	16	29.63	28	47.46	34	18.28
Separations	7	12.96	9	15.25	73	39.25
Resignations	4	7.40	0	.00	4	2.15
Declinations of job offers	3	5.56	6	10.17	47	25.27
Retirements	0	.00	3	5.08	19	10.22
Other	0	.00	0	.00	3	1.61

Source: Centralized Referral System, Office of Data Systems, Defense Electronics Supply Center, U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton, Ohio.

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